Stewardship of Creation: Some Implications for Economic Theory and Policy. by Mcdonald, John Harlan
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1984
Stewardship of Creation: Some Implications for
Economic Theory and Policy.
John Harlan Mcdonald
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mcdonald, John Harlan, "Stewardship of Creation: Some Implications for Economic Theory and Policy." (1984). LSU Historical
Dissertations and Theses. 3965.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/3965
INFORMATION TO USERS
This reproduction was made from a copy o f a docum ent sent to  us for microfilming. 
While the most advanced technology has been used to  photograph and reproduce 
this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the 
quality o f the material submitted.
The following explanation o f techniques is provided to help clarify markings or 
notations which may appear on this reproduction.
1.The sign or “ target” for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is “ Missing Page(s)” . If it was possible to  obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This 
may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages 
to assure complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an 
indication o f either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, 
duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials tha t should not have been filmed. For 
blurred pages, a good image o f the page can be found in the adjacent frame. If 
copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pages in 
the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part o f the material being photographed, 
a definite method o f “sectioning” the material has been followed. It is 
customary to  begin filming at the upper left hand comer o f a large sheet and to 
continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, 
sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on 
until complete.
4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced by xerographic 
means, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and inserted 
into your xerographic copy. These prints are available upon request from the 
Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any docum ent may have indistinct print. In all cases the best 
available copy has been filmed.
University
Microfilms
International
300 N. Zeeb Road 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106
f
8425880
McDonald, John Harlan
STEWARDSHIP OF CREATION: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC 
THEORY AND POLICY
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col. Ph.D.
University 
Microfilms
International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106
Copyright 1984 
by 
McDonald, John Harlan 
All Rights Reserved

STEWARDSHIP OF CREATION: 
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR 
ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Economics
by
John H. McDonald 
B.S., University of Michigan, 1968 
M.S. University of Arizona, 1972 
Diploma, Regent College, 1977 
May 1984
© 1984
JOHN HARLAN MCDONALD 
All Rights Reserved
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
To acknowledge my Indebtedness to all who have helped me achieve 
this goal would be very difficult. Yet some deserve special expres­
sions of gratitude: to Dr. James M. Houston, who taught me the impor­
tance of integrating faith and life; to Dr. William F. Campbell, who 
helped me to examine the moral foundations of economics; to Dr. Herman 
E. Daly who helped me to understand the relationship between the 
physical laws of nature and economics.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................. ii
ABSTRACT ........................................................  v
CHAPTER
I . INTRODUCTION .........................................  1
II. THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES......... 11
Modern Welfare Economics ............................  14
Economic Efficiency and Positive Welfare
E c o n o m i c s .........................................  18
The Ethical Premises of Welfare Economics ........... 28
Moral or Ethical Relativism..........................  31
C o n c l u s i o n ...........................................  36
III. A BIBLICAL CONCEPT OF HUMANS AS STEWARDS OF
GOD’S CREATION.....................................  38
A Biblical View of Creation..........................  39
Models of God and Creation........................  39
Creation as O r d e r ............................   43
Creation as H i s t o r y ..............................  46
Creation and Covenant ............................  50
Creation and Purpose..............................  56
Conclusion.........................................  64
The Biblical View of Ste w a r d s h i p .................... 67
Stewardship as Responsible Dominion Over
C r e a t i o n .......................................  70
A Moral Relationship Between Man and
C r e a t i o n .......................................  72
God's Sovereignty and O w n e r s h i p .................  75
Conclusion.........................................  77
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF STEWARDSHIP FOR ECONOMIC
THEORY AND P O L I C Y ................................. 80
Objective and Subjective Value ...................... 81
Subjective Value and Neoclassical Economics ......... 86
Stewardship Versus Pareto Optimality ...............  102
Property Rights .......................................  117
C o n c l u s i o n .............................................. 128
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
CHAPTER Page
V. A COMPARISON OF NEOCLASSICAL AND STEWARDSHIP 
THEORIES ON THE QUESTION OF ENDANGERED 
SPECIES AND EXTINCTION ............................  131
Neoclassical Theory ................................... 131
Stewardship Theory ................................... 140
The Federal Endangered Species Act ..................  147
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................... 156
V I T A ............................................................... 172
iv
ABSTRACT
Neoclassical economic theory defines an optimal or efficient 
allocation of natural resources as one which secures the maximum out­
put of preferred goods and services, or as an allocation in which the 
resources are used in their highest valued uses. The theory is based 
on two important normative assumptions: the welfare of the community
is an increasing function of the individual's welfare, and an indivi­
dual is better off in a freely chosen position. These assumptions 
form a subjective theory of value which locates the source of intrin­
sic value in the individual's tastes and preferences; value or wealth 
is whatever satisfies the individual's desires. An alternative objec­
tive theory of value is a biblically based theory which locates the 
source of value in an objectively good creation as created and sus­
tained by God. In this biblical and historical Hebrew-Christian 
position, human beings are stewards (not owners) responsible for 
proper care (welfare) of all of God's creation.
A biblically based theory of stewardship of creation does not 
agree that all values are reducible to personal preferences. Conse­
quently, it rejects Pareto optimality as either a necessary or suf­
ficient criterion for the optimal allocation of resources. Nor does 
it accept the related conclusion that resources will be optimally 
allocated when property rights are well defined and exchangeable. 
Stewardship theory thus rejects the fundamental normative conclusions 
of neoclassical economic theory about efficiency.
v
Neoclassical economic theory seems to be persuasive for those 
who only recognize the need to resolve conflicts in individual sub­
jective valuations. Thus, for conflicts over truly innocuous tastes 
and preferences competitive markets function well (with a few well 
recognized exceptions). But for the conflicts between individuals 
over objective valuations, competitive markets and neoclassical 
theory are inadequate and misleading. To resolve these conflicts, 
stewardship theory points to a double criterion of proper ends and 
economically efficient means. The criterion of proper ends will 
mean limits, duties and obligations, besides rights, on the part of 
human beings as stewards of a valuable and purposive creation.
vi
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
What is the "optimal" allocation of our natural resources?'*'
This single question probably best captures the central problem for
natural resources economists. Natural resources economists are not
alone in their concern for the "optimal" use of natural resources.
Moral and ethical philosophers have begun to study the question as
witnessed to by the publication of numerous articles, books, and even
the recent appearance of a journal, Environmental Ethics; all devoted
to a basic question: what is the proper relationship between mankind
and the rest of nature? Religious scholars also have begun to
address the question of stewardship of nature in light of ethical
2
and biblical principles. And, of course, the so-called environ­
mentalists and conservationists have long been involved with the 
question of "optimal" use of natural resources. Perhaps most eco­
nomists will not be surprised at this broad range of interest.
Perhaps some are actually familiar with the ethical and theological 
literature on natural i ’.sources, environments and nature. But
"*As we will discovei, "optimal" is a loaded word, how one loads 
it seems to depend on one's professional area of expertise, but more 
importantly on one's theory of value.
2
See, for example, Mary Evelyn Jegen and Bruno V. Manno, eds., 
The Earth is the Lord's (New York: Paulist Press, 1978); and Loren
Wilkinson, ed., Earthkeeping: Christian Stewardship of Natural
Resources (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1980).
1
2relatively few have begun to integrate knowledge from these other 
disciplines relevant to the economic analysis of natural resources.
The knowledge generated by these other disciplines is, of course, 
normative. It concerns the possible meanings of "optimal" in terms 
of norms, goals, means and ends, and values. Consequently, it helps 
to explain the normative roots of "optimal" as used in neoclassical 
economics.
The scientific question, "How are natural resources allocated?" 
becomes both positive and normative when we ask how they are allo­
cated "optimally." To determine an "optimal" allocation the econo­
mist must first answer the normative question, "What is optimal?"
Or, in the language of ethics, what is the good, worthwhile, desirable 
allocation of natural resources? What are the normative goals or ends 
in pursuit of which we shall use natural resources? What is the value 
of natural resources, of nature, of creation?
The normative end, widely accepted by economists is referred to
as Pareto optimality or economic efficiency. Although widely accepted
by economists, Pareto optimality has seldom been defended, or for that
matter criticized (until recently) on its own normative, ethical
grounds. Pareto optimality is now being questioned, for example,
as to its implicit ethical assumptions regarding present and future 
3
generations. It is argued that Pareto optimality, as it is usually
3
See, for example, E. J. Mishan, Introduction to Normative 
Economics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 501-5 and
John V. Krutilla, and Anthony C. Fisher, The Economics of Natural 
Environments (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975),
pp. 65-69.
3defined and applied, does not (but should) include the welfare of 
future generations as perceived by future generations. The welfare 
of future generations might be thought of as the ultimate opportun­
ity cost of using a natural resource. The opportunity cost of using 
a natural resource in the present is that someone in the future can­
not use it. If natural resources are scarce and their use necessarily 
entails irreversible entropic degradation and if our time frame is 
across generations then it appears in principle impossible to allo­
cate resources such that no individual is made worse off.^ In the 
words of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen:
Economists are fond of saying that we cannot get some­
thing for nothing. The Entropy Law teaches us that 
the rule of biological life and, in man’s case, of its 
economic continuation is far harsher. In entropy terms, 
the cost of any biological or economic enterprise is 
always greater than the product. In entropy terms,,, 
any such activity necessarily results in a deficit.
Yet another fundamental criticism of the normative premises of 
Pareto optimality, developed in Chapter 2, that has received very 
little exposure in the economic literature is their moral subjec­
tivity. I. M. D. Little is one of the first to clearly state the 
subjective moral premises of Pareto optimality and modern welfare 
economics:
Pareto optimal move is one where at least one individual is 
made better off and no one else is made worse off.
’’Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Energy and Economic Myths (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1976), p. 55.
A. . . value premises are essential to welfare economics 
because welfare conclusions are value judgements . . . .
[Our] analysis presupposes only two value judgements, 
both of which we believe to be widely acceptable. The 
first is that the welfare of the community is an increa­
sing function of the welfare of individuals. The second
is that an individual is better off if he is in a chosen 
position.^
These premises define an individualistic philosophy of mankind, com­
munity and morality, known in moral philosophy as subjective moral 
relativism. Social welfare is simply a name for the sum of indivi­
dual welfares; individual welfare has no definition other than what 
individuals choose on the basis of their subjective preferences. 
Subjective preferences are sovereign and cannot be judged or even 
compared in objective terms. There are no objective moral principles 
or values which can be rationally discussed as regards their truth
content. In other words, a moral judgment is nothing more than a
description of an attitude or preference of the individual making 
it. Objective moral philosophy is impossible. In contradistinction 
to "optimal" resource allocation based upon the theory of subjective 
moral relativism is the Hebrew-Christian view of mankind as stewards
I. M. D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics, 2nd ed. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 12A. Contrast the
second premise with the following passage from Richard B. Brandt, 
Value and Obligation (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961),
p. 15: "It is a matter of universal agreement that there is some­
times a discrepancy between what people want and what is good for 
them to have or do. Every language, anthropologists tell us, con­
tains words used to mark off what is considered really good or worth­
while from what people may like or want. Moreover, it is generally 
supposed that it is relatively easy for a person to know what he 
wants or would like to have but a much more difficult matter to 
learn what is worthwhile or what would be the objects of a reasonable 
desire."
5of God's creation called to a discerning stewardship of all of cre­
ation for the Creator's good purposes.
The Hebrew-Christian view of stewardship, developed in Chapter 3, 
sees humans (individually and corporately) as responsible for the care 
and welfare of all creation. Simply put, the function and purpose of 
our stewardly dominion is to "cultivate and keep" the Creator's good 
purposes in creation-history. This theory of stewardship stands in 
stark contrast to Lynn White's now rather famous conclusion that the 
roots of our ecological crisis lie in the Old Testament view of man 
and nature where,
God planned all of this [creation] explicitly for man's 
benefit and rule: no item in the physical creation had
any purpose save to serve man's purposes.^
White's view may, indeed, represent the predominant moral subjectivist
view that creation simply consists of natural resources, but it does
not represent the biblical view of stewardship where,
. . . stewardship is concerned with nothing less than 
man's responsibility to God as he participates in the 
whole technological-industrial-distributional system 
of his environment context. For stewardship is the 
active recognition of the sovereignty of God over his 
whole creation; over the creative and productive
Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Cri- 
sis>" Science 155 (1967), p. 1205. White's conclusion has received 
widespread acceptance and rehearsal. For example, in the area of 
environmental economics, Hugh H. Macaulay and Bruce Yandle, Environ­
mental Use and the Market (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977),
pp. 7-8, say: ". . . Judeo-Christian theology holds that after God
created the world and everything in it, He proceeded to give man 
dominion over all creatures therein . . . .  Other instructions given 
to man were to till the soil and to build homes and fires, all of 
which indicate that the welfare of man was the paramount consider­
ation in running the world."
6processes in which men share and the uses to which they 
put all of the resources and means that come under their
* Q
care and control.0
Although the Bible reveals that mankind is to be a steward (not
an owner) of all of creation, it does not reveal a ready-made set of
9
political and economic ends, or the insitutions to accomplish them.
This is not to say, however, that any end or institution is as good
as another. It is the responsibility of the steward to seek after
and search out the best (optimal) relational ends and institutional
ways of organizing our lives in creation.
God has granted humanity the possibility of organizing 
its collective life through social, political, and eco­
nomic structures. The positive role of these structures 
is outlined in the Bible, and should be affirmed and 
celebrated by all Christians. It is difficult to imagine 
an orderly, secure life of any sort without nation, family, 
law, commerce, and so on. At the same time, we must con­
fess with humility that: 1) not all human structures have
been affected by Christians or Christian principles; 2) 
not all Christians have felt or exercised any mandate to 
improve structures; and 3) not all that Christians have 
done with those structures has been ethically or biblic­
ally correct. As a result, the very structures that 
support our struggle to live as members of God’s kingdom, 
restraining the influence of sinful acts, are themselves 
tainted with human sin.^-O
g
Albert Terrill Rasmussen, "Stewardship in an Economy of Abun­
dance," in Stewardship in Contemporary Theology, ed. by Thomas K. 
Thompson (New York: Association Press, 1960), p. 232.
Q
Rather than political and economic ends (policies, projects) 
and institutions, the biblical witness points to the good required 
of the steward of creation. For example, "he has told you, 0 man, 
what is good; And what does the Lord require of you, But to do jus­
tice, to love kindness [or loyalty], And to walk humbly [or circum­
spectly] with your God (Micah 6:8)?"
^Loren Wilkinson, ibid., pp. 73-74.
7The final purpose of this dissertation, presented in Chapters 4 
and 5, is to contrast neoclassical economic subjective theories of 
value, welfare, and property rights with a theory of stewardship. 
Stewardship theory contends that individual subjective preferences 
are not the sole arbiters of value. Valuation is both a subjective 
and objective enterprise. Creation has subjective value as it satis­
fies human preferences, but it ultimately has objective value as it 
satisfies the ends of its Creator. The actual political-economic 
process of discerning and responding to the objective value of cre­
ation is, of course, a human process and thus in some sense subjec-
11tive, but not necessarily subjectivistic. The subjectivistic 
proposal of the Sophist Protagoras ("man is the measure of all 
things") - a cornerstone of neoclassical economics - is changed to, 
"man is the measurer of all things."
Neoclassical theory has tried to correct for one problem with 
the Pareto criterion: its limited range of application to practical
problems. The result - the "new welfare economics" of compensation 
tests and social welfare functions, however, has been severely cri­
ticized, perhaps, even defeated in its attempt to expand the 
12criterion. What has not been adequately criticized in this vast
^Subjectivism refers to the philosophical theory that all value 
is subjectively derived and grounded; objective value is cognitively 
meaningless.
12
See, for example, E. J. Mishan, Economic Efficiency and Social 
Welfare (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981); S. K. Nath, A Re­
appraisal of Welfare Economics (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969);
and William J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
8body of literature is the Pareto criterion itself. This literature 
takes to task the additional value judgments required by the various 
"new welfare economics," but uncritically accepts the value judg­
ments necessary for Pareto optimality. A theory of stewardship, 
however, does not find the subjective premises of Pareto optimality 
either convincing or descriptive of objective-intrinsic values in 
creation. To put it bluntly, but succinctly, efficiency conclusions 
based on Pareto optimality only necessarily satisfy those individuals 
with subjective moral philosophies. Since this is hardly a defensible 
outcome for economic science, the role of neoclassical economics needs 
to be both narrowed and broadened. It needs to be narrowed to pro­
nouncing on the economic efficiency of alternative means for achieving 
an objectively valuable end. It has no legitimate business pro­
nouncing on the economic efficiency of alternative objective ends.
As Lionel Robbins long ago warned:
. . . the use of the adjectives 'economical' and 'uneco­
nomical' to describe certain policies is apt to be very 
misleading . . . .  it is not intelligible to use them 
as regards ends themselves . . . .  there are no economic 
ends. There are only economical and uneconomical ways 
of achieving given ends. We cannot say that the pur­
suit of given ends is uneconomical because the ends are 
uneconomical; we can only say it is uneconomical if the 
ends are pursued with an unnecessary expenditure of 
means . . . .
In addition, neoclassical economics needs to be broadened to 
include a stewardship theory of objective valuation of ends. If
13Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of 
Economic Science, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1945), p. 145.
9economics is going to aid us in determining the best ways to manage 
creation it must differentiate between means and ends, subjective 
and objective values. It doesn’t help to know how to efficiently 
allocate means to achieve objectively unworthy ends. Nor does it 
help to know the subjective economic valuation of things used as 
means which are instead valuable ends and thus ought not to be used 
as means.
Economics from a stewardship perspective has a clear and direct 
impact on the new, so-called, economic theory of property rights.
It will be shown that the conclusion that problems of externalities 
and common property resources can be solved by assigning, wherever 
possible, private property rights, is incorrect. The conclusion 
that privately owned natural resources will be efficiently allocated 
is, of course, based on the subjective premises of valuation. Ste- 
warship, however, argues that so-called natural resources are proper­
ly valued and allocated only when both their subjective and objective 
values are recognized and accounted for. Absolute, unattenuated 
property rights implicitly deny objective value or at least the 
obligation to discern such value. In contrast, stewardship argues 
that before property rights can be properly assigned, the objective 
worth of their ends must be determined. Moreover, stewardship recog­
nizes that creation (what we often blithely call natural resources) 
is not simply a means to the satisfaction of our individual subjec­
tive preferences. All of creation, human and nonhuman, living and 
nonliving, are properly "used" when we recognize - as best we can -
10
all their proper functions and relations, that is, their subjective 
and objective value. The process of stewarding creation, at times, 
entails assigning attenuated property rights (both private and public) 
to encourage or perhaps even to ensure objectively valuable ends and 
to discourage unworthy ones.
A good example of this process is the Federal Endangered Species 
Act which severely limits both individuals' and governmental agencies' 
rights to threaten the existence of endangered species. An examina­
tion of this act, presented in Chapter 5, shows in a very specific 
context the differences between a neoclassical and a stewardship 
approach to the best "use" of nonhuman species.
CHAPTER 2
THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES
What does it mean to say that a particular natural resource pro­
ject or policy is optimal or economically efficient? First of all, it 
does not mean that the project or policy necessarily results in a 
preferable income distribution. It does mean, however, that compared 
to the alternative projects or policies, the optimal one "will contri­
bute the most to natural income and product."^
Putting aside the question of preferable income distribution; is 
the optimal, efficient project the best project? On this question, 
neoclassical economists seem to disagree. Freeman, Haveman, and 
Kneese, for example, argue that the optimal allocation of resources 
by competitive markets (assuming a political mechanism for assuring 
an equitable distribution of resources and income) is the "best pos­
sible allocation of resources."
If these conditions [equitable distribution] hold, it can be 
said that the competitive market system yields the best 
possible allocation of resources. It achieves this optimum 
because it does the best that can be done with a given tech­
nology, resource endowment, set of tastes and preferences, and 
that particular distribution of resource ownership and its
John V. Krutilla and Otto Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River 
Development (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for
the Future, 1964), p. 4.
11
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associated distribution of income that society has chosen 
through an effective political mechanism.^
In similar fashion, Seneca and Taussig find it difficult to imagine
anyone opposing the principle of efficiency or Pareto optimality
(assuming, of course, no distributional problems.)
Efficiency is a deceptively simple and attractive objective 
for government economic policy. Who can oppose the prin­
ciple that more of every good for everybody is desirable. 
Economists are careful to point out, of course, that greater 
efficiency in the Pareto Optimum sense means only that more 
of everything is potentially available for everybody . . . .^
Krutilla and Eckstein, however, argue that efficient does not mean
best.
We will attempt, first, to demonstrate which among several 
alternatives for development, in a particular case, is the 
more efficient, that is, which will contribute the most to 
national income and product. We then will compare the income 
redistributive consequences of alternatives in a particular 
situation. In neither instance will we be equipped, as 
economic analysts, to judge which is the "best" alternative 
from a "public" standpoint. While our discipline equips us 
for expertise in the analysis of economic problems, it does
2
A. Myrick Freeman, Robert H. Haveman, and Allen V. Kneese, The 
Economics of Environmental Policy (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1973), p. 70.
3
Joseph J. Seneca and Michael K. Taussig, Environmental Econom­
ics , 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 114.
"More of every good for everybody is desirable" is somewhat ambiguous. 
It could be a tautology wherein the good is equated with desirable, 
and so, of course, more of every good, i.e., desirable thing, is 
desirable, i.e., good. But it is neither common practice nor rea­
sonable to understand the principle of efficiency as a mere tautology. 
Tautologies are definitions not principles and they do not make for 
objectives of government economic policy. It appears then more rea­
sonable to understand Seneca and Taussig as saying, "who can oppose 
the principle that more of every desired thing for everybody is 
desirable." This is a recognizable principle contending that the 
desirable (the good) is the desired; clearly a debatable normative 
theory of value.
13
not provide us with any expertise in making value judgments 
or prescribing ethical values.^
Kruti'lla and Eckstein do not think economists can say that the effi­
cient alternative is the best alternative because:
Values in addition to economic efficiency are at stake . . . .  
aesthetic appeal, the improvements of public health and 
welfare . . . .  preferences for private institutions as 
instruments for natural resources development . . . .  belief 
that natural resources are a property of the entire community 
. . . .  the socially desirable solution . . . depends on what 
weights attach to each of the separate issues within the 
larger policy context. Nevertheless, efficiency is a sig­
nificant value in our society . . . the public interest 
requires that efficiency considerations be given due weight.
The conflict among these economists as to the normative (ethical) 
nature of economic efficiency illustrates the confusion and differen­
ces of opinion generated when otherwise positive economists enter the 
field of welfare economics. The confusion is rooted in the positive- 
normative distinction. As we will see, it is quite possible to do 
positive, analytical tasks within welfare economics, but these tasks 
do not a positive welfare economics make. If economics is going to 
analyze alternative economic studies, or alternative allocations of 
resources in terms of better or worse then it must clearly state its 
ends, objectives, values or norms. This is seldom, if ever, denied, 
but often hedged about by referring to the norms as merely "postu­
lated" or "taken as given." Apparently this hedging is due to the 
widely accepted view within the economics profession that norms or 
values cannot be rationally discussed because they are alledgedly
4Krutilla and Eckstein, ibid., p. 4.
^Ibid., pp. 265, 277.
14
mere statements of subjective preferences.^ This hedging merely 
adds to the confusion and ambiguity of the economic analysis and 
conclusions about resource allocation. The following section attempts 
to clearly identify and evaluate the norms of modern welfare economics.
MODERN WELFARE ECONOMICS
The development of modern welfare economics has moved away from 
the explicit normative approach of the classicalists and toward the 
implicit normative approach of the neoclassical positivists. Welfare 
economics has rejected the Marshallian-Pigouvian assumption of inter­
personal comparison of utility and the goal of maximizing total util­
ity as its normative criterion of value (worthwhileness). Instead, 
it has accepted the Paretian goal of satisfying individual subjective 
preferences. The classical, utilitarian approach was discarded by so- 
called positive economists because it required the seemingly impos­
sible tasks of measuring the individual's utility and redistributing 
individual utility or income (a frankly ethical task) in order to 
maximize the total. The Paretian goal, on the other hand, requires 
no measuring of utility nor ethical redistributing of utility or 
income, etc. It does not presume to pass judgment on the justness 
or fairness of either the initial or the final distribution of util­
ity or income. More importantly, the positivist methodology purports
^Paul Hayne, "The Abuse of the Positive-Normative Distinction by 
Economists," paper presented at a Conference of the Southern Economic 
Association, Atlanta, Georgia, November 1974, p. 10.
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to examine economic welfare, in general, as a value-free, purely 
scientific enterprise. Its methodological strictures are supposed 
to eliminate ethical criteria. Its welfare conclusions are there­
fore supposed to be as positive and scientific as those of price 
theory. All of this was to be accomplished by rejecting the ethical 
assumption of interpersonal utility comparisons and by defining wel­
fare in terms of efficient resource allocation.^ Whether or not 
efficient resource allocation requires normative criteria is a cru­
cial problem which is discussed below. But first let us continue 
with this brief historical sketch of modern welfare economics.
The development of modern welfare economics can be described as 
an expansion out from its core of Pareto optimality and then back 
again. The attempts to expand upon Pareto's optimum conditions stem 
from two basic problems. First, there are an infinite number of 
Pareto optimum positions and only "the optimum" (which depends upon 
the best income distribution) is necessarily better than any other 
position. Second, there is no criterion for the best income distri­
bution. According to Little, these two problems result in the pos­
sibility that,
. . .  an "optimum" situation [on the contract curve] . . . 
which corresponds to a bad distribution of income, may well 
be worse than a "sub-optimum" position corresponding to a 
good distribution of income. It therefore follows that it
^John Elliott, "Fact, Value, and Economic Policy Objectives," 
Review of Social Economy 38 (April 1980), p. 10.
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cannot be said that an increase in welfare would follow 
from putting the "optimum" condition into practice, even 
assuming that there was a community to which the analysis 
could be applied . . . .  Pareto did not, indeed, clearly 
say when one situation could be said to be better than 
another. He only laid down some of the necessary con­
ditions which must be fulfilled if it is to be impossible 
to make some individual "better off" without making any 
other "worse off."®
The attempts to expand upon the Pareto conditions has led to what
Little identifies as at least three schools, besides the strictly 
9
Paretian school. These schools can be labeled: 1) Kaldor-Hicks-
Scitovsky; 2) ethical or social welfare function; and 3) Little.
The Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky school provides us with the sufficient 
conditions for an "increase in general economic welfare." The con­
ditions are that the gainers from some change could compensate the 
losers and the losers could not bribe the gainers not to make the 
change. Since actual compensation is not required, economic welfare 
remains independent of distribution. The ethical or social welfare 
function school approach is to identify the necessary conditions for 
a_ Pareto optimum and the sufficient conditions for the Pareto optimum, 
which is the ideal distribution of economic welfare among individuals. 
Needless to say, not much progress has been made in determining the 
social welfare function which would reveal the Pareto optimum. The 
Little school has developed a "sufficient criterion for deciding when 
a change is economically desirable," which has features of both of
g
I. M. D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics, 2nd ed. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 84-85.
^Ibid., pp. 84-93, 117-24.
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the above two schools. A change is desirable if "it results in a 
good redistribution of welfare" and if "the potential losers could 
not bribe the potential gainers to vote against the change."^ As 
Little notes, his conditions permit the deduction of all the Pareto 
optimum conditions with the added stipulation that a value judgment 
has to be made on the redistribution of welfare.
In addition to trying to solve the problem of income distribu­
tion, all three schools have tried to expand on Pareto optimality 
which severely limits the practical application of welfare economics 
to situations where no one is made worse off. The limited use, if 
not complete irrelevancy, of Pareto optimality is addressed by T. W. 
Hutchison.
. . .  if it is argued "that all contemporary welfare eco­
nomics says is that where universal consent does not exist, 
then welfare economists simply are unable to declare whether 
there has been an increase in welfare in the cases in which 
some people feel better off and others feel worse off," 
then, certainly, the conclusion seems to follow . . . that 
"in most cases welfare economics is irrelevant." In fact, 
analysis in Pareto-optimum terms seems confined to situa­
tions not restricted by scaracity in a relevant politico- 
economic sense, that is to situations in which more can be 
had of one desideratum (A's welfare) without diminishing 
some other desideratum (B's welfare) . ^
Whether or not the three schools have made any progress in 
expanding welfare economics beyond Pareto optimality is open to 
debate. Less debatable is the common appeal to the Pareto optimality
10Ibid., p. 123.
^T .  W. Hutchison, "Positive" Economics and Policy Objectives 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 164, quoting H.
Leibenstein, "Notes on Welfare Economics and the Theory of Democ­
racy," Economic Journal (June 1962), p. 311.
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of competitive markets for defining the optimum resource allocation 
(always assuming no distributional problems). That is to say, Pareto 
optimality is often (but not always) used as a normative criterion.
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND POSITIVE WELFARE ECONOMICS 
There seems to be some agreement that positive welfare economics 
is possible if the economist merely analyzes alternatives with respect 
to some postulated norm and describes the results but does not pre­
scribe or advocate them. Apparently the reasoning is that to use a 
norm to rank and describe alternative projects or policies as better 
or worse is positive economics, whereas to advocate the adoption of 
the best alternative would be to practice normative economics. This 
rather ingenious definition of positive welfare economics as anything 
short of advocacy does, however, put severe restrictions on the pos­
itive economist. As Mishan well notes:
Indeed, there is now no ground on which the economist, qua 
economist, may challenge the allocative decisions reached 
by the political process. He may, of course, always draw 
attention to the economic consequences of the course of 
action to be adopted and give his opinion that, on balance, 
they are favorable or unfavorable. What he cannot do, how­
ever, is to pronounce the politically determined allocation 
to be good or bad by reference to an independent economic 
criterion. Put otherwise, he may no longer judge the allo­
cation to be "economically efficient" or "economically 
inefficient" by reference to a criterion that transcends 
current expressions of political opinion.12
Perhaps Mishan's position appears unreasonable. To be sure, the 
positive economist cannot advocate economic efficient allocations;
■^E. J. Mishan, Economic Efficiency and Social Welfare (London: 
George Allen Unwin, 1981), pp. 259-60.
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but may he not even judge (describe) an allocation to be economically 
efficient or inefficient? The answer is: no, he may not; for which
of the infinite number of norms that can be merely postulated by the 
positive economist should be used to define "economic efficiency?" 
Mishan's point is that if the positive economist cannot defend or rank 
normative criteria either on objective ethical grounds or as "sanc­
tioned by society . . . .  independent of any political expression
about allocative matters . . . [and] grounded in an ethical consen-
13
sus," then his language must be extremely circumspect. In other 
words, "economic efficiency" might just as well be used to describe 
the allocation of resources obtained through the political process as 
through the market process; the choice is arbitrary as regards pos­
itive welfare economics.
Mishan's point is crucial, but not new. It was also made by 
Lionel Robbins who succinctly mapped out the territory of positive 
economics in his book, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of 
Economic Science. He identified the border between positive and 
normative economics and indicated what can and cannot be done within 
positive economics. The limitations on the positive economist, 
according to Robbins, are quite demanding.
And suppose . . .  we had succeeded in showing that certain 
policies had the effect of increasing "social utility," 
even so it would be totally illegitimate to argue that 
such a conclusion by itself warranted the inference that 
these policies ought to be carried out . . . .
13Ibid., p. 260.
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Exactly the same type of stricture may be applied to any 
attempt to make the criteria of free equilibrium in the price 
system at the same time the criteria of economic justifica­
tion . . . .  freedom to choose may not be regarded as an 
ultimate good. The creation of a state of affairs offering 
the maximum freedom of choice may not be thought desirable,
having regard to other social ends. . . . There is nothing
in the corpus of economic analysis which in itself affords 
any justification for regarding these ends as good or bad. 
Economic analysis can simply point out the implications as 
regards the disposal of means of production of the various
patterns of ends which may be chosen.
For this reason, the use of the adjectives "economical" 
and "uneconomical" to describe certain policies is apt to 
be very misleading . . . .  it is not intelligible to use 
them as regards ends themselves . . . .  there are no economic 
ends. There are only economical and uneconomical ways of 
achieving given ends. We cannot say that the pursuit of 
given ends is uneconomical because the ends are uneconomical; 
we can only say it is uneconomical if the ends are pursued 
with an unnecessary expenditure of means . . . . ^
Robbins' strictures on the use of "economical" (economic efficiency)
and "uneconomical" apply to economics in general, be it positive or
normative. His point is that "economical" or "economic efficiency"
apply to alternative means not to alternative ends. In other words,
it is not intelligible to label market valuations as economically
efficient and political valuations as inefficient. Furthermore, it
is inappropriate to label as efficient or inefficient alternative
policies or projects that have different ends or objectives. Only
alternative means to achieve the same ends may be judged efficient
or inefficient.
In addition to Mishan and Robbins, Hla Myint expresses doubt 
about advocating economic efficiency as a criterion of value for
14Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of 
Economic Science, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1945), pp.
142-45.
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passing judgment on the acceptability of patterns of resource 
allocation.
. . . interpersonal comparisons of utility can be avoided 
by the Paretian formulation of the Optimum and the prin­
ciple of Compensation . . . .  welfare analysis need not 
involve any normative value judgments so long as we take 
the wants of the individuals to be given and constant and 
confine our study to the purely mechanical efficiency of 
the economic system in satisfying these given wants. At 
this pure subjective level of analysis our propositions 
are logically as stringent as those of price economics.
But, since we stop short at this neutral concept of mechanical 
efficiency, we are still on an intermediate plane of discourse 
and although our propositions deal with quantities of satis­
faction they are in some ways still as inconclusive as those 
at the physical level as a guide to practical action. Thus 
when we have demonstrated that a particular pattern of allo­
cating the resources satisfies the given wants better than 
others, this does not amount to a categorical imperative 
that this pattern ought to be adopted. To obtain that we 
need a further premise, viz. that these given wants are of 
the same ethical quality of goodness. It is easy to make 
the mistake of slipping this premise implicitly into the 
argument . . .
If we agree that Mishan, Myint, and Robbins have accurately 
circumscribed positive welfare economics to the function of eval­
uating alternative means for achieving the same ends, then we surely 
must conclude that Freeman, Haveman, Kneese, Seneca and Taussig, if 
not also Krutilla and Eckstein, are not positive economists. Indeed, 
we might even despair of finding a single positive economist among 
us, if to be one means we cannot even advocate "freedom to choose" 
because it just might "not be regarded as an ultimate good." But 
even if "freedom to choose" were regarded as an ultimate good (end),
■^Hla Myint, Theories of Welfare Economics (New York: Augustus
M. Kelley, 1962), pp. 198-99.
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the positive economist qua positive economist could neither advocate 
it as an economic end, nor equate it with economic efficiency. Ethi­
cal, normative values or the processes that achieve them do not 
become positive, scientific criteria (e.g. economical) simply because 
they are unanimously agreed upon.
It is clear that Freeman, Haveman, and Kneese fail to pass 
Robbins' stricture against making "free equilibrium in the price 
system at the same time the criteria of economic justification . . . ." 
when they say,
If these conditions [equitable distribution] hold, it can 
be said that the competitive market system yields the best 
possible allocation of resources.^
It can be argued that Krutilla and Eckstein also fail as positive 
economists but on more subtle, less well recognized grounds. And 
yet it is precisely the subtlety and seeming acceptability of their 
position that makes it more important for us to recognize it.
Krutilla and Eckstein violate Robbins' warning that because economic 
analysis does not provide any justification for regarding social ends 
as good or bad, "the use of the adjectives 'economical' and 'uneco­
nomical' to describe certain policies is apt to be very misleading 
. . . ." Indeed, the misuse of "economical," "economic efficiency," 
and "optimal" is rampant.
1 f \Freeman, Haveman, and Kneese, ibid., p. 70. The most that can 
be said is that competitive markets (under certain conditions) yield 
a Pareto optimum allocation; which is far different from saying, "the 
best possible allocation."
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Economic efficiency when used in place of Pareto optimality is 
a deceptive term that spuriously connotes scientific objectivity, 
rather than its true subjective, normative nature. Whereas' Robbins 
argued that, "We cannot say that the pursuit of given ends is uneco­
nomical because the ends are uneconomical . . . ." that is exactly 
what economists are saying when comparing non-market with market allo­
cations. When an eccaomist presumes to rank policies and institutions 
with different allocational ends according to their economic effi­
ciency, he has left the domain of positive welfare economics. Eco­
nomic efficiency has become Pareto optimality, rather than Robbins' 
positive, scientific economical expenditure of means. Allocational 
ends may be Pareto optimal or not, but they are neither economically 
efficient nor inefficient, at least not as ends.
Still another way of explaining the misuse of economic effi­
ciency is to note that the general or normal meaning of efficiency 
requires a comparison of the level of useful output to the total out­
put. Economic efficiency, when used in place of Pareto optimality, 
refers only to maximum total output. Typically, it is assumed that 
all the output is useful and in some cases rhetorically asserted as
such: "Who can oppose the principle that more of every good for
17
everybody is desirable." Such an assumption is equivalent to 
slipping in the ethical premise that individual subjective preferen­
ces are the good.
■^Seneca and Taussig, ibid., p. 114.
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Frank H. Knight also recognized this problem of an efficiency 
concept which ignores the question of value or usefulness of the 
output.
It is impossible to form any concept of "social efficiency" 
in the absence of some general measure of value. Even in 
physics and engineering, "efficiency" is strictly a value 
category; there is no such thing as mechanical efficiency 
. . . .  The efficiency of any machine means the ratio 
between the useful output and the total output . . . .
There is no more important function of a first course in 
economics than to make the student see that the whole prob­
lem of social management is a value problem; that mechanical 
or technical efficiency is a meaningless combination of 
words.I®
As prominent as economic efficiency is in our vocabulary, we certainly 
do not think it to be a "meaningless combination of words." Krutilla 
and Eckstein, for example, say "efficiency is a significant value in 
our society . . . the public interest requires that efficiency con­
siderations be given due w e i g h t . g u t  what do they mean by 
"efficiency": economical expenditure of means to achieve some given
end or Pareto optimality? Surely the former is of value (assuming the 
given end is worthy of pursuit), but the latter is problematic, as we 
will better see in the next section.
Krutilla and Eckstein do not make the mistake of thinking that 
all ethical values are accounted for in the market's so-called effi­
cient allocation of resources; they are, however, mistaken if they 
think they have not made an ethical judgment - despite their disclaimer
1 ft
Frank H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1936), pp. 42-43.
^Krutilla and Eckstein, ibid., p. 277.
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of "any expertise in making value judgment or prescribing ethical 
values." Their value judgment or ethical premise is, as we have 
seen, that "economic efficiency" (Pareto optimality) is of value 
and ought to be used to judge between alternative allocational 
projects or policies.
This ethical premise, so taken for granted by neoclassical 
economists who otherwise eschew all thought of making value judg­
ments, typically goes unnoticed or at least undefended. Krutilla 
and Eckstein, for example, assert but do not defend their ethical 
prescription that: "economic efficiency in a free society must
begin with the preferences of individuals."
The concept of economic efficiency for a free society must 
include some notion of maximizing the output of those items 
most preferred by the members of the community per unit of 
input of those resources which are relatively the more 
scarce. That is, beginning with the preferences of indi­
viduals making up a free society, our concept of economic 
efficiency will require for any given resource endowment 
and state of technological knowledge, the maximum level 
of the preferred composition of output.^0
Asserting or simply assuming individual subjective preferences 
as the criterion of value for an efficient or optimum allocation of 
resources is standard neoclassical fare. Moreover, this ethical
^Krutilla and Eckstein, ibid., p. 16. Contrast this notion of 
economic efficiency with J. M. Clark's notion of welfare, in Economic 
Institutions and Human Welfare (New York: Aired A. Knopf, 1961), p. 
116: "Welfare is here conceived in terms of needs, rather than of an 
undiscriminating list of desires. It calls for healthy and respon­
sible individuals, organized in a healthy society which in turn is 
responsible to and for its members."
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premise is effectively forgotten when expressed in terms of the
market’s ability to secure the optimum allocation of resources.
Coase, for example, on factory smoke regulation, says,
The aim of such regulation should not be to eliminate smoke 
pollution but rather to secure the optimum amount of smoke 
pollution, this being the amount which will maximize the 
value of production.21
The casual reader might think that Coase has managed to remain a
positive economist by advocating what a market for smoke would achieve
if its formation were possible. Perhaps Coase even things so, as he
goes on to say,
In this article, the analysis has been confined, as is 
usual in this part of economics, to comparisons of the 
value of production, as measured by the market. But it 
is, of course, desirable that the choice between dif­
ferent social arrangements for the solution of economic 
problems should be carried out in broader terms than this 
and that the total effect of these arrangements in all 
spheres of life should be taken into account. As Frank
H. Knight has so often emphasized, problems of welfare 
economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of 
aesthetics and m o r a l s . 2 2
Coase seems to give the impression that his economic analysis, con­
fined to the "value of production, as measured by the market," has 
thereby remained positive. And only by expanding the analysis, of 
the "optimum" amount of smoke pollution, into other "spheres of life" 
would the analysis "dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals." 
Such an impression is quite common and quite wrong.
21r . H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," The Journal of Law 
and Economics 3 (October 1960), p. 42.
^^Ibid., p. 43.
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Economic welfare problems do not have to be expanded into other
spheres of life, or other disciplines before values and morals are
encountered. The reason Frank H. Knight emphasized that problems of
welfare economics ultimately dissolve into morals and ethics is
because welfare economics is grounded upon moral and ethical premises.
It is true within limits that the purpose of economic 
activity is to satisfy wants, and the fact raises a 
group of questions for consideration in an appraisal 
of any system of economic organization . . . .  It is 
hardly necessary to remark that the questions which 
wants and whose wants are to be satisfied are in fact 
closely bound up together. The system's answer . . . 
constitutes its social economic value scale; and very 
different social value scales may be formed from the 
same set of individual wants . . . .  The striking fact 
in modern life is the virtually complete separation 
between the spiritual ethics which constitutes its 
accepted theory of conduct and the unethical, uncri­
ticized notion of efficiency which forms its substi­
tute for a practical working i d e a l .23
And finally, in the words of J. de V. Graaff:
Theoretical welfare economics proceeds from a number of 
definite assumptions, factual and ethical, which are sel­
dom stated explicitly. If their nature were more widely 
appreciated by professional economists, it is improbable 
that the conventional conclusions of welfare theory would 
continue to be stated with as little caution as is at 
present the custom.24
Let us now turn to the ethical premises of welfare economics to see
what they are and how worthy they may or may not be.
^Knight, ibid., pp. 45, 73.
^ J .  de V. Graaff, Theoretical Welfare Economics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 1.
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THE ETHICAL PREMISES OF WELFARE ECONOMICS
The goal of a positive, scientific welfare economics extends
back to Pareto and Weber. The goal required the minimization or, if
possible, the elimination of normative judgments from economic
science. Pareto was able to eliminate the interpersonal comparisons
of utility required by the classical utilitarian approach. But, as
he well recognized, his theory did not eliminate all norms.
. . . one has to state just what norms - they have to be 
to some extent arbitrary - one intends to follow in 
determining the entities that one is trying to define.
Pure economics has succeeded in doing that. It has taken
a single norm, the individual's satisfaction, and it has
further set down that of that satisfaction he is the only 
judge. So economic "utility" or "ophelimity" came to be
defined.25
Pareto recognized that his theory was grounded upon the norm of 
individual satisfaction, with the individual as the only judge. He 
also, and perhaps more importantly, recognized that this norm is 
merely arbitrarily postulated. He does not argue that this norm 
is ethically better than others and thereby avoids the obvious 
excursion into moral philosophy. This excursion was to take place, 
however, in his sociology which would provide a "positive basis for 
policy." In the words of Vincent Tarascio,
In his sociological discussion, Pareto dropped the 
term "ophelimity" (economic satisfaction) and spoke of 
community "utility" . . . .  as the term was used by 
Pareto, it is important to keep in mind that this has
25Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, trans. Andrew Bongiorno 
and Arthur Livingston (New York: Dover Publications, 1963), p. 1458.
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nothing to do with economic "utility" theory as we use 
the term today - it is a social concept, deriving from 
.ethical, moral, religious, political, etc., as well as 
economic causes. In fact, Pareto originally made the 
distinction between "ophelimity" and "utility" to avoid 
confusion between strictly economic and "sociological"
(both economic and non-economic) considerations . . . .
Pareto was fully aware of the restrictive nature of the 
Pareto Optimum criterion of "welfare" . . . .  The dis­
tinction between Pareto's "ophelimity" theory and "utility" 
theory has generally been overlooked, resulting in some 
misleading impressions regarding this aspect of his work.^
In other words, Pareto recognized the rather arbitrarily postu­
lated norm of individual satisfaction and thus carefully differen­
tiated between this norm as a criterion of value for "ophelimity" 
and what he called community "utility." The latter would be developed 
in his sociology.
. . .  in his sociology, he attempted to provide another 
type of "objective" criterion - the "real" norms of 
society. Hence Pareto's endeavors represented a program 
aimed at establishing a positive basis for p o l i c y .^7
Tarascio puts quotation marks around "real," apparently because, as 
he explains, even those norms of society are not necessarily asser­
ted to be true, but may be only postulated.
^Vincent J. Tarascio, Pareto's Methodological Approach to 
Economics (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1968),
pp. 83-84.
27Ibid., p. 130. Tarascio helps us to understand his meaning of 
"objective" by using it in a footnote on page 129: "Although welfare
economics deals with what ought to be, it does so "objectively," 
since it does not involve interpersonal comparisons of individual 
utilities by the observer. Pareto, it will be recalled, carried 
the same reasoning to his sociological "utility" theory: he believed
that the identification of the "real" norms of a society would allow 
"objective" social welfare judgments for policy purposes."
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No value-judgments inevitably have to be asserted even 
in discussions of policies, which can always be treated 
in the perfectly "positive" technical-hypotehtical mood 
by simply postulating (not asserting) particular objec­
tives, and examining to what extent different policy- 
measures attain them.^®
Thus, Pareto fully realized the necessity of at least arbi­
trarily postulating norms before welfare analysis can take place. 
Moreover, the function of positive welfare analysis is to determine 
"to what extent different policy-measures attain them." The purpose 
is to determine which policies or projects obtain a particular norm 
with the least expenditure of resources. The purpose is not (cannot 
be) to rank various norms; nor is it to rank policies or institutions 
which seek to obtain different norms or ends. Thus, to say that 
policy "A" is "optimal" is merely to say that it is judged less costly 
than the alternatives means for obtaining some particular norm and 
therefore may not be optimal for obtaining some other norm.
As we have seen, not all contemporary economists are equally 
careful to point out, or perhaps even recognize, the arbitrary nor­
mative foundation for determining so-called "optimum" or "efficient" 
economic policies. An exception is I. M. D. Little:
The above analysis presupposes only two value judgments, 
both of which we believe to be widely acceptable. The 
first is that the welfare of the community is an incre- 
sing function of the welfare of individuals. The second 
is that an individual is better off if he is in a chosen 
position. We found that value premises are essential to 
welfare economics because welfare conclusions are value 
judgments, and because value conclusions require value
o o
Ibid., pp. 116-17.
31
premises . . . .  These foundations are, in our opinion, 
sound. If welfare economics is found to be useless, it 
is not because there is anything shifty about the philo­
sophical or logical foundations. We claim to have stated 
the required postulates in a clear, precise manner. It 
only remains to accept or reject them. It will be pre­
sumed, in what follows, that they are a c c e p te d .29
Little clearly recognizes the necessity of postulating norms if one
is going to analyze policies or states of affairs in terms of better
or worse. The two presupposed norms (premises) are familiar to the
economist and lead to the Pareto definition of an optimum. The
second norm is also familiar to the moral philosopher who would
categorize it as an example of moral or ethical relativism. What
is the philosophical nature of morally relative versus objective
norms?
MORAL OR ETHICAL RELATIVISM 
Moral relativism is a philosophical theory that views moral 
principles as relative or subjective rather than objective. That 
is, moral principles cannot be rationally discussed as regards their 
truth content or authoritative appeal. There is no authoritative 
moral truth to which rational men can appeal. There is no authori­
tative moral reality external to the individual that is what it is 
regardless of the opinions individuals entertain about it. Thus, 
value judgments or moral principles are at best relative or at worst 
meaningless or emotive. They are classified into three types:
29Little, ibid., p. 124.
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culturally relative, subjectively (individually) relative and 
emotive.-*® Culturally relative moral judgments merely describe 
the shared attitudes and preferences of the particular culture of 
which the individual making the judgments is a member. Subjective 
moral judgments are nothing more than descriptions of attitudes and 
preferences of the individual making them. And finally, to say that 
a moral judgment is emotive is to say that it is cognitively meaning­
less; it is an emotion, a taste. For example, when one says 
"stealing is wrong or bad," all one really is saying is "stealing - 
ugh!"31
The one thing that these three different types of moral rela­
tivism have in common is their opposition and challenge to objective 
moral judgments. If moral relativism is true then two individuals 
could disagree over some fundamental moral principle and both be 
correct as long as they were from different cultures or had dif­
ferent attitudes and preferences.
Notice that it is not truth that is said to be relative and 
subjective, but only moral principles. To argue for a subjective 
view of truth is to speak nonsense due to its self-contradiction. For
■^Jeffrie G. Murphy, "The Possibility of Moral Philosophy," 
mimeograph, University of Arizona, Philosophy, Department, p. 13.
31Ibid., pp. 13-14. Consider the following example in Edwin G. 
Dolan, Basic Economics, 2nd ed. (Hinsdale, 111.: The Dryden Press,
1980), p. 13: "The mention of economic policies such as the price
controls or budget deficits tends to set little lights labeled 
'hurrah' or 'ugh' flashing in our minds . . . .  1. If Policy X is 
followed, Outcome Y will resut. 2. Outcome Y is a good (or bad) 
thing. 3. Therefore, hurrah (or ugh) for Policy X."
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example, to say that proposition "A" is true only for the individual who 
believes it true, is itself a proposition which would be true only for 
the individual who believes it and thus does not apply to anyone else.
It is not possible to have an objective, non-contradictory definition of 
truth as subjective.
It is, however, possible to speak objectively about and rationally 
discuss moral relativism. Although the moral principles only describe 
culturally or individually accepted preferences (or emotions) there is 
the possibility that the culture or individual Is misinformed about its 
preferences. Therefore rational discussion about moral principles can 
take place, albeit of a rather limited scope. The function of such 
rational discussion would not be to find objective moral truths when 
supposedly none exist. Rather it would be for the purpose of correctly 
identifying existing cultural or individual-subjective preferences. In 
this limited sense, objective, rational discussion of moral judgments 
can take place. But, such discussion is limited, for in Lionel Robbins' 
famous words,
If we disagree about ends [subjective preferences] it is a 
case of thy blood or mine - or live and let live, according to 
the importance of the difference, or the relative strength of 
our opponents. But if we disagree about means, then 
scientific a^|lysis can often help us to resolve our 
differences.
With this understanding of moral relativism, we can examine 
Little's second value premise. It is postulated that the individual is 
better off if he or she is in a chosen position. It seems fair to
"^Robbins, ibid., p. 150.
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assume that Little does not mean to imply that individuals never make 
mistakes in judging how best to get to a chosen position. It also 
seems fair to assume that Little does not mean to imply that the 
individual once at a chosen position may not decide that it is not 
what he expected and thus he may not perceive himself to be better 
off. To assume otherwise would be to assume perfect knowledge, but 
this does not seem necessary. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to 
understand both of Little's two premises as nontautological, funda­
mental assumptions (premises), rather than tautologies. In other 
words, his premises as with all premises may be either true or false, 
whereas tautologies are definitional - neither true nor false, but 
rather either useful or not. Tautologies, therefore, cannot serve 
as premises that are supposed to function as true statements and as 
criteria of value.
Little's appeal to the wide acceptability of his two premises is
an appeal to cultural relativism, i.e., norms are merely the shared
attitudes and preferences of the culture. Whether or not the premises
are widely accepted is an empirically verifiable question about which
33Little presents no data nor cites any references. Regardless of 
their acceptability of relative truth, there still remains the problem
33In these days of the supposed prevalance of the "moral 
majority" and their view of objective morals, one may entertain 
serious doubts about the wise acceptability of subjective moral 
relativism. One is also led to recognize that grave mistakes can 
be made in the name of objective morals. Interestingly, the moral 
relativist cannot criticize the "moral majority" - only a moral 
objectivist can argue that the moral majority is objectively mis­
taken in some of its views.
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of moral relativity versus moral objectivity. It is not, however, 
the purpose of this chapter to defend one or the other, but rather 
to establish the fact that welfare economics is arbitrarily based 
upon the former.
If welfare economics merely postulates relative, subjective 
criteria of value, in what sense can it perform economic welfare 
analysis? The answer is fairly obvious: welfare economics, arbi­
trarily postulating individual subjective preferences as its cri­
terion of value can only perform economic welfare analysis arbitrarily 
and incompletely. To say that competitive markets are economically 
efficient or that policy "A" is Pareto optimal is not to say that 
they are best or ought to be used; unless, of course, the economist 
is prepared to rigorously define subjective moral relativism as true, 
rather than arbitrarily postulating it as true. Short of defending 
his relative premises, the economist should at least avoid the per­
suasive and deceptive positive sounding words, such as, optimum,
Q /
best, economic efficiency, etc. A more accurate statement would
^ The following passages taken from S. K. Nath, A Reappraisal of 
Welfare Economics (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969), p. 152,
indicate that even economists are deceived: "It should not be neces­
sary to point out that, despite its slightly misleading name, the 
concept of a Pareto optimum is completely objective and that our dis­
cussions are thus of a positive rather than a normative nature." M. J. 
Farrell, "The Convexity Assumptions in the Theory of Competitive Mar­
kets," Journal of Political Economy (1959), p. 378. "We notice, more­
over, that the necessary condition ['maximizing a market preference 
function'] is a condition of economic efficiency whilst the additional 
condition for sufficiency (namely a "just" money income distribution) 
involves a value judgment. This suggests that we may continue to use 
the market preference function without inhibitions and in the usual 
way in discussions of such topics as "optimum tariffs," or "ideal" 
tax systems, provided that we bear in mind that we are concerned with
36
be to say that competitive markets or policy "A" obtains a Pareto
outcome as contrasted with other possibilities, e.g., egalitarian,
utilitarian, Rawlsian, or steady-state, to name only a few. As
Samuelson has said,
It is a legitimate exercise of economic analysis to 
examine the consequences of various value judgments, 
whether or not they are shared by the theorist, just 
as the study of comparative ethics is itself a science 
like any other branch of an th rop o logy . 35
CONCLUSION
To recognize that modern welfare economics is based upon subjec­
tive moral relativism is to also recognize that a morally objective 
or purposive approach is an obvious alternative. To recognize the 
difference between moral relativism and objectivism is to recognize 
the irrelevance of the supposed "widely acceptable" premises of 
welfare economics. For a morally objective approach to economic 
welfare analysis, the relevant question is: are these subjective
premises objectively true? The answer is "no, not necessarily." The 
individual is not necessarily better off because he is in a chosen 
position, but only if he has chosen the good and avoided the evil.
In addition, the welfare of the community is not a simple aggrega­
tion of the welfare of totally private, independent individuals.
The welfare of the community is a function of (among other things)
questions of economic efficiency and not with questions of justice 
and injustice." I. F. Pearce, A Contribution to Demand Analysis 
(Oxford, 1964).
35Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (New 
York: Atheneum, 1965), p. 220.
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good and proper human relationships which promote, for example, 
justice and love. Nor is the optimal allocation of natural resources 
that which secures the maximum output of goods and services. How can 
we justify the identification of a welfare optimum with a maximum 
output of taste-adequate goods? Why should such maximization be 
superior to Aristotle’s vision of "happy man . . . .  able to act 
according to virtue with moderate means" or to the medieval ideal
of a traditional standard of living or to some other "homeostatic"
,,36goal?
The purpose of this dissertation, however, is not to simply 
replace these two arbitrary, subjective premises of welfare eco­
nomics with a few objective premises; something perhaps equivalent 
to a Kantian categorical imperative or a Rawlsian "maximin" cri­
terion. Rather, it is to expand the scope of neoclassical econom­
ics; to introduce to the economic debate the biblical and historical 
Hebrew-Christian view of mankind as stewards responsible for proper 
care (welfare) of all of God's creation. Thus, the following chap­
ter develops a stewardship view of mankind as responsible for the 
welfare of creation.
Adolph Lowe, "The Normative Roots of Economic Value," in Human 
Values and Economic Policy, ed. by Sidney Hook (New York: New York
University Press, 1967), pp. 175-76. He goes on to argue that, ". . . 
there is indeed one state of resource supply and technology in which 
the attainment of any life goal is conditional on maximization of 
production. This is a state of destitution in which the available 
stock of resources and the output produced from it do not rise above 
the threshold that assures physical survival" (p. 176).
CHAPTER 3
A BIBLICAL CONCEPT OF HUMANS AS 
STEWARDS OF GOD’S CREATION
The biblical concept of humans as stewards of God's creation is, 
for the most part, foreign to modern, scientific man. The ancient 
Hebrews and early Christians, in contrast to modern man, knew nothing 
of an autonomous Nature, Mother Nature or the Laws of Nature. The 
ancient Hebrews, indeed, had no word equivalent to our word, nature. 
This, perhaps, is less surprising when we consider a modern definition 
of nature: "The creative and regulative physical power which is con­
ceived of as operating in the physical world and as the immediate 
cause of all its phenomena." As H. Wheeler Robinson has noted, "The 
only way to render this idea [of nature] into Hebrew would be to say 
simply 'God.'"'*' In agreement with Robinson is another theologian,
B. W. Anderson:
The idea "nature" as an autonomous sphere governed by 
natural law or set in motion by a First Cause is not 
found in the OT. The Creator stands in personal rela­
tionship to his creation. It is the divine decree . . . 
that determines order . . . and it can even be said that 
Yahweh has made a covenant with the day and the night 
(Jer. 33:20).2
"hi. Wheeler Robinson, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old 
Testament (Oxford: The Claredon Press, 1946), p. 1.
2Bernhard W. Anderson, "Creation," Interpreter's Dictionary of 
the Bible (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962), vol. 1, p. 729.
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To understand the biblical concept of man as steward of God’s creation 
it is necessary to understand the ancient Hebrews' and Christians' 
perceptions of creation and the relationship between the Creator and 
creation, including man.
A BIBLICAL VIEW OF CREATION 
Current studies of the ancient Hebrews' perception of creation - 
partially generated by a renewed interest in creation theology due to 
the perceived environmental crisis - are far from unanimous in their 
conclusions. Three easily distinguishable theologies or "models of 
God" and creation are emerging today which purport to be the Hebrews' 
(and Christians') perception as recorded in the Old Testament.
Models of God and Creation
1. God, self-sufficient and aloof, rather arbitrarily creates 
the world and deeds it over to man. God is sharply separated from 
and unaffected by creation - a mere product of his will. This thumb­
nail sketch of the so-called "monarchical" relationship between God,
man and nature is said (by a few) to represent the dominant model
3
in the Old Testament. Theologian, Harvey Cox and historian, Lynn
4
White, Jr. are two of the better known adherents to this interpre­
tation. According to White:
3
Harvey Cox, The Secular City (New York: Macmillan, 1965).
4
Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological 
Crisis," Science 155 (1967).
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God planned all of this [creation] explicitly for nan's 
benefit and rule: no item in the physical creation had
any purpose save to serve man’s purposes. And, although 
man's body is made of clay, he is not simply part of 
nature: he is made in God's image.
Two other theologians recognized for their "monarchical'" theolo­
gies are Karl Barth and Emil Brunner. John Macquarrie, a critic of 
the monarchical view, sees the physical world devalued and profaned 
by Brunner in his book, Christianity and Civilization, because Brunner 
sees the world as a more or less arbitrary product of divine will. 
Brunner sums it up in two equations:
God minus the world = God
The world minus God = Zero.^
According to this view, "The Hebrew understanding of creation . . . 
separates nature from God. Nature thus becomes 'disenchanted' and 
can be seen in a 'matter-of-fact' way."^
Richard Baer accuses both Barth and Brunner of suffering from
"cosmological nearsightedness" when they argue that nature is simply
8
the stage for the God-man encounter. In agreement with Baer's
criticism is Paul Santmire:
We should be aware, however, that the biblical picture
of nature has not only been neglected in scholarly
5Ibid., p. 1205.
£
John Macquarrie, "Creation and Environment," The Expository 
Times 83 (1971), p. 7.
^Ibid., p. 4.
8Richard A. Baer, Jr., "Conservation: An Arena for the Church's
Action," The Christian Century (January 1969), p. 41.
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study, but frequently obscured . . . .  The problem 
has been an overly narrow focus. Karl Barth is typical 
in this respect when he states that the interest of the 
biblical writers is God's activity in relation to man.
In similar vein Emil Brunner remarks that "the cosmic 
element in the Bible is never anything more than the ^
'scenery' in which the history of mankind takes place."
Besides Cox, White, Barth, and Brunner, Macquarrie also sees
John Calvin as presenting an extreme monarchical view:
Everything happens by divine will. The world itself is 
a product of a free act of God's will, and he might 
equally well have refrained from creating, so that in 
no sense is the world organic to God.
Macquarrie further argues that with a "doctrine of voluntary creation"
the world has no intrinsic worth, but only utilitarian worth.^ Baer,
however, finds no scriptural basis for a utilitarian view of nature.
Although Scripture obviously demythologizes the pagan views of nature,
12
nature remains deeply respected. This will be shown later in this 
chapter.
9
Paul Santmire, Brother Earth: Nature, God and Ecology in a Time
of Crisis (New York: T. Nelson, 1970), p. 81.
*^Macquarrie, ibid., p. 7.
i L . jIbid.
12Richard A. Baer, Jr., "Conservation Problems More Human Than 
Technological," Catalyst II (1967), p. 5. Santmire (n. 9 above) per­
ceptively notes that our 20th century utilitarian approach to nature 
weakens our faith in God, especially our understanding of justifica­
tion. He contrasts our time with that of Calvin and Luther's where, 
"men of faith could sense the presence and activity of God in nature, 
as well as in history . . . having heard in the preaching of justi­
fication by grace through faith alone that my salvation is sure and 
certain . . .  I can learn to sense that the same God of grace and 
power is at work in, and controls finally, my environment . . . .
But if I cannot sense God's activity in the world around me . . . 
there will be little or no sense of liberation of my earthly life." 
Santmire, ibid., pp. 68-69.
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It is this "monarchical" view of God with its concomitant util­
itarian approach to nature that Macquarrie sees as dominant in the 
Old Testament, but it is not the only one. He argues for another, 
a more "earthy" interpretation where God is imminent in nature, not 
sharply separated from the world. He concludes, "obscure and frag­
mentary though it may be, there are at least traces of [this] alter-
13
native model, which we may call the organic model."
2. The "organic" model understands the world as eternally 
emanating from God. The world is not an arbitrary creation. But 
although God does not need to create, because he is a "creative 
spirit" creation "flows" from his nature. Since God is organically 
connected with creation, he is affected by the absence of creation. 
Consequently, the organic model accepts only one of Brunner's 
equations:
The world minus God = Zero, 
for the world would cease to exist if God were not.
Proponents of the organic model (e.g., Macquarrie, and Frederick 
14
Elder) advocate an attitude of wonder and mystic communion between 
man and nature. Critical of this position is Hendrick Aay who argues 
that Elder's view of a miraculous and mystic relationship with nature
13Macquarrie, ibid., p. 6. Unfortunately, Macquarrie does not 
cite any Old Testament texts to support his organic model.
"^Frederick Elder, Crisis in Eden (Nashville: Abingdon Press,
1970).
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will not combat and defeat our mechanistic, dehumanized view of life 
and nature. Rather, Aay forsees it setting up a "tension between 
nature and civilization.
The literature on the "organic" model is sparse, and unfortu­
nately, for the purposes of this study, does not derive from an 
examination of the Old Testament. Rather it seems to derive from 
pragmatic reasoning in order to develop an environmental ethic 
designed to solve such current problems as pollution and natural 
resource depletion.
3. In contrast to both the "monarchical" model (where God is 
aloof from his creation and humans are free to reign as tyrants) and 
the "organic" model (which comes dangerously close to pantheism) is 
what we may call the "covenantal" model. This model will now be 
developed by examining four fundamental concepts which try to explain 
the interrelationship in the Old Testament between the Creator and 
creation. These concepts are: 1) Creation as order, 2) Creation as
history, 3) Creation and covenant, 4) Creation and purpose.
Creation as Order
The Creator commands and a creature or inanimate object is not 
only brought into being, but is given its own particular nature and 
tasks. The stars, sun and moon, e.g., are God's servants with
15Hendrick Aay, "Confronting the Ecological Crisis: The Kingdom
of God in Geographical Perspective," Vanguard (November 1972), p. 12.
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appointed functions. They are not independent gods controlling man's
life as was commonly believed by Israel's neighbors.^
Then God said, "Let there be lights in the expanse of 
the heavens to separate the day from the night, and 
let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days 
and years . . . (Gen. 1:14)17
Moreover, the earth itself "is not just the fertile 'mother,' from
whose womb all life proceeds and to which it returns (Job 1:21,
Eccles. 4:1), but is God's creature who produces vegetation and
18
animals at his command." For example:
Then God said, "Let the earth sprout vegetation, plants 
yielding seed, and fruit trees bearing fruit after their 
kind, with seed in them, on the earth," and it was so.
And the earth brought forth . . . .  (Gen. 1:11,12)
Then God said, "Let the earth bring forth living crea­
tures after their kind: Cattle and creeping things
and beasts of the earth after their kind;" and it 
was so. (Gen. 1:24)
Furthermore, the order and regularity of creation are promised to Noah
and are established as a covenant between Yahweh and creation:
While the earth remains,
Seedtime and harvest,
And cold and heat,
And summer and winter,
And day and night
Shall not cease. (Gen. 8:22)
■^Anderson, ibid., p. 729.
"^Biblical quotations are taken from the New American Standard 
Bible.
18
Anderson, ibid., p. 729.
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When the bow is in the cloud, then I will
look upon it, to remember the everlasting covenant
between God and every living creature of all
flesh that is on the earth. (Gen. 9:16; cf. 9:13-17)
Additional examples of Yahweh establishing order are numerous:
Do you know the ordinances of the heavens,
Or fix their rule over the earth? (Job 38:33)
Thou didst set a boundary that they may not pass over;
That they may not return to cover the earth. (Ps. 104:9)
He has also established them forever and ever;
He has made a decree which will not pass away. (Ps. 148:6)
Who gives rain in its season,
Both the autumn rain and the spring rain,
Who keeps for us
The appointed weeks of the harvest. (Jer. 5:24)
Thus says the Lord,
Who gives the sun for light by day,
And the fixed order of the moon
and the stars for light by night,
Who stirs up the sea so that its waves roar; 
the Lord of hosts is His name:
"If this fixed order departs
From before Me," declares the Lord,
"Then the offspring of Israel also shall cease
From being a nation before Me for ever." (Jer. 31:35,36)
Jeremiah also expresses the Israelite view that all creation
belongs inalienably to God the Creator and thus he is in control,
nothing is impossible to him.
Ah Lord God! Behold, Thou hast made the heavens and 
the earth by Thy great power and Thine outstretched 
arm! Nothing is too difficult for Thee . . . (Jer. 32:17)
Finally, Gerhard Trenkler summarizes the magnitude of this creative
act depicting the absolute lordship of the Creator over creation:
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Matter belongs inalienably to him. Nothing is impossible 
to him (Jer. 32:17). Viewed from his standpoint the cos­
mos shrinks to the dimensions of a mere toy. He measures 
the oceans in the hollow of his hand and marks off the 
heavens with a span (Is. 40:22). He sets Leviathan, the 
monster, swimming about in the sea like a goldfish in an 
aquarium (Ps. 104:26). All nature belongs to him: he 
overthrows mountains, shakes the earth out of its place, 
commands the sun (Job 9:57), and so on.-^
Clearly the Israelites’ view of creation is the antithesis to the
modern view of autonomous Nature. Their view of order in creation
radically disagrees with the modern mechanistic view of the laws of
nature as imminent forces forming a universe. In disagreement with
this modern view and in the spirit of the Old Testament, Donald MacKay
argues that "The laws of nature we discover are not alternatives to
divine activity, but only our codification of that activity in its
20normal manifestations." In other words, we do not have a mechanical 
system of autonomous laws working in creation, but a Creator working 
in and through his laws.
Creation as History
The ancient Hebrew view of creation also stands in contrast to 
the views of Israel’s neighbors.
19Gerhard Trenkler, "Creation," Sacramentum Verbi: An Encyclo­
pedia of Biblical Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970),
p. 148.
20Donald M. MacKay, The Clock Work Image (Downers Grove, Illinois: 
Inter Varsity Press, 1974), p. 60.
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In various ways ancient people affirmed that the world 
emerged out of primordial chaos. In Babylonian mythology 
the origin of the three-storied universe was traced to 
a fierce struggle between divine powers that emerged 
from uncreated chaos - Marduk the god of order and Tiamat 
the goddess of chaos . . . .  Although the Bible takes 
for granted the contours of ancient cosmology, it has 
demythologized the ancient understanding of existence.
The Old Testament contains no theogony, no myth which 
traces creation to a primordial battle between divine 
powers, no ritual which enables men to repeat the myth­
ological drama and thereby ensure the surpremacy of the 
national god. Mythological allusions have been torn out 
of their ancient context of polytheism and nature religion, 
and have acquired a completely new meaning within the 
historical syntax of Israel’s faith.^
Israel's "creation faith" as expressed in the creation stories of 
Genesis, Isaiah, and various psalms (e.g., Pss. 8; 19; 104) pre­
supposes and yet radically transforms the cosmological views of 
antiquity. Yahweh's creative work was understood and expressed as
a polemic against the creation stories of the Babylonians, Egyptians,
22and Canaanites. Genesis begins not with "In the beginning chaos," 
but with "In the beginning God." No struggle takes place between 
order and chaos; rather, God simply and powerfully says, "Let there 
be." Thus the pagan cosmogonies of Israel's neighbors are denied 
by Israel’s creation faith. Creation of the cosmos out of primordial- 
eternal stuff is rejected by Israel. Only Yahweh is eternal. Israel 
does not speculate about an origin of Yahweh.
21Anderson, ibid., p. 726.
22Anderson, ibid., p. 727; Cf. John Reumann, Creation and New 
Creation (Minneapolis: Augsbury Publishing House, 1973), pp. 33-34;
and Claus Westermann, Creation, trans. John J. Scullion (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1974), pp. 44-45.
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Nor are Israel's creation stories meant to be cosmogonies.
While affirming that Yahweh is the Creator, the Hebrews are somewhat 
relaxed about how Yahweh created the world. As Claus Westermann 
points out:
The Old Testament never speaks of belief in the Creator 
. . . and Creation or belief in Creation never occurs 
in the confessions of faith of the Old Testament . . . .
One can easily see the reason: for the man of the Old
Testament it was not possible that the world could have 
originated in any other way. Creation was not an article 
of faith because there was simply no alternative . . . .
The question, how did God create the world, could never 
have been a question of faith for the man of the Old 
Testament. There could be quite different opinions about 
this . . . .  Consequently the Old Testament presents not 
one but many Creation accounts.^3
Thus, the biblical stories of creation are not prescientific
attempts to explain the origin or evolution of the universe; rather
they reveal the Who and wherefore of creation. They reveal that
Creator, creation, and history are inseparably related.
. . . creation is the starting point of history. It 
sets the stage for the unfolding of the divine purpose 
and inaugurates a historical drama within which first 
Israel and, in the fulness of time, the church were 
destined to play a key role . . . .  In this view, 
creation is a temporal event, the beginning of a move­
ment of history.
This means that creation is an open system not closed; its future is 
not wholly or necessarily determined by past or present. It is open 
to communication from without. The final state is different from the 
beginning. Creation as historical event is three things: beginning,
23Westermann, ibid., p. 5.
24Anderson, ibid., p. 727.
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present activity, and future consumation (restoration). Creation as 
historical-relational-event, rather than autonomous nature, is per­
haps the main thread running through the ancient Hebrews* view of 
creation.
Understanding creation as historical event means for instance,
that the creation stories of Genesis 1 and 2 are, "inseparable from
the narratives that follow it: the call of Abraham, the deliverance
from Egypt, the guidance through the wilderness, and the inheritance
25
of the Promised Land." The God who acted in the beginning continues 
to act and work in creation-history. The One who creates light and 
darkness also brings peace and calamity (Is. 45:7); brings down 
princes and undercuts the rulers of the earth (Is. 40:23); forms the 
people Israel for himself (Is. 43:21) and makes all people great 
according to his will (1 Chr. 29:11,12).
^Anderson, ibid.
26Although the importance of Israel's creation faith is its 
concept of creation as historical event, this does not rule out the 
acceptance of some of its neighbors' cosmological views. A three- 
storied universe is taken for granted: heaven, earth, and underworld
(Ex. 20:4). "According to this Weltbild, the earth is a flat surface, 
corrugated by mountains and divided by rivers and lakes. Above the 
earth— like a huge dome— is spread the firmament, which holds back 
the heavenly ocean and supports the dwelling place of the gods (Gen. 
1:8, Ps. 148:4). The earth itself is founded upon pillars which are 
sunk into the subterranean waters (Pss. 24:2, 104:5), in the depths 
of which is located Sheol. In this view, the habitable world is 
surrounded by the waters of chaos, which, unless held back, would 
engulf the world in chaos (Gen. 7:11; cf. 1:6)." Anderson, ibid., 
pp. 725-26.
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Creation and Covenant
The Israelites not only had the security of a world and history
inseparably linked by a personal Creator, but they were promised con­
tinuity: a continuing relationship between Creator and creation. The
source and form of this promise is a covenant initiated by the Creator.
Numerous covenants were established: already mentioned was the cove­
nant made between Yahweh and creation after the flood (Gen. 9:11-17).
In Genesis 15 and 17 God initiates a covenant with Abraham. Abraham 
is promised to be the father of a multitude of nations, and the land 
of Canaan is promised to Abraham and his descendents. Notice that the 
covenant is conceived and established by God, not Abraham. It is 
God's covenant in that he will fulfill the promises therein. Abraham 
accepted Sara's plan for producing Ishmael as heir, but God had made 
an absolute covenant with Abraham, that is, Isaac, not Ishmael, was 
God's plan to fulfill the covenant. Therefore Isaac would still be 
born according to God's plan, despite Sara's advanced age.
Israel thus understood the relationship between the Creator and 
creation as essentially that of a covenant.
For the belief that "heaven and earth" or "everything"
(Ps. 8:6; Is. 44:24) is dependent upon Yahweh the 
Creator is a derivative from Israel's covenant under­
standing that her whole life is dependent upon the God 
who delivered his people and bound them to himself. The 
covenant, rather than rational principle, is the ground 
of the unity of creation.^
27Anderson, ibid., p. 727.
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The covenant was a pledge of Yahweh’s allegiance to creation; 
it would be upheld by his sustaining activity. This faith is expres­
sed in numerous passages (e.g., Jer. 10:13; Pss. 65:9,10; Lev. 26:4f.; 
Job 5:10):
Thou dost visit the earth, and cause it to overflow;
Thou dost greatly enrich it;
The stream of God is full of water;
Thou dost prepare their grain, for thus Thou dost 
prepare the earth.
Thou dost water its furrows abundantly;
Thou dost settle its ridges;
Thou dost soften it with showers;
Thou dost bless its growth. (Ps. 65:9,10)
It is in Isaiah, however, that we find the covenantal relationship 
between Yahweh and creation fully developed and applied to Israel's 
historical situation.
The Israelite faith in the Yahweh of covenant (and exodus, e.g., 
out of Egypt) was shattered by the Babylonian captivity. The Baylonian 
nature-gods appeared to have swallowed up the tiny nation of Israel 
and its God. Isaiah, therefore, makes a spirited appeal to remember 
that Yahweh is the God of Creation and covenant. Isaiah reaffirms 
and attempts to reestablish Israel’s faith in Yahweh as Creator and 
Sustainer of history. Yahweh is not depicted as simply in control of 
creation - this would be too similar to baal worship - but also in
control of history. The link between creation and history is re­
established to reveal the power and sovereignty of Yahweh in contrast
, 28
to the impotent Babylonian nature-gods.
28A. D. Matthews, "The Prophetic Doctrine of Creation," Church 
Quarterly Review 166 (1965), pp. 148-49.
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Moreover, Yahweh alone is the God behind the deeds that Isaiah
often describes by the Hebrew word "bara" (create or make). These
deeds have been revealed beforehand so that the "stiff-necked"
Israelites might know whose hand created them and might not say,
"My idol has done them, and my graven image and my molten image have
commanded them" (Is. 48:5).
They are created now and not long ago;
And before today you have not heard them.
Lest you should say, "behold, I knew them." (Is. 48:7)
Here is Yahweh in a seemingly direct and current act of creation.
Apparently before now these new things (that is, deliverance from
Babylon) had not been created, but now, that is, the day of Isaiah's
prophetic utterance, they were created even though they would not
29
appear in human history for some time. This is a good example of
the Hebrew link between Yahweh as Creator and as covenantal Sustainer
of history. In yet another place, Isaiah uses a past historic event
and incorporates the creation element of Yahweh's power:
But now thus says Yahweh; 
he who created you, 0 Jacob, 
he who formed you, 0 Israel:
"Fear not, for I have redeemed you;
I have called you by name, you are mine." (Is. 43:1)
Thus we see that Isaiah's thought is similar to the early Israelites: 
Yahweh is the God of Creation and History. But Isaiah has much more 
to say about this God of Creation and History than these two passages
29Edward J. Young, The Book of Isaiah (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1972), vol. 3, pp. 250-52.
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reveal. Isaiah mounts a spirited attack on the idols and nature-
gods of the Babylonian exile period.
The whole of Isaiah 40 is concerned with the greatness of Yahweh
over against idols and nature-gods. His greatness is explained in
terms of his power in and over creation; He is the Lord of Creation.
It is he who measured the waters, marked off the heavens and weighed
the mountains (Is. 40:12). Idols are made by men; it even takes a
skilled craftsman to make an idol that will not fall over (Is. 40:20).
The folly of idolatry is humorously ridiculed in Is. 44, where a tree
is cut down and used for firewood and an idol:
And no one recalls, nor is there knowledge, or under­
standing to say, "I have burned half of it in the fire, 
and also have baked bread over its coals. I roast meat 
and eat it. Then I make the rest of it into an abomi­
nation, I fall down before a block of wood!" (Is. 44:19)
The stars which were of particular interest to the Babylonian
religious system of nature-gods and idol worship are brought into
proper perspective by Yahweh:
Lift up your eyes on high.
And see who has created these stars,
The One who leads forth their host by number 
He calls them all by name; (Is. 40:26)
Whereas Babylonian cosmogony held that chaos first existed, and out
of this the gods emerged, Isaiah declares: Yahweh is the "first"
and "last." He formed the cosmos and did not create it to be chaos,
but formed it to be inhabited (Is. 45:18).
The Babylonian nature-gods included forces of nature, chaotic
forces of darkness of the depths of the earth which could bring chaos
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and woe. To these supposed forces, before which the Babylonians burned
incense, Yahweh says:
I am the Lord, and there is no other,
The One forming light and creating darkness,
Who makes happiness and creates woe;
I am the Lord who does all these. (Is. 45:6f.)
Yahweh also ridicules the Babylonian New Year Festival when, according
to Stuhlmueller, "the Enuma Elis [Babylonian creation story] was
chanted and the creation gods were carried through the streets 
30. . . ." Yahweh*s response is:
They have no knowledge,
Who carry about their wooden idols . . .
Who has announced this from of old . . . ?
Is it not I, the Lord?
And there is no other God besides Me. (Is. 45:20f.)
Yahweh taunts the nature-gods to announce and declare what is going
to take place (Is. 41:22). But there is no response, they are of no
account (Is. 41:24). These false gods are divested of their false
powers and toppled from their stolen positions. They are reduced to
wind and waste:
Behold all of them are false;
Their works are worthless,
Their molten images are wind and empitness. (Is. 41:29)
Thus Isaiah dealt for the Israelites a devastating blow to the 
gods of the Babylonian state religion. This was no small victory for 
the exiled nation, for the people of Israel found themselves engulfed 
by these monstrous, deified powers of chaos and heavenly bodies. In
30Carrol Stuhlmueller, "The Theology of Creation in Second 
Isaiah," Catholic Biblical Quarterly XXI (1959), p. 450.
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exile the nation of Israel appeared to be consumed by the Babylonian
gods. Thus the prophetic annihilation of these gods was necessary if
the Israelites were to understand the true nature of their exile.
Isaiah shows them that the exalted Babylonian deities of darkness and
31
chaos are not as imagined, but as God’s obedient servants:
I was angry with My people,
I profaned My heritage,
And gave them into your hand . . . .  (Is. 47:6)
But evil will come to you . . . .  (Is. 47:1)
There is none to save you. (Is. 47:15)
And to the Israelites Yahweh says:
Behold, I have refined you, but not as silver;
I have tested you in the furnace of affliction.
For My own sake, for my own sake, I will act;
For how can My name be profaned?
And My glory I will not give to another. (Is. 48:10f.)
The children of Israel had lost faith in Yahweh, their God of 
Covenant, Creation, and History. They had turned away from the God 
of their fathers to practice all sorts of abominations and idolatry. 
Indeed, for these very reasons came the destruction of Jerusalem and 
the exile to Babylon. Isaiah was given the message that not only 
would the exile take place, but also that Israel would be restored. 
But how could he convince a people who had lost faith in their God 
of Covenant (and exodus from Egypt) that they would be restored in 
a new exodus from Babylon? He did this particularly by revising 
their faith in Yahweh as Creator and thus Sustainer.
"^Ibid., p. 448.
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In Isaiah 48, it is Yahweh the Lord of Creation; the "first" and 
the "last," who called out Israel in the past and who will now deliver 
them from Babylon. It is Yahweh-Creator who founded the earth, the 
one who spread out the heavens with his right hand, who now calls them 
to assemble and listen (Is. 48:13). It is Yahweh-Creator who reveals 
future deeds of deliverance. It is the Lord of Creation, their Redee­
mer, (17) who says, "Go forth from Babylon! Flee from the Chaldeans! 
(20)."
A final example shows Isaiah's desire to link the power and pur­
poses of Yahweh the Creator-Redeemer-Sustainer with the future restor­
ation of Israel:
Thus says the Lord, your Redeemer, and the one who formed 
you from the womb; I, the Lord, am the maker of all things, 
stretching out the earth all alone, causing the omens of 
boasters to fail, making fools out of diviners, causing 
wise men to draw back, and turning their knowledge into 
foolishness . . . .  It is I who says of Jerusalem, "She 
shall be inhabited!" And of the cities of Judah, "They 
shall be built." (Is. 44:24-26)
Creation and Purpose
Purpose and meaning in creation are grounded in the God of Order,
History, and Covenant. Creation has purpose and meaning because it
is established by and for the eternal purposes of the Creator rather
than by chance, fate, or even man.
. . . creation faith affirsm that God alone is the cre­
ator of the meaning which supports all human history and 
the natural world which is the theater of the historical 
drama. Human history or nature do not secrete their own 
meaning. Rather, God's revelation creates the meaning 
which undergirds all existence. His Creative Word is the 
source of all being. So the psalmist affirms: By the
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word of the Lord the heavens were made and all their 
host by the breath of his mouth. Hence it is folly 
for men and nations to act as though their plans were 
determining the meaning of life. Let all the earth 
fear the Lora; let all inhabitants of the world stand 
in awe of him! For he spoke, and it came to be; he 
commanded, and it stood forth (Ps. 33:6-9)."^
For the ancient Hebrew the ultimate purpose of creation is the 
33 34glory, praise and joy of the Creator as effected by all of cre­
ation, each in its own way. Psalm 148 enlists a whole host of animate 
beings and inanimate objects to praise their Creator; which they do 
by simply being what they were created to be:
Let them praise the name of the Lord,
For He commanded and they were created.
He has also established them forever and ever;
He has made a decree which will not pass away.
Praise the Lord from the earth,
Sea-monsters and all deeps;
32Bernhard W. Anderson, "The Earth is the Lord's: An Essay on
the Biblical Doctrine of Creation," Interpretation IX (January 1955),
p. 6.
33Gerhard Trenkler, ibid., p. 149. In his opinion, the most 
important aspects of the relationship of the creature to his creator 
are "praise, trust and solidarity of all created things."
34 ..Kenneth Henry Maahs, The Theology of Human Ecological Respon­
sibility in the Old Testament," (Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Baptist 
Theological Seminary, March, 1972), p. 130: "According to Arthur
Weiser, [The Psalms: A Commentary, trans. Herbert Hartwell (Phila­
delphia: The Westminster Press, 1962), p. 669] Psalm 104 serves to 
forward one essential religious concept: God has created the world
for His own enjoyment in order that it might serve His purposes, the 
chief religious purpose (v. 26) being ". . . God’s joy in his creature 
('to play with him'), a joy that is entirely detached from any thought 
of human calculation or expediency (cf. Job 40:29)."
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Fire and hail, snow and clouds;
Stormy wind, fulfilling His word;
Mountains and all hills;
Fruit trees and all cedars;
Beasts and all cattle;
Creeping things and winged fowl;
Kings of the earth and all peoples;
Princes and all judges of the earth;
Both young men and virgins;
Old men and children.
Let them praise the name of the Lord. (Ps. 148:5-13)
The heavens are telling of the glory of God;
And the firmanent is declaring the work of his hands. (Ps. 19:1)
All Thy works shall give thanks to Thee, 0 Lord,
And Thy godly ones shall bless Thee. (Ps. 145:10)
All of creation exists to praise the Creator by being what it was 
created to be and doing what it was created to do. "The Lord has
made everything for its own purpose (Prov. 16:4)." Thus are the
high mountains a home for the wild goats and the rocky cliffs for 
the badgers (Ps. 104:18). The grass he grows for the cattle, vege­
tation for cultivation by man, and trees for the birds (Ps. 104:14-17). 
Each living creature looks to God and he gives them their food; he 
satisfies their desire (Ps. 145:15-16). Even the formidable lion
receives his prey from God (Job 38:39). And finally God says to all
his creatures, including man:
Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters in the 
seas, and let birds multiply on the earth . . . .
Let the earth bring forth living creatures after their
kind: cattle and creeping things and beasts of the
earth after their kind; and it was so . . .  . and God
saw that it was good (Gen. 1:22, 24-25).^5
■^Langdon Gilkey, Maker of Heaven and Earth (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), p. 78: ", . . when theologians
have spoken of the act of creation; they have used the analogy of
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And in the words of Bernhard Anderson,
. . . the doctrine of creation affirms that every crea­
ture is assigned a place in God’s plan in order that it 
may perform its appointed role in serving and glorifying 
the Creator.
This is magnificantly portrayed in the Priestly crea­
tion story [Gen. 1]. God "calls" each thing by its name, 
that is, he exercises his sovereignty by designating the 
peculiar nature and function of each creature. The heavenly 
bodies, for instance, are not celestial beings who control 
man's life, as was supposed in the astrological cults of 
antiquity; rather, they are servants of God whose appointed 
function is to designate the seasons and to separate the 
day from the night . . . .
It is man, however, who occupies a special place in the 
liturgy of creation . . . .  His task is to glorify God 
by filling the earth and subduing it, thereby acting as 
the appointed servant of his sovereign. In the J creation 
story [Gen. 2 and 3] the same truth is stated . . . .  he 
stands in an "I and thou" relation with his Maker and may 
be obedient, or disobedient, to the task which is given 
him: to dress and keep the garden.36
The man of God, although he knew himself to be dependent and con­
tingent like all creatures also knew that he was called into a coven-
37antal relationship to serve God and his purposes. He knew that he 
was called to be a part of creation-history that is purposeful and is 
going someplace; indeed, he was to be a steward of creation and a
human historical action. They have emphasized that this act was a 
free and intended act on the part of God, and that the purpose of 
this act was that ’it was good.’"
Of:
Anderson, "The Earth is the Lord's," ibid., pp. 14-15.
"^Gilkey, ibid., pp. 201, 204-5; and Anderson, "The Earth is the 
Lord's," ibid., p. 16. "The natural world is man's God-given habitat, 
wherein he is to find joy in the service of God. Thus the doctrine 
of creation frees man from the alternatives between which human 
thought often moves: either the materialistic enjoyment of the
natural world for its own sake, or the verdict that the world of 
change and death is essentially meaningless," Anderson, "Creation," 
ibid., p. 729.
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history maker. He was called to expend his energies in the meaning­
fulness of the "God created moment," not to seek to escape the con-
38
creteness and contingency of the moment. He knew that his ultimate
source of meaning and security in creation could only be found in the
Creator. Only in God could he be free of the terror and tyranny of
his own contingency and temporality. Only when he acknowledged his
dependence upon God as his ultimate source of existence and purpose
could he fully enter into creation and celebrate his dependence and
contingency in it. Only because he understood that his finite crea-
tureliness was good and significant could he celebrate his role as
39steward and history maker called in service to God.
Moreover, and in a more positive view, the ancient Israelite 
affirmed his creaturely existence as good because he was created in 
the image of God - imago Dei. But what might that mean? Anderson 
argues:
. . . the main import of the statement about the imago 
Dei is not to define man's essence in comparison to God, 
but to accent the special function which God has assigned 
to man in the creation. Man is designed to be God's 
representative, for he is the representation or image 
of God . . . .  Hence the statement about the imago Dei 
is appropriately followed immediately by the further state­
ment that God gives man a special blessing and commands 
him to exercise dominion over the earth.
The dignity of man is not based upon something intrinsic 
to human nature, such as "the infinite value of human 
personality." Man's worth [and identity] lies in his
38
Gilkey, ibid., p. 305.
39
Gilkey, ibid., pp. 121, 229-35; and Bernhard W. Anderson, Cre­
ation Versus Chaos (New York: Association Press, 1967), p. 81.
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relation to God. He is the creature whom God addresses, 
visits, and meets in fellowship; but above all he is 
dignified by the task which his sovereign gives him.
This special eminence of man in God's creation excites 
the wonder and praise of the psalmist:
"When I look at thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, 
the moon and the stars which thou hast established;
What is man that thou art mindful of him,
and the son of man that thou dost care for him?
Yet thou has made him little less than God, 
and dost crown him with glory and honor.
Thou hast given him dominion over the works of thy hands,
thou hast put all things under his feet . . . "
(Ps. 8:3-6) . . . .
As in Genesis 1, this high status endows man with a func­
tion given to no other creature: to have dominion over
the nonhuman creation. Man's rule on earth is to be 
exercised within the sovereignty of God. His "glory 
and honor" is the task which God has given him.^0
Walther Eichrodt, commenting on the imago Dei and Psalm 8, reminds
us, lest we forget, of the relative nature of our dominion.
. . . as a result of his being made in the image of God,
Man acquires not only supreme value, but also the power
for his work in the world, the programme of which is
summed up in the divine blessing: "Be fruitful and
multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it!" . . .
His duty of realizing the task laid upon him by God 
subordinates Man to the mighty teleological world 
movement, which by its own inner logic moves inexorably 
toward the concept of history.^-*-
And concerning Psalm 8 he says:
The almost defiant sense of power, and the naive joy in 
what man can achieve, as evinced in the lively descrip­
tion of his kingdom, [w. 7-9] rings with all the
^Anderson, "The Earth is the Lord's," ibid., pp. 17-18.
^Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2 vols., 
trans. J. A. Baker (Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1961-67),
vol. 2 (1967), p. 110.
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self-confidence of antiquity, and is given a distinc­
tive twist only by the fact that it is combined with the 
most profound reverance before the almighty Lord of crea­
tion. What makes the free sovereign power of the latter 
impressive is precisely the fact that the one whom he 
clothes with royal status is a weak and insignificant 
creature who by himself could never be more than an elo­
quent testimony to the complete impotence of created things 
. . . .  it is God's inconceivably marvellous power which 
alone is the basis of human self-confidence . . . .  it is 
a spiritual factor which determines the value Man sets 
upon himself, namely his consciousness of partnership with 
God, a privilege of which no other creature is considered 
worthy.^3
The New Testament reinforces the Old Testament's view of man's 
"partnership with God," of man's "worth and identity in his relation­
ship with God." Indeed, probably the central message of the New 
Testament is that God, in the person and work of Jesus, is redeeming 
and restoring humankind to their proper relationship with their 
Creator and to their proper task in creation.
Through Jesus Christ the ultimate purpose of God is 
revealed to be personal, fellowship with His creature 
man . . . .  For it is through man's personal trust 
and obedience that God's rule over man and man's 
enactment of God's purpose are both achieved . . . .  
the life of faith and obedience is a life in which the 
divine sovereignty is fulfilled, and in which God's 
rule over His creation is most perfectly accomplished.
Moreover, as a being rooted in God, man fulfills his 
own essential structure only through personal fellow­
ship with God: the creature becomes himself when he
lives in total dependence upon his Creator. Only 
through faith in God is man able to love his fellows,
^According to Eichrodt, Psalm 8 "is often compared to the hymn 
in praise of Man's dominion in the Antigone by Sophocles." Eichrodt, 
ibid., p. 120.
^Eichrodt, ibid., pp. 120-21.
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and so to realize in his life the harmony of creation 
which is God's own ultimate purpose in history.^
Both the Old and New Testaments speak with much similarity on the
role of God as Creator and Sustainer, and also of God's judgment and
ultimate restoration of creation.^
The eschatological aspect of the creation faith is more 
evident in J [Gen. 2 and 3] and the prophets than in the 
Priestly Source [Gen. 1] which lacks the story of Adam's 
revolt against his Creator. While the priest emphasizes 
God's sovereignty over the present world, the prophet sees 
the present under the stigma of divine judgment. For man, 
whose every imagination of the heart is only evil continually 
(Gen. 6:5), mars the goodness of the creation and thereby 
provokes the Creator to destroy the works of his hands.
The contrast between God's original intention for his 
creation and the sorry reality of the present is so sharp 
that, according to prophets, God himself must act, bringing 
judgment upon the world in order that he may create a new 
heaven and a new earth . . . .  Here, again, we see that 
from the Christian viewpoint the doctrine of Creation can­
not be separated from Heilsgeschichte - the history of the 
saving acts of God which is fulfilled in Jesus Christ. The 
whole of human history and all of nature stand under God’s 
signature in Christ. In Christ is laid bare the meaning 
which undergirds all existence; through him men acknowledge 
the God upon whom they are completely dependent; from him 
they hear anew the summons to a task within God's plan.
From this standpoint of faith the Christian community 
traces the purpose of God backward to the beginning, saying 
that "In Christ all things were created," and it traces the 
purpose forward to the consummation of history, saying that 
"God will sum up all things in Christ.
^Gilkey, ibid., pp. 275-76.
^"The chief difference is, of course, that the New Testament 
gives Jesus Christ a place in this, as agent or mediator of the 
creation." John Reumann, ibid., p. 84. For similarities between 
the New and Old Testaments on creation see, for example: John 1;
Rom. 8:19-23; 1 Cor. 8:6; 10:26; 2 Cor. 9:7-12; Eph. 2:10; Philip. 2: 
6-11; Col. 1:15-20; 3:10; Heb. 1:2-3; Rev. 21.
^Anderson, "The Earth is the Lord's," ibid., pp. 19-20.
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Conclusion
Environmental exigencies have stirred up studies in the history
of man's attitudes toward and perceptions of nature. Lynn White's
now famous article, "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,"
is one such study. He comes to the conclusion that the roots of the
crisis lie in the Old Testament view of man and nature where,
God planned all of this [creation] explicitly for man's 
benefit and rule: no item in the physical creation had
any purpose save to serve man's purposes. And, although 
man's body is made of clay, he is not simply part of nature:
he is made in God's image.
In that same year, 1967, another study was published, but much less
publicized, which does not concur with White. It was Traces on the
Rhodian Shore by Clarence Glacken.
Most striking, for our themes, is the idea of the dominion 
of man as expressed in Genesis, and repeatedly expressed 
in other writings, notably Psalm 8. But one must not read 
these passages with modern spectacles, which is easy to do
in an age like ours when "man's control over nature" is a
phrase that comes as easily as a morning greeting . . . .
Man's power as a vice-regent of God on earth is part of the 
design of the creation and there is in this fully elaborated 
conception far less room for arrogance and pride than the 
bare reading of the words would suggest.^®
1 would certainly agree with Glacken that a reading of Genesis 1 and
2 and Psalm 8 - without modern ideas of dominion as domination and 
tyranny - will reveal no sense of arrogant pride in the biblical view 
of creation. Also in disagreement with White is James Barr who
^White, ibid., p. 1205.
^Clarence J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967), p. 166.
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contends that "man made in the image of God" does not mean that as
49
God is sovereign over all, so man is likewise.
As God's living image on earth, man is to act as his
representative. He is the administrator of God's 
works . . . .  Man is to exercise sovereignty within
God's sovereignty, so that all earthly creatures may
be related to God through him."’®
God remains the Creator, Sustainer and Ruler of creation and all 
it contains. He is personally, intimately and powerfully involved in 
sustaining and ruling over all creatures and inanimate things for 
their well-being and thus His own praise, glory and joy.
The people of God understood themselves and the rest of creation 
to be utterly dependent on the Creator for order, history and purpose 
in creation. Even in their role of exercising sovereignty over cre­
ation they knew themselves to be functioning within and under the 
sovereignty of God. Their creaturely sovereignty was real but not 
absolute. Furthermore, the function and purpose of their sovereignty 
was to be servants of God to obtain His good purposes in creation- 
history. Commenting on the role of man as expressed in Genesis 2:15, 
John Black says:
The burden of the passage in Genesis is clear enough:
God put man into the world in order that he should look 
after it. The ultimate ownership of the world was never 
for a moment in doubt . . . .  Man is frequently reminded 
of his subordinate position; he may have been put on 
earth to look after it, but there is no suggestion of 
ownership at the time of creation, nor is there any
^  James Barr, "Man and Nature - The Ecological Controversy and 
the Old Testament," Bulletin, The John Rylands University Library 
55 (1972), p. 19.
^^Anderson, "Creation," ibid., p. 729.
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suggestion that in the course of time man might come to 
inherit the earth for himself, for instance as a reward 
for good management. Accordingly, the conclusion must 
be that the Hebrews believed that one reason for man's 
presence on earth was that he should look after it on 
behalf of God.51
Gilkey profoundly summarizes the biblical view of man in creation.
Under God, a divine purpose, in which our lives may by 
grace participate, runs through the chronological se­
quence of time. And because of God's love and power, 
no evil, whether of fate, sin, or death, can permanently 
separate our lives from that ultimately significant 
service
In Christian faith, concrete finite existence is given 
an eternal meaning which does not absorb but enhances the 
uniqueness of an individual person. A finite individual 
person, with all his peculiar talents, is not only freed 
from the terrors of contingency, the distortions of sin, 
and the fears of transiency, but also he is used crea­
tively for a significant work in his actual situation.
As a creature dependent on his Creator, each man's life 
in time can become good and meaningful. It is, therefore, 
finally through his faith in God as redeeming love, and 
his obedience to God's calling as providential Ruler, that 
the Christian can experience and understand the real good­
ness of God's creation. And the concrete meaning of his 
own creation as a unique individual person is revealed 
to him only when he finds that unique self restored to 
its Creator and called to its own peculiar task in God's
history.52
The dependence of man - indeed, all of creation - upon the sus­
taining work of the Creator is emphasized again and again in Scrip­
ture. This theme is so important to biblical people that really very 
little, in comparison, is said about the particulars of man's task 
as steward of creation. The emphasis is almost always on the ini­
tiating activity of God and the appropriate response of obedience
■^John N. Black, The Dominion of Man (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1970), pp. 48-49.
52Gilkey, ibid., p. 309.
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by man. But what is the appropriate response of obedience by man 
the steward? What does it mean to "have dominion" or "cultivate 
and keep" the earth? Although the Bible does not provide us with a 
program for "creation management" (that is man's task as steward), 
it does provide us with a vision of the principles and values of 
proper stewardship.
THE BIBLICAL VIEW OF STEWARDSHIP
What does it mean to "have dominion . . . over the earth"? One
man's answer to this question, which is pictured in the following
account, is not unusual, indeed, it may reflect a common notion.
Gavin Maxwell, the well-known writer of books about 
otters, described, in an article in the Observer for 
October 13, 1963, how he lost two lovely otter cubs 
brought back from Nigeria: "A minister of the Church
of Scotland, walking along the foreshore with a shot­
gun, found them at play by the tide's edge and shot 
them. One was killed outright, the other died of her 
wounds in the water. The minister," added Maxwell 
bitterly, "expressed regret, but reminded a journalist:
'The Lord gave man control over the beasts of the 
field . . . .'"53
Putting aside the apparent violation of private property, does domin­
ion entail license or responsibility in exercising our physical, 
technological powers in creation? And if not license, but rather 
responsibility is called for, then what does responsible dominion 
entail? Recent studies on this fundamental biblical and environ­
mental question have begun to unearth a biblical vision of human­
kind as stewards of God’s creation. Moreover, exegetical and word
53C. F. D. Moule, Man and Nature in the New Testament (Phila­
delphia: Fortress Press, 1967), p. 1.
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studies are providing the necessary foundation for understanding key 
words and concepts, such as: dominion or rule (radah) and steward­
ship (oikonomia) More work, however, remains to be done in sys­
tematizing a technology and philosophy (ethic) of stewardship which 
addresses contemporary problems.
The concept of stewardship appears to have been rediscovered 
around the turn of the century by the Protestant churches in the 
United States. At first it was restricted to mean tithing or service 
within the church and its congregational life. The concept slowly 
broadened and the United Stewardship Council of the Churches of 
Christ in America was formed in 1920. The council, after considering 
150 suggestions, produced a definition of stewardship in 1946, which 
read;
Christian stewardship is the practice of systematic and 
proportionate giving of time, abilities, and material 
possessions, based upon the conviction that these are 
trusts from God to be used in his service for the bene­
fit of all mankind in grateful acknowledgment of Christ's 
redeeming love.56
Economists will no doubt recognize oikonomia for as John 
Reumann notes, "From this term oikonomia, which views the cosmos as 
a well-organized city-state (polis) or household (oikos), we get our 
term 'economics,' denoting the management of this (cosmic) household." 
See his book Creation and New Creation, p. 11.
"^Our lack of a robust theology of stewardship is, of course, 
partially due to the newness of perceived environmental problems, but 
more importantly due to the heavy theological emphasis on redemption 
to the exclusion of creation since the Englightenment.
■^Helge Brattgard, God’s Stewards: A Theological Study of the
Principles and Practices of Stewardship, trans. Gene J. Lund 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1963), p. 5.
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This definition was soon criticized for implying that stewardship was
simply a function of "giving" rather than a "God-man relationship of a
57total nature . . . Subsequent studies further broadened the con­
cept and produced more inclusive definitions. For example, from three 
early, prominent writers on stewardship:
No area of his [man's] existence is excluded from the 
claims of Christ upon him. Because the Lordship of 
Christ includes everything - both in heaven and earth - 
all of life is sacred . . . .  When Paul said, "Whatso­
ever ye do, do all to the glory of God" (1 Cor, 10:31), 
he made specific mention of the everyday need of eating 
and drinking . . . .  in the language of the New Testa­
ment, stewardship means, simply, to be a worker together 
with Christ (2 Cor. 6 :1).58
Acknowledgment of the absolute sovereignty of God and 
of the instrumental nature of the things he has cre­
ated leads to another basic thought of stewardship; the 
thought of responsible trusteeship. We are neither the 
lords of creation nor slaves of "the elemental spirits 
of the universe" [Col. 2:8] but stewards to whom the 
Creator and Owner of all things has entrusted what 
belongs to him for the realization of his purpose with 
regard to it.59
. . . stewardship is concerned with nothing less than 
man's responsibility to God as he participates in the 
whole technological-industrial-distributional system of 
his environment context. For stewardship is the active 
recognition of the sovereignty of God over his whole 
creation; over the creative and productive processes 
in which men share and the uses to which they put all
57Ibid.
co
A. C. Conrad, The Divine Economy: A Study in Stewardship
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), pp. 122, 157-58.
CQ
T. A. Kantonen, A Theology for Christian Stewardship 
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1956), p. 36.
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of the resources and means that come under their care 
and control.
Thus, the biblical concept of stewardship has grown from a limited 
notion of individual tithing for the support of the local church into 
a fairly inclusive view of responsible living under the sovereignty 
of God. And yet, as T. K. Thompson notes, our understanding of stew­
ardship has not progressed very far if it simply means "the practice 
of the Christian religion," however true that may be . ^  It would be 
helpful if we could begin to discern between responsible and irre­
sponsible stewardship; for who today is not calling for "responsible 
and wise use of our environment?"
Stewardship as Responsible Dominion Over Creation
In a study of the Hebrew root word radah (dominion or rule),
James Limburg observes that the word, as used outside of Gen. 1:26-28,
always denotes human relationships. For example, it is used as the
rule of a king over his subjects (1 Kings 4:24; Ps. 72:8; Ezek. 34:4);
a master over a hired servant (Lev. 25:43); chief officers over
62
laborers (1 Kings 5:16). He suggests that a "king/people 
60Albert Terrill Rasmussen, "Stewardship in an Economy of Abun­
dance," in Stewardship in Contemporary Theology, ed. by Thomas K. 
Thompson (New York: Association Press, 1960), p. 232.
^Thomas K. Thompson, "The Praxis of Stewardship in North Ameri­
ca," in Christian Stewardship in Ecumenical Confrontation (New York: 
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1961), p. 28.
62James Limburg, "What Does it Mean to 'Have Dominion Over the 
Earth'?" Dialog 10 (1971) pp. 221-23. Cf. Claus Westermann, ibid., 
pp. 51-53.
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relationship provides the model for understanding the man/earth-and-
63
its-creatures relationship as portrayed in Genesis 1:26-28." Two of
the texts cited provide first a positive, then a negative description
of the proper rule of a king over his people. The first text reads:
May he judge Thy people with righteousness,
And Thine afflicted with justice . . . .
May he vindicate the afflicted of the people,
Save the children of the needy,
And crush the oppressor . . . .
For he will deliver the needy when he cries for help,
The afflicted also, and him who has no helper,
He will have compassion on the poor and needy,
And the lives of the needy he will save.
He will rescue their life from oppression and violence;
And their blood will be precious in his sight . . . .
(Ps. 72:2, 4, 12-14)
Contrary to those who think the biblical injunction "have dominion"
means arrogant, despotic, tyrannical exploitation, Psalm 72 describes
the dominion of the king as judging with righteousness and justice
which results in saving the oppressed and needy and crushing the 
64
oppressor.
The second text, which provides a negative example of kingly
rule, is an indictment brought against the kings of Israel who were
not shepherding the people,
Woe, shepherds of Israel who have been feeding themselves!
Should not the shepherd feed the flock? You eat the fat 
and clothe yourselves with the wool, you slaughter the fat 
sheep without feeding the flock. Those who are sickly
63Ibid., p. 222.
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Three examples of misunderstood notions of dominion are: Lynn
White, ibid., p. 1205; Ian L. McHarg, Design With Nature (Garden City, 
N.Y.: The Natural History Press, 1969), p. 26; and Hugh H. Macaulay
and Bruce Yandle, Environmental Use and the Market (Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 1977), pp. 7-8.
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you have not strengthened, the diseased you have not 
healed, the broken you have not bound up, the scat­
tered you have not brought back, nor have you sought 
for the lost; but with force and with severity you 
have dominated them. (Ezek. 34:2b-4)
Limburg concludes that radah, as employed by the author of Genesis
1:26-28, in no way implies domination or exploitation.
To rule with "force and harshness," i.e., to exploit 
rather than to care for, is to misrule! . . .  to 
"have dominion" over the earth and its creatures 
. . . .  man is called to exercise responsible care 
for the fish, the birds, the cattle, that which 
creeps on the earth, even the earth i t s e l f .^5
A Moral Relationship Between Man and Creation
Further light has been shed upon this biblical view of the 
steward as a shepherd-king by the recognition of a moral relation­
ship between man and creation. Among the relevant texts the classic 
is the encounter between God and a disobedient Adam in Genesis 3:17-19 
where creation itself suffers as a result of man's sin. A second well 
known text is Isaiah 11:5-9 where, apparently in response to the wise
and righteous ruler from Jesse's stock, nature is blessed with a har-
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mony of peaceful relationships. Another vivid example is Hosea 4: 
1-3 where deception, murder, stealing, adultery and violence have
Limburg, ibid., p. 223. Cf. Eichrodt, ibid., p. 127; Eric C. 
Rust, Science and Faith: Towards a Theological Understanding of
Nature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 307-8; Emil
Brunner, Christianity and Civilization, 2 vols. (London: Nisbet and
Co., 1948-49) vol. 1 (1949), p. 89; Hugh Montefiore, Can Man Survive? 
(London: Fontana, 1970), pp. 55, 71-72; and Carl E. Braaten, Christ
and Counter-Christ: Apocalyptic Themes in Theology and Culture
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), pp. 129-31.
^Moule, ibid., pp. 5-6.
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replaced faithfulness, kindness and knowledge of God, thus causing all
parts of creation to suffer.
Therefore the land mourns,
And every one who lives in it languishes 
Along with the beasts of the field and the 
birds of the sky;
And also the fish of the sea disappear. (Hosea 4:3)
For a final example from the Old Testament, Rust observes that the
promised land of Israel was wed to God:
"Beulah" land, married to Yahweh, just as they themselves
were Yahweh's people [Isa. 62:4] . . .  . So long as
Yahweh is with His people and they are not cut off from
Him by sin, so long Israel will be Beulah land; but when ^
they are cast off and forsaken, it becomes "Desolate" . . . .
The most striking example of this thought found in the New Testament
occurs in Romans 8. Moule paraphrases Rom. 8:19-23:
For creation, with eager expectancy, is waiting for 
the revealing of the sons of God. For creation was 
subjected to frustration, not by its own choice but 
because of Adam’s sin which pulled down nature with 
it, since God had created Adam to be in close connec­
tion with nature. But the disaster was not unattended 
by hope - the hope that nature, too, with man, will be 
released from its servitude to decay, into the glorious 
freedom which characterizes man when he is a true and 
obedient son of God. For, up to the present time, we 
know that the shole of creation joins together in common 
groaning and agony; and not only creation in general, 
but we Christians too - even though we have the Holy 
Spirit as a foretaste of that hope - groan inwardly in
f \ 7
Eric C. Rust, Nature and Man in Biblical Thought, Lutterworth 
Library (London: Lutterworth Press, 1953), vol. 40, p. 51. Cf.
Eichrodt, ibid., p. 119. The biblical texts cited are only a few 
of many where man's sin results in the land being defiled, for 
example: Deut. 24:4; Lev. 18:25-28; 20:22; Jer. 2:7; 3:lf.; 16:18;
Ezek. 36:17f.
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our longing for that adoption as sons which means the 
release of our bodily existence from decay . . . .6®
A summary statement by Rust provides an overview of the biblically
perceived moral relationship between man and creation.
The relation of the people to God is reflected in their 
relation to, and in the state of, the natural order in 
which their life is lived. Let man sin, and the whole 
cosmos turns against him. Let man reject the living 
God and his judgment is reflected in the way in which 
the natural order hits back at him . . . .  A lack of 
concern for his fellows and the divine plan of fellow­
ship leads to a lack of harmony in the whole universe, 
in which the balance of nature is upset and in which 
nature itself becomes the medium of the divine judgment 
upon a sinful civilization or people.^9
The conclusion to be drawn is that man, called to be a steward 
of creation, can and does reject his calling to the peril of creation 
including his own good life. He rejects it by denying his dependence 
upon the Creator. He rejects it by "worshipping" the creation 
(natural or man-made) and thereby becoming spiritually dependent upon
68Moule, ibid., p. 10. For similarity cf. Robinson, ibid., pp. 
31-32. Reflecting on Romans 8, Joseph Sittler says, "One is not 
falling into words only in sentiment or poetic fancy but extrapolating 
from a clear theological position when he makes the affirmation that 
Christianly Lake Michigan must be regarded as ’groaning in travil, 
waiting to be set free from its bondage of decay.' . . .  A proper 
doctrine of creation and redemption would make it perfectly clear 
that from a Christian point of view the ecological crisis presents 
us not simply with moral tasks but requires of us a freshly reno­
vated and fundamental theology of the first article whereby the 
Christian faith defines whence the Creation was formed, and why, and 
by whom, and to what end." "Ecological Commitment as Theological 
Responsibility," Zygon 5 (June 1970), p. 179.
69Rust, Nature and Man in Biblical Thought, ibid. For similarity 
cf. Moule, ibid., pp. 13-14; and Robinson, ibid., pp. 31-32.
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it rather than upon the Creator. Man can be a steward and exercise 
dominion over creation only as he is spiritually (although, not 
physically) independent of it. To be a steward is to be free from 
the dread of a contingent creation; it is to know, with Job, that 
in the Lord's hand, "is the life of every living thing, and the 
breath of all mankind (Job 12:10)."
God's Sovereignty and Ownership
Job recognizes, as his friends have not, that the Creator is
not only transcendent, but also the sovereign "giver and maintainer
of life . . . .  Job is not the cosmic housekeeper. God is."^ A
partial understanding of God's sovereignty over creation vis-a-vis
man's stewardship, is that God retains complete ownership of 
71
creation.
^James M. Houston, I Believe in the Creator (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1980), pp. 197-98.
^Indeed, only a partial understanding is possible because in 
Houston's words (pp. 196-99), "The mystery of the meaning of creation 
is God's, and man can never fully explore it. This is eloquently 
described in the didactic poem of Job 28. Man as Homo faber can 
accomplish incredible feats . . . .  But the most precious reality 
of all is the mystery of creation, which he will never discover by 
his own unaided skills. Only God knows its place and purpose. It 
is beyond the reach of man. Thus to say the creation is ordered and 
meaningful . . .  is not to say it is fully understandable . . . .  
the writer of Ecclesiastes, Qoheleth, points out that the created 
world cannot be an end in itself. This is the 'vanity of vanities' 
. . .  to assume that man can absolutise any created things as if it 
were God the Creator, or as if it were a compensation for His absence 
. . . . So Job's repentance lies in accepting once again that he is 
only a creature, who can trust the Creator when he cannot know His 
ways."
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It is the Creator’s prerogative to declare:
"The world and all that is in it is mine
[Ps. 50:12]"; "Every beast of the forest is
mine, the cattle on a thousand hills [Ps. 50:10]";
"The silver is mine, and the gold is mine [Hag. 2:8]."
If God is God, then man can actually never own
anything.^2
Brattgard calls into question a m o d e m  view of "our possessions" in
contrast to Luther's view.
Modern man is often said to believe in the good God 
who is Creator of all . . . .  But to do this, 
according to Luther, one must live his life as a
steward. It is thus that one recognizes his total
dependence upon the Creator, at the same time that 
he permits his gifts to go through his hands in order 
to serve others and to praise God. This kind of faith 
excludes the egotistical ideas that there is something 
which really belongs to man, which he has at his own 
disposal.^
Also questioning a modern view of possessions, Quanbeck comments on
the so-called "stewardship parables" of Jesus.
The teaching of Jesus in these parables differs 
radically from our viewpoint today. It is first 
of all a denial of man's autonomy, of his freedom 
and competence to manage his own affirs. Man owns 
nothing at all in the biblical view, not even his 
own life. He has been placed in the world through 
God's sovereign freedom, is maintained in life and 
health through God's sustaining goodness, and pos­
sesses all that he has as a trust from his Creator.
Man's presumption of autonomy is not a sign of his 
peculiar glory as the crown of creation, as is often 
supposed in liberal humanism, but rather an expres­
sion of his sin, of the egocentricity that separates 
him from God and flaws his life. Man is most truly
72
Kantonen, ibid., p. 33.
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Brattgard, ibid., p. 142. Also see his comments (p. 86) on 
the sabbatical year and the year of jubilee which were "of special 
assistance to the Israelites who were to live in a right relation­
ship to property and ownership . . . ."
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himself, not when he struts about in pride of ability 
and possession, but when he sees himself as a creature 
of God and submits to the will of his Creator which is 
his true happiness.^
Needless to say, few moderns - Christians or otherwise - manage their
possessions or property as gifts from God who remains absolute owner.
That is to say, the biblical concept of stewardship, for the most
part, is not in operation either individually or institutionally.
More important than the question of what extent it may or may not be
presently operative, however, is the question: how would it affect
our economic theory of "optimal" resource allocation? As we will see
in the next chapter, a biblical theory of stewardship - as a normative
foundation for our economic theories of value, welfare, and "optimal"
allocation - has some radical implications for neoclassical economic
theory founded on individualistic, subjectivistic premises.
Conclusion
The biblical goal and task for man in relation to creation is to 
be God's steward. He is given the responsibility of discerning, 
developing and exercising dominion over the earth that it might not 
be a "waste place, but rather be inhabited" (Isa. 45:18). Lynn White
Warren A. Quanbeck, "Stewardship in the Teachings of Jesus," 
in Stewardship in Contemporary Theology, ibid. pp. 47-48. For similar 
conclusions about the absolute ownership of property by God and the 
relative rights of stewardship of man, cf., Black, ibid., p. 60; 
Brunner, ibid., p. 95; Conrad, ibid., pp. 156-57; Denys L. Munby, 
Christianity and Economic Problems (London: Macmillan, 1956), p. 37;
and Richard L. Scheef, Jr., "Stewardship in the Old Testament," in 
Stewardship in Contemporary Theology, ibid. pp. 19-20.
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has argued that our ecological crisis is spiritual; but the crisis 
is not - as he believes - due to the biblical vision of man’s dominion 
over creation. Just the opposite; it is due to the lack of such a 
vision; a vision of man’s dominion as a stewardship of the welfare 
of all creation.
Although the Bible reveals that man is to be the steward and not 
the owner - fundamentally responsible to and dependent upon the Cre­
ator not the creation - it does not reveal a ready-made set of "Chris­
tian" political and economic institutions. This is not to say, 
however, that any institution or relationship is as good as another.
It is to say that perfect institutions, as well as, perfect knowledge 
are as common as perfect human beings. Consequently, the steward is 
not called to ground his faith and hope in institutions or individuals 
but in God. And yet, Scripture is rife with principles for doing 
good and ruling wisely, but lest we slip into a simplistic, reduc- 
tionistic view of biblical wisdom and its vision of stewardship let 
us be reminded of this fallacy in Job’s friends. As Houston notes:
Unlike Proverbs, which teaches that there are ordi­
nances that are useful in gaining wisdom, the book 
of Job teaches that to live in a meaningful world 
one needs to cultivate proper attitudes rather than 
depend upon simple answers. Relating to God is more 
profound than knowing about God . . . .  The mystery 
of the meaning of creation is God's, and man can 
never fully explore it [cf. Job 28] . . . .  The 
mistake made by Job's three friends . . .  is to 
reduce God to workable definitions, so that they 
depend on systems of knowledge and belief, not the 
living Creator.75
Houston, ibid., pp. 196-97.
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In other words, the steward is not called to do what only the Creator 
can do, that is, inaugurate and complete his kingdom. The Christian's 
hope is a New Heaven and New Earth wherein God will dwell with his 
people (Rev. 21:1-2). Nevertheless, our calling as we live in the 
"between times" is to live as signs of the coming kingdom which, 
indeed, becomes an annunciation, anticipation, and even an approxi­
mation of God's eschatological kingdom.^
^Carl E. Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics (Minneapolis: Augsburg 
Publishing House, 1974), pp. 109-11.
CHAPTER 4
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF STEWARDSHIP 
FOR ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY
A biblical theory of humankind's stewardship of a good and
valuable creation has recently begun to emerge as a model for human
valuation and choice. The theory reaffirms a long-standing Hebrew-
Christian tradition: "that creation exists to glorify God, not to
provide happiness to human beings;" and "that man is not so much the
2
possessor of the world as a tenant on his Master's estate." It 
follows that the general purpose of mankind as tenant is to manage 
the estate according to its general purpose: to glorify its Creator.
To fully determine how creation might be managed, in order to glorify 
the Creator, is neither a task for the fainthearted nor for a single 
dissertation. A much more manageable endeavor is the following:
First, contrast neoclassical economic theory's subjective view of 
value with a stewardship theory of objective value. Second, deter­
mine whether or not the normative premises and conclusions of Pareto 
optimal allocation of natural resources are compatible with steward­
ship premises and conclusions. Third, contrast the so-called new
•^ ■Roger L. Shinn, "Calvin Revisited, Revised," Christianity and 
Crisis 42 (July 12, 1982), p. 219.
2
R. V. Young, Jr., "A Conservative View of Environmental 
Affairs," Environmental Ethics 1 (Fall 1979), p. 254.
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economic theory of property rights with a stewardship approach to 
property. Fourth, in the last chapter (Chapter 5), show how a 
stewardship theory of objective value calls for an allocation of 
resources different from neoclassical theory in the specific area 
of renewable resources and the extinction of species. Before embark­
ing on this task it will be helpful to begin by defining some crucial 
terms.
OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE VALUE
3
Georgescu-Roegen, in his article on "Utility," points to four 
different views of value in its long and tortuous history. First, 
the position of the "ancient Greeks" was that value is "an intrinsic 
quality of the object of value and a subjective evaluation by the
4
user." Second, moving away from the Greek view,
economic thought was dominated for centuries by com­
modity fetishism: "the value of a thing lies in the
things itself," as we find it frankly stated by J. B.
Say. . . . value is determined by the amount of labor 
crystallized in the commodity.5
The third view,
a reaction against commodity fetishism . . . swung 
to the opposite extreme: "A thing does not have
^Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, "Utility," in International Encyclo­
pedia of the Social Sciences, ed. by David L. Sills (New York: The
Macmillan Co. and The Free Press, 1968), vol. 16, pp. 236-67.
4Ibid., p. 237.
5Ibid.
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value because, as it is assumed, it costs; but it 
costs because it has value [in use], "as Condillac 
. . . was to summarize the position . . . . ®
The fourth view is, of course, our contemporary utility theory, 
where, "in value, utility and scarcity (both in their modern mean­
ings) are linked together through the whole economic process."7
Presumably, the "modern meaning" of utility is a subjective, 
individual view of pleasurableness or desirability. This is not, 
however, the only possible meaning of utility. De Roover writes 
that San Bernardino of Siena developed a theory of value that included 
scarcity and two views of utility:
value is composed of three elements: (1) usefulness
(virtuositas); (2) scarcity (raritas); and (3) plea­
surableness or desirability (complacibilitas) . . . .
Virtuositas is, he explains, a virtue, or property, 
inherent in the goods themselves, of satisfying, 
either directly or indirectly, human wants. It may, 
therefore, be defined as objective utility. Com­
placibilitas is undeniably a subjective factor which 
depends upon the mood and preferences of the consumer 
• • • •
The distinction between virtuositas and complac­
ibilitas , objective and subjective utility, in my 
opinion, is quite a fruitful idea and it is perhaps 
regrettable that modern economists did not accept 
it, with the result that they became involved in 
hedonism and pleasure-pain calculus.®
6Ibid.
7Ibid.
8Raymond De Roover, San Bernardino of Siena and Sant'Antonino 
of Florence (Boston: The Kress Library of Business and Economics,
1967), p. 18.
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San Bernardino's distinction between objective (virtuositas) and sub­
jective (complacibilitas) utility is helpful because it points to the 
further distinction between objective and subjective value. Frankena 
clearly differentiates between the two:
'Value' . . .  is often used (a) to refer to what is 
valued, judged to have value, thought to be good, or 
desired. The expressions 'his values,' 'her value 
system,' and 'American values' refer to what a man, 
a woman, and Americans value or think to be good . . . .
Behind this widespread usage lies the covert assumption 
that nothing really has objective value, that 'value'  ^
means being valued and 'good' means being thought good.
This is the meaning of 'subjective value' as it is used in this dis­
sertation. Something has value if a human subject deems it so. 
Something has value because it is so valued, the reverse is not true; 
thus we would not say that something is valued because it has value 
(according to the subjective definition). To say this, Frankena 
explains, would be a way of defining 'objective value.'
But the term 'value' is also used to mean (b) what has 
value or i£ valuable, or good, as opposed to what is 
regarded as good or valuable. Then 'values' means 
'things that have value,' 'things that are good,' or 
'goods' and, for some users, also things that are right, 
obligatory, beautiful, or even true.^®
Thus, if something is objectively valuable it is so regardless of
human valuation. Human valuation of objective values can produce
conclusions that are either right or wrong. Since, our knowledge of
9
William K. Frankena, "Value and Valuation," in The Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, ed. by Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Co. and
The Free Press, 1967), vol. 8, p. 230.
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objective value is itself objective, in the same way that theoretical 
knowledge is objective, it may be either correct or mistaken. Thus, 
like all human objective knowledge, knowledge of creation's objective 
value is believed to be true, even though we know that it might con­
ceivably be false.^ Our knowledge of the objective value of creation 
may be false precisely because objective value does not derive from 
our individual subjective preferences. It is entirely different from 
individual subjective valuation. Individual subjective preferences 
themselves cannot be correct or incorrect; only the individual may be 
correct or incorrect about what his subjective preferences really are. 
He may be mistaken about his preference for vanilla rather than choco­
late ice cream, but his preference itself cannot be mistaken, it is 
whatever it is.
The idea of creation having objective worth is not peculiar to
a biblically based theory. Other religious and non-religious theories
of the "inherent-intrinsic value" of nature are emerging which argue,
that there is something morally objectionable in the 
destruction of natural systems, or at least in their 
wholesale elimination, and this is precisely the belief 
that natural systems, or economically "useless" species 
do possess an intrinsic value. That is, it is an attempt 
to articulate the rejection of the anthropocentric view 
that all value ultimately, resides in human interests and 
concerns.^
"^This material draws heavily from Michael Polanyi, Personal 
Knowledge (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).
^^William Godfrey-Smith, "The Value of Wilderness," Environmental 
Ethics 1 (Winter 1979), p. 312. See also, for example, J. Baird 
Callicott, "Elements of an Environmental Ethic: Moral Considerability
and the Biotic Community," Environmental Ethics 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 
71-81; Charles Y. Deknatel, "Questions About Environmental Ethics -
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The practical outcome of this theory of intrinsic value would be
institutional changes which recognize such value. Laurence Tribe
announces his intentions in this regard:
I propose giving institutional expression to the per­
ception that "nature exists for itself" by taking 
steps to recognize "rights" in natural objects, not 
as a way of broadening the class of wants to be aggre­
gated by a utilitarian calculus, but rather as part of 
a structure for approaching a shared agreement about 
our responsibilities as persons - responsibilities to 
one another and to the world.
Consider the similar approach, taken by Earl Murphy, to use the
institution of property rights to incorporate nature's intrinsic
worth into our environmental decisions.
There must be a way to locate within human institutions 
as the rules of property the perception of a worth in 
nature requiring protection from human demand and having 
importance independently of any conferral of value by human 
activity . . . .
The rules of property and the bureaucratic mechanism 
may set the constraints, so that no demand generating 
activity can act independently of such limits.^
Toward a Research Agenda with a Focus on Public Policy," Environmental 
Ethics 2 (Winter 1980), pp. 353-62; Paul W. Taylor, "The Ethics of 
Respect for Nature," Environmental Ethics 3 (Fall 1981), pp. 197-218; 
and Holmes Rolston III, "Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objec­
tive?" Environmental Ethics 4 (Summer 1982), pp. 125-51.
•^Laurence H. Tribe, "Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees," 
in When Values Conflict, ed. by Laurence H. Tribe, Corinne S. 
Schelling, and John Voss (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co.,
1976), p. 62.
14Earl F. Murphy, Nature, Bureaucracy and the Rules of Property: 
Regulating the Renewing Environment (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub­
lishing Co., 1977), p. 203.
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And finally, Robert Dorfman speaks of the need for environmental 
policy analysis to include "higher values" that "transcend the eco­
nomic calculus." He also argues that these values are objectively 
knowable and can be agreed upon, but not proved as though they were 
merely the valid conclusions of a simple syllogism.
For higher values to be integrated into a policy analysis 
there must be widespread agreement about them - or at 
least about the qualities to be sought in the process 
for arriving at such substantive value agreement. For­
tunately, in any society there is often such agreement, 
though this circumstance is frequently denied. The 
denial arises from confusing what is "objectively 
provable" with what is generally agreed. The fact 
that there is no way to "prove" that denuding forests 
is bad is perfectly consistent with universal agree­
ment that it i£ bad . . . .  In the environmental field, 
the road to wisdom is a decision process that forces 
explicit recognition that the environment has values 
that transcend the economic calculus.^
Although Dorfman does not clearly explain or define these "higher 
values" that "transcend the economic calculus," as we will see, it 
is objective values that transcend the subjective valuation of neo­
classical economics.
SUBJECTIVE VALUE AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
Modern neoclassical economists, whether empiricists or a priori 
rationalists - with all their epistemological differences - generally 
agree that economics is the study of individuals whose actions aim to
Robert Dorfman, "An Afterword: Humane Values and Environ­
mental Decisions," in When Values Conflict, ed. by Laurence H. Tribe, 
Corinne S. Schelling, and John Voss (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Pub­
lishing Co., 1976), pp. 167-73.
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maximize their utility (expected). For the empiricist this is an 
observed fact about individuals. For the rationalist, it is somehow 
known a priori. For those economists between these extremes, it may 
be either an assumption or a tautology. Regardless of their broad 
epistemological differences, they generally agree that the subject 
matter of economic science is individuals who attempt to maximize 
their utility. They also tend to agree that whatever utility is, 
even though seldom defined, it is a function of the individual’s 
subjective preferences or valuations (with a positive first deriva­
tive and a negative second derivative). Here is the important dif­
ference between "economic man" and a "steward": whereas economic
man only values subjectively, the steward’s task is to value both 
subjectively and objectively. For example, the steward, like economic 
man, chooses between red and green neckties according to his subjec­
tive preferences. Unlike economic man, however, he is not to choose 
between a fancier car and an adequate diet for his family according 
to his subjective preferences, but rather according to what he 
believes to be objectively good and proper. Thus, the steward may 
be willing to sacrifice his subjective preferences and diminish his 
subjective utility in order to either increase his objective utility
or choose according to what he believes to be objectively valuable,
16or perhaps both.
16The standard rebuttal to this type of example is that the 
individual chooses to give his family an adequate diet because this 
is a greater subjective preference for him than is the fancier car, 
not because it is objectively good to do so. Or, that even though 
the individual may consider some of his preferences as objectively
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The idea of objective value influencing individual choice and 
action apart from a utility function is foreign to the standard sub­
jective approach as expressed in the following passage by Furubotn 
and Pejovich:
. . . regardless of the number, character, or diversity 
of the goals established by an individual decision 
maker, the goals can always be conceived as arguments 
in some type of utility function . . . .I?
Thus, the objective of all individual goals (choices, preferences) is
to increase the individual's utility. Utility is usually conceived 
as subjective utility (but the idea of objective utility would not 
seem to violate the basic principle). This is the subjective theory 
of value, where individual utility is the ultimate criterion of value. 
Such a theory rules out the stewardship idea of the objective value 
of things, because objective value does not depend upon individual 
utility for its value.
It is difficult to know who or how many economists subscribe to 
a subjective theory of value, because it is seldom examined in any
detail. Do individuals always make choices according to their desire
for utility or do they sometimes sacrifice utility and choose accor­
ding to an objective value other than their own utility (which may be, 
of course, objectively valuable)? The passage above by Furubotn and
grounded and others as not, he still behaves as if he were maximizing 
a utility function with preferences as arguments, and thus not accor­
ding to the idea of objective value or good. These views of human 
behavior, known as Psychological Egoism, are discussed below.
•^Eirik G. Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, "Property Rights 
and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature," Journal of
Economic Literature 10 (December 1972), p. 1138.
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Pejovich seems to imply all choices are and can be (can only be?)
explained in terms of utility and self-interest. On the other hand,
Heilbroner and Thurow seem to say something different.
Economic theory is therefore a study of the effects of 
one aspect of human behavior as it motivates people to 
undertake their worldly activities. Very often, as 
economists well know, other aspects will override or 
blunt the acquisitive, maximizing orientation . . . .
[But] economists do not think that political or religious 
or other such motives regularly overwhelm maximizing 
behavior.18
Nor does Frank Knight believe that all valuation is based on our
preferences or desires.
People report and feel two different types of motiva­
tion for their acts. There is the wish or preference 
which is treated by the actor and by outsiders as final, 
as a brute fact. On the other hand, people make value 
judgments of various sorts in explanation of their acts; 
and explanation runs into justification. In other words, 
no one can really treat motive objectively or describe a 
motive without implications of good and bad. Thus not 
only do men desire more or less distinctly from valuing, 
but they desire because they value and also value without 
desiring. Indeed the bulk of human valuations, in con­
nection with truth, beauty and morals, are largely or 
altogether 
or result.
The most extreme interpretation of the Furubotn and Pejovich 
passage is that individuals are psychologically incapable of doing 
anything but promoting their own self-interest. This subjectivist
18Robert L. Heilbroner and Lester C. Thurow, The Economic Prob­
lem, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1981), p. 87.
^•^Frank H. Knight, "Value and Price," Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, ed. by Edwin R. A. Seligman (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1934), vol. 15, p. 221.
independent of desire for any concrete thing
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20theory, called Psychological Egoism, has some serious flaws as a 
scientific theory. According to this theory, for example, the indi­
vidual who says that he helped the little old lady across the street 
because it was the proper or good thing to do, is deceiving himself 
with artificial moral rhetoric. The theory argues that if we dig 
beneath this rhetoric we will find the true motives to be a sense of
personal pride or righteousness, or, at the very least, the avoidance
21of social criticism or guilt feelings. The problem with this theory 
is that rather than rationally explaining the motives of such behav­
ior, it results in a paradoxical relationship between the motives and 
the behavior; as explained by Murphy:
It is indeed true that men sometimes feel good about or 
proud of performing unselfish acts. But the good feeling 
comes only because of the perception that our act was not 
motivated selfishly, not motivated by the desire for the 
good feeling. If it had been, then there would be nothing 
to feel good about, nothing to be proud of.22
At the root of the problem with this theory is its failure to
distinguish between two distinctly different meanings of an indivi-
23dual's desires. The first meaning is that everything we do (freely),
2®Jeffrie G. Murphy, "The Possibility of Moral Philosophy," 
University of Arizona, Philosophy Department (Mimeographed), p. 26; 
and William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1963), p. 19.
21 Ibid.
22Ibid., p. 28.
2^P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (London: Penguin Books, 1954),
p. 142, offers the following explanation of the two different uses 
of "desires." "It is a tautology that all my desires, inclinations, 
wantings, likings, and enjoyments are mine; but it is a plain false­
hood that what I desire, like, want, or enjoy is necessarily my own
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we do because we want or desire to do it. This merely means that 
our actions are explained in terms of our wants or desires. "I did 
X because I desired to do X." That is all the first meaning of 
desire means. Desire in this sense tells us nothing about the motives 
behind our desired actions. The second meaning of desire concerns 
our motives. Some of the things we do, we do with ourselves (self- 
interest, utility, pleasure, etc.) as the ob.ject of our desires. "I 
did Y because I desired to benefit myself." Y is the type of goal 
that can be included in a utility function because the objective of 
Y is the individual's utility. Whereas all our actions or choices 
are determined by our desire to do them (first meaning), that does 
not necessarily mean that we are the object of our desires (second 
meaning). "I did X because I desired to do good," cannot - without 
introducing a paradox - be reduced to an argument in an individual's 
utility function. X may or may not give the individual utility. Even 
if X does result in utility for the individual, it is difficult to 
see how it could be conceived as an argument in a utility function 
since its objective was not utility. To include X in a utility func-
A /
tion is to introduce the paradox explained above. The objective 
of the arguments in a utility function is utility, but the objective 
of X is its intrinsic, objective value. To include X in a utility
pleasure or my own anything else; and it is also a plain falsehood 
that a man who does what he wants to do or 'acts from inclination' 
always acts selfishly."
^That is, it is impossible to derive utility from an objec­
tively good act, which of itself offers no utility to the individual, 
if the act is done merely to gain utility.
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function is to deny its objective value, but there is no good reason 
for doing this other than merely asserting that all actions are done 
to maximize utility. Rather than asserting either a tautological 
theory (we do what we desire), or a theory of Psychological Egoism, 
the neoclassical economist could agree with Heilbroner and Thurow,
"Very often, as economists well know, other aspects will override or
2 5blunt the acquisitive, maximizing orientation." Which of these 
positions is predominant among economists is most difficult, if not 
impossible to discern, because these fundamental aspects of the sub­
jective theory of value as utility are seldom discussed. Let us then 
discuss them.
The subjective theory of value as utility is, of course, based
on the work of the great Austrian economists: Carl Menger, E. von
Bohm-Bawerk, and Friedrich von Wieser. The genius of their work is
evidenced by its ability to convince economists that a subjective
theory of value would best explain the workings of the market place.
It was, however, with some reluctance that the classical economists
relinquished their "costs of production" theory of value and prices
or exchange value as a measure of welfare. Jacob Viner charges
Alfred Marshall, among others, with such a reluctance.
In several notable instances economists who have formally 
accepted the utility analysis but were not well disposed 
toward a calculus in subjective terms have found irksome 
its questioning of the validity of objective measurement 
of welfare, and by minimizing, on one pretext or another, 
the degree of conflict between analysis in utility terms 
and analysis in objective terms . . . have succeeded in
^Heilbroner and Thurow, ibid., p. 87.
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reverting to measurement of welfare in terms of price, 
while retaining the language and the superficial appea­
rances of subjective m easurem ent. 26
The Austrian subjective theory of value, besides successfully 
challenging classical economic value theories, withstood a challenge 
from another subjective theory: B. M. Anderson's theory of "social
value." Anderson argued against both the classical and the Austrian 
schools.
Value as treated by the cost theories, or value as a sum 
of money costs, is a blind thing, a product rather than 
an end, and fails utterly as a guiding, motivating prin­
ciple for economic activity. It is the merit of the 
Austrian School to have pointed this out. But the 
abstract individual factors which the Austrians have 
established are just as helpless in explaining the 
motivation of social activity.27
Anderson developed a theory where value was seen as a motivating force
embodied in the object of value, not the subject. "Here, then, is
value 'stripped for racing': a quantity of motivating force, power
28over the actions of a_ man, embodied in an object■" At first blush 
this appears to be an objective theory of value, but Anderson is care­
ful to dispel this notion.
28Jacob Viner, The Long View and the Short (Glencoe, 111.: The
Free Press, 1958), p. 201.
^B .  M. Anderson, Jr., Social Value (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1911), pp. 198-99.
28Ibid., p. 106.
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What I wish to insist upon is that no implication, either 
optimistic or pessimistic, as to the existing social 
order, can be drawn from the theory defended in this 
.book. Whether or not economic values in particular 
cases correspond with ethical values, whether or not 
goods are ranked on the basis of their import for the 
ultimate welfare of society, and the extent to which 
this is the case, will depend on the extent to which 
the ethical forces in society prevail over the antiethical 
forces. The theory as such is neutral.29
This passage alone does not make it clear that Anderson's "social
value" is a subjective theory. Coupled, however, with the following
passage, "social value" is revealed to be subjective, since it merely
replaces the individual with society, as the arbiter of value.
The Austrian theory, and the cost theory . . . all fail 
alike to lead us to an ultimate quantity of value . . . .  
they abstract the individual mind from its connection 
with the social whole . . . this abstraction is necessi­
tated by the individualist, subjectivistic conception 
of society . . . growing out of the skeptical philosophy 
of Hume . . . present day sociology has rejected this 
conception of society . . . [making] it possible to treat
society as a whole as the source of the values of goods 
30
• • • •
Replacing the individual with society is merely to relocate the sub­
jective arbiter in an otherwise subjective theory. Thus, the short 
battle between the Austrian and "social value" schools was not a 
battle between subjectivism and objectivism.
In the Austrian defense of subjective value and utility, objec­
tive value and utility are defined, more or less, as the physical or 
mechanical results from using a good.
29Ibid., p. 196.
30Ibid., pp. 197-98.
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Consider, for example, the following definitions of subjective
and objective value offered by William Smart:
Value, in the subjective sense, we may call, generally, 
the importance which a good is considered to possess 
with reference to the wellbeing of a person . . .  a 
good is valuable to me when I consider that my well­
being is associated with or dependent on the possession 
of it - that it 'avails' towards my wellbeing.
Value, in the objective sense, is a relation of 
power or capacity between a good and an objective 
result . . . .  Thus while the subjective value of 
coal to me is the amount of 'good' I get from the fire, 
its objective value is the temperature which it main­
tains in the room . . . or the money it brings me if 
I sell it . . . .31
His definition of subjective value is quite in keeping with the nor­
mal understanding of a subjective theory of valuation. That is, 
something has value only in reference to and determined by the sub­
ject (in this case individual) and his well-being or utility. His 
definition of objective value, however, is totally unrelated to 
objective value as the philosophical countertype to subjective value. 
Thus, rather than defining objective value, for example, as: "the
importance which a good possess intrinsically as a part of a good 
creation," it is defined as some physical characteristic. To take 
objective value out of the ethical realm by defining it as a temp­
erature or price is a rather ineffectual way to eliminate the philo­
sophical alternative to subjective valuation. The objective value
33-William Smart, An Introduction to the Theory of Value (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1926), pp. 5-6. Smart offers no explanation for 
why the warmth that the individual gets from the fire is not also an 
"objective result" and thus an objective value or, perhaps better, 
objective utility.
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or utility of particular things or actions or relationships may or 
may not exist, but it cannot be reduced to either individual sub­
jective value or temperatures or velocities or whatever. Defining 
away the opposition is always one of the easier but more spurious 
ways to fight a battle.
Given Smart’s initial definition of subjective value there are 
two logically related definitions of objective value. One is anthro- 
pocentric and the other is not. An anthropocentric definition of 
objective value would read something like: "Value, in the objective
sense, is the importance which a good possess with reference to the 
well-being of a person. A good is valuable to me when my well-being 
is associated with or dependent on the possession of it - that it 
avails towards my well-being." The deletion of the phrase, "I con­
sider that," from Smart’s subjective definition, causes it to become 
objective although remaining individualistic or anthropocentric.
This definition would accord well with De Roover’s definition of 
objective utility. The individual’s well-being has become an objec­
tive utility. The individual’s well-being has become an objective 
notion subject to objective definitions of human well-being which may 
or may not agree with an individual's subjective preferences. In 
similar fashion, a nonanthropocentric or stewardship definition of 
objective value might read something like: "Value, in the objective-
stewardship sense, is the importance which a thing possesses with 
reference to the well-being of God's creation. A part of creation 
is valuable when it is properly functioning and relating to the rest
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of creation according to its Creator’s good and valuable purposes." 
Thus,, we have at least two very different ways for valuing: subjec­
tively and objectively. How do people value?
The Austrian approach to a theory of value, according to Smart, 
is based on analysis of actual human conduct. "The theory of value,
therefore, must begin with a careful analysis of what the word means
32in the mouths of ordinary people." From this analysis Smart dis­
tills three things about value.
First, that, in probably the great majority of cases, 
the word has some direct or indirect reference to 
human life . . . .
Second, that men, as not only imperfect in nature 
but erring in judgment, have made an easy extension of 
the term "human life" to cover "human desire," . . . .
The economic "want" is not necessarily a rational or a 
healthy want - and political economy, as primarily ana­
lytic, must not be censured for the statement, nor con­
demned as if it approved of the fact - but simply a 
want, and the things which satisfy such wants we call 
"goods." The desirable is interpreted in economics by 
the desired.
Third, that the element of scarcity somehow plays a 
large part in many, and seems to have a share in all, 
estimates of value.33
Smart offers no empirical evidence to support his supposed careful
analysis from which he claims that "ordinary people" (whoever they
are) by and large exhibit a subjective philosophy of value. Even if
this were true, it does not follow that those "unordinary people,"
with apparently an objective philosophy of value, do not count as
32Ibid., p. 9.
33Ibid., p. 10.
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34worthy of economic investigation and theory. What is more likely, 
is that subjective valuation well describes the behavior of indivi­
duals choosing between red and green neckties - "the great majority 
of cases" - but not between feeding their children and fancier cars, 
or between electric can openers and the snail darter as a species. 
Furthermore, Smart's subjectivist "conclusions" (assumptions) lead 
him to make the dubious statement that in economics, "The desirable
is . . . the desired." This is only true if value is subjective; it
35
is certainly false if it is objective.
Continuing his analysis, Smart distinguishes between things 
valuable and things useful, by noticing that the so-called "free 
gifts of nature" are useful, but in their abundance, are not con­
sidered valuable. From this he concludes:
A subjective theory of value is a fundamental presupposition 
of neoclassical economics, a well accepted value judgment. Paul 
Heyne commenting on the ethical, normative assumptions necessary 
for scientific inquiry says about economists: "They believe that
the value judgments which enter inevitably into scientific inquiry 
are trivial or ones which all serious inquiries hold in common.
But if the claim was ever defensible, it is no longer . . . .  Eco­
nomists are accused of doing economics on the basis of analytical 
preconceptions that cause them to count as solutions [e.g., subjec­
tive valuation] what their critics perceive as problems and that 
prevent them from even seeing certain social relationships as in 
any sense problematic." "Economics and Ethics: The Problem of
Dialogue," in Belief and Ethics, ed. by W. W. Schroeder and Gibson 
Winter (Chicago: CSSR, 1978), p. 186.
■^John Elliott, "Fact, Value, and Economic Policy Objectives," 
Review of Social Economy 38 (April 1980), p. 8, argues, "The good 
. . .  is not that which we desire, but that which is desirable, not 
that which we prefer, but that which is preferable . . . "
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Evidently Usefulness or Utility is the larger concep­
tion of the two, and embraces Value. But if all val- 
-uable things are useful, while all useful things are 
not valuable, value must emerge at some particular 
limiting point of utility. Value, then, will be based 
on utility - utility, limited in some particular way, 
but still utility.
Quoting F. von Wieser, he goes on to conclude:
"Utility and not Value," says Wieser, is "the supreme 
principle of all economy; where value and utility come 
into conflict, utility must conquer." The statement 
is suggestive. The economic goal of civilization is 
to turn the whole natural environment of man from a 
relation of hostility or indifference into a relation 
of utility.
In similar Austrian fashion, Wieser states:
all the utility which goods afford - amounts in the 
last resort to satisfaction of wants, and the opinion 
that the value of goods arises from their use may be 
more exactly stated by saying that it rests upon the 
satisfaction of wants which they furnish. It is the 
satisfaction of wants which, in the first instance, 
has value, or "worth" or "importance" to us. Satis­
faction is that which is really desired, and is worthy 
of desire; and, as we do not desire goods for them­
selves, but for the satisfaction they give, so do we 
value them only for that satisfaction. The value of 
goods is derived from the value of wants . . . .
What it is that gives value to the satisfaction ..--- ,   —, .Sf.. —  ....  “fr'ft*...
itself we shall not here attempt to explain.JO
^^Smart, ibid., p. 12.
37Ibid., p. 13. Thus does the goal of civilization from the 
perspective of a subjective theory of value as utility contrast with 
the stewardship goal to cultivate, keep, and replenish a good cre­
ation which exists (including ourselves) to glorify God.
^®Friedrich von Wieser, Natural Value, trans. by Christian A.
Mailoch (New York: G. E. Stechert and Co., 1930), pp. 6-7, emphasis
added. Thus, by avoiding the question of the value of individual 
preference, Wieser avoids the question of ultimately grounding value 
in "something which is held to be good or valuable in itself."
William Godfrey-Smith, "The Value of Wilderness," Environmental Ethics 
1 (Winter 1979), p. 309.
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Thus, we are to conclude that "ordinary people" do not desire or
value anything, action, or relation because it is good objectively,
but only if it avails the individual's subjective wants.
It is a commonplace that value is not inherent in 
things: it is not so well recognized that neither
is utility. There is nothing "useful" except in 
relation to a being who finds it so, but even the 
useful is not "of use" if that being has already
enough or too much of it.39
As with Smart, Wieser appeals to the supposed "commonplace" knowledge
that people do not recognize value in creation objectively, but only
in reference to human satisfaction. This is a rather obvious method­
ological ploy to give the impression that "ordinary people" have 
indeed been analyzed to find out how they make valuations. What is 
actually being done is to define "ordinary people" as those who value 
subjectively and "extraordinary people" (non-existent?) as those who 
perhaps value objectively or both.
Is it extraordinary for an individual to believe that other 
individuals are valuable, worthy and important parts of creation 
apart from our individual desires for satisfaction or utility? Is 
it not a commonplace that value is intrinsic in human beings; that 
they are objectively valuable as mere human beings irrespective of 
their usefulness in satisfying another's subjective desires? Is it 
not ordinary to affirm this philosophical-theological view of human 
beings and extraordinary to deny it?
39Ibid., p. vii.
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Are human beings the only things in creation that violate
Wieser's statement: "value is not inherent in things . . . .  There
is nothing 'useful* except in relation to a being who finds it so?"
A theory of stewardship answers no. The recognition of objective
value in creation is an affirmation that things have ultimate value
in relation to their Creator and to their purposes for existence. In
the words of Charles Hartshorne:
My religious faith is in a God who takes delight in the 
creation. Moreover, I hold that the ultimate value of 
human life, or of anything else, consists entirely in 
the contribution it makes to the divine life. Whatever 
importance we, and those we can help or harm, have is 
without residue measured by and consists in the delight 
God takes in our existence . . . .
And I say that, while rational animals make a special
contribution to the Summum Bonum, every creature makes
some contribution, however humble it may be.^®
This specifically biblical-stewardship view of objective valu­
ation is not the only basis upon which people ground their objective 
views of valuation. "Environmental ethics" has arisen as a speciality 
within ethical philosophy as an effort to examine and articulate the 
valuation of nature and to affect environmental policy. Environmental 
ethicists are not, perhaps needless to say, in complete agreement on 
the subjective-objective nature of valuation, nor is it likely that 
they ever will b e . ^  This should not be surprising, however, since
^Charles H. Hartshorne, "The Rights of the Subhuman World," 
Environmental Ethics 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 49-50.
^ B y  the same token, it is unlikely that "ordinary people" will 
ever be in complete agreement about subjective versus objective 
values, regardless of the Austrian assertions to the contrary.
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the subject matter is about fundamental presuppositions about the 
nature of man and the nature of nature. But absolute agreement is a 
false goal; the basic function of both environmental ethics and 
stewardship (religious and non-religious) is to show the relevance 
of an objective theory of value for our political and economic actions 
in nature. A theory of objective value shows, as we will see, that 
economic conclusions about "optimal" natural resource allocation, and 
property rights assignments based on the criterion of Pareto optimal­
ity (economic efficiency) are only true in a world of subjective value. 
Pareto optimal allocation of resources in creation is not necessarily 
the correct, or best solution and can be part of the problem.
STEWARDSHIP VERSUS PARETO OPTIMALITY 
Is a Pareto optimal allocation of natural resources an optimal 
allocation in light of a theory of stewardship? Is economic effi­
ciency, defined in subjective terms, a good criterion when judged by 
hi
objective terms? In other words, would a theory of stewardship 
agree that competitive markets, which allocate natural resources
/  O
According to Edwin G. Dolan, Basic Economics, 2nd ed., 
(Hinsdale, 111.: The Dryden Press, 1980), p. 15, "Most economists
think that efficiency itself is a good thing." If this is true then 
all the worse for most economists, because the bare concept of effi­
ciency is valueless, it is neither good nor bad. Efficiency takes 
on value only in reference to the value of the end which is to be 
efficiently accomplished. Efficiency is a good "thing" if the end 
is a good thing and efficiency is a bag "thing" if the end is bad.
The efficient killing of Jews in a gas chamber is not better than 
the inefficient method of shooting them even if most economists think 
efficiency itself is a good thing.
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among competitng uses according to individual subjective valuations, 
is an optimal, good way to manage creation? To answer these ques­
tions let us begin by analyzing the subjective foundations of Pareto 
optimality and economic efficiency. For, as we will see, it is their 
subjective view of value that stewardship rejects.
A Pareto optimal, economically efficient change is one where at 
least one individual is made better off and no other individual is 
made worse off. This criterion for a welfare improvement may appear 
unassailable to the subjective moral relativist, except, of course, 
for questions of equity and justice of the resulting distribution. 
But, the subjectivist argues, if we assume these other values are 
adequately handled by the various social, political institutions how 
could one possibly disagree that a Pareto optimal change is not a 
good thing? Recall the words of Freeman, Haveman, and Kneese, from 
Chapter 2:
If these conditions [equitable distribution] hold, it 
can be said that the competitive market system yields 
the best possible allocation of resources. It achieves 
this optimum because it does the best that can be done 
with a given technology, resource endowment, set of 
tastes and preferences, and that particular distribution 
of resource ownership and its associated distribution 
of income that society has chosen through an effective
political mechanism.
Also recall the words of Seneca and Taussig:
Efficiency is a deceptively simple and attractive objec­
tive for government economic policy. Who can oppose 
the principle that more of every good for everybody 
is desirable. Economists are careful to point out,
4%reeman, Haveman, Kneese, ibid., p. 70.
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of course, that greater efficiency in the Pareto Opti­
mum sense means only that more of everything is poten­
tially available for everybody . . . . ^
A theory of stewardship has no quarrel with the logic and analytics 
used to reason from the subjective premises (explicit and implicit) 
to the conclusion that competitive markets yield a Pareto outcome 
(assuming no third party problems). Stewardship does not, however, 
accept the subjective premises as true, and consequently rejects the 
notion that Pareto optimality - the outcome of competitive resource 
markets - is the best or optimal allocation of resources.
For the subjective theorist it is good to allocate resources 
according to the "given . . . set of tastes and preferences." This 
is the subjective definition of good. The good is determined sub­
jectively by each individual according to tastes and preferences. 
Thus, for subjectivism it is only logical to say that a Pareto or
4.
competitive market allocation is the best (meaning good) allocation. 
As we learned in Chapter 2, the careful, consistent, positive econo­
mists (e.g., Robbins, tfyint, and Graaff) avoid labeling Pareto opti­
mality as economic efficiency or good or best. If, however, Dolan is 
correct that "Host economists think that efficiency itself is a good
^Seneca, Taussig, ibid., p. 114. Efficiency is deceptive, 
but it is anything but simple and attractive - in its subjectivist 
guise - to stewardship. Moreover, Seneca and Taussig add to the 
deceptiveness of efficiency by equating it with Pareto optimality.
^ W e  are granting the assumption of equitable distribution. And 
therefore "best" allocation means better than any other allocation 
with the same equitable distribution assumed.
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thing, then these economists have accepted subjectivism as their 
underlying theory of value. It should be reiterated that only with 
some.underlying theory of value can the Pareto criterion (and effi­
ciency) be a criterion of value, that is, a criterion of better or 
worse, or welfare or welfare improvement. Without a theory of value 
the Pareto "criterion" is not a criterion of anything, it is merely 
an inconclusive outcome. For as Jfyint has said:
. . . welfare analysis need not involve any normative 
value judgments so long as we take the wants of the 
individuals to be given and constant and confine our 
study to the purely mechanical efficiency of the eco­
nomic system in satisfying these given wants. At this 
pure subjective level of analysis our propositions are 
logically as stringent as those of price economics.
But, since we stop short at this neutral concept of 
mechanical efficiency, we are still on an intermediate 
plane or discourse and although our prepositions deal 
with quantities of satisfaction they are in some ways 
still as inconclusive as those at the physical level 
as a guide to practical action. Thus when we have 
demonstrated that a particular pattern of allocating 
the resources satisfies the given wants better than 
others, this does not amount to a categorical imper­
ative that this pattern ought to be adopted. To obtain 
that we need a further premise, viz. that these given 
wants are of the same ethical quality of goodness. It 
is easy to make the mistake of slipping this premise 
implicitly into the argument . . . .47
Myint refers to this analysis as "welfare analysis" of the given
wants of individuals, and yet without a theory of value (subjective,
or objective) the word ,lwelfare" has no meaning. In his own words,
"Since we stop short at this neutral concept of mechanical efficiency
^ S e e  footnote 42 above. 
^Myint, ibid., pp. 198-99.
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. . . our propositions . . . are in some ways still as inconclusive 
as those at the physical level as a guide to practical action." Note 
carefully, that this inconclusiveness is not due to other contending 
values (e.g. equity, etc.) which must also be considered. The propo­
sitions are inconclusive because without a definition of welfare, a 
proposition which is supposed to describe an increase in welfare is 
meaningless. Without a theory of value, (or as Myint says, "norma­
tive value judgments" to define welfare, and thus Pareto optimality 
as a welfare criterion) Pareto optimality is a criterion of something, 
but we have no idea what. Positive economic analysis of welfare is 
possible, but only after welfare is defined according to some theory 
of value. Pareto optimality, apart from a theory of value, is at 
best a meaningless combination of words and at worse an outcome which 
merely satisfies the preferences of Vilfredo Pareto or the person 
advocating them.
It would seem that Dolan is correct: that most economists think
that economic efficiency and Pareto optimality mean something and use 
these terms to meaningfully differentiate between policies as better 
or worse. That is, a theory of value is being assumed, whether or not 
it is made explicit. As Myint has shown, one can "take the wants of 
the individuals as given," and one can show that "a particular pattern 
of allocating the resources satisfies the given wants better than 
others," but it takes a theory of value concerning the goodness or 
badness of those subjective wants and the relevance of objective value 
to pronounce one pattern optimal. Indeed, it would require the
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subjective theory: that individual preferences, each and every one,
are good (valuable), in order to say that the competitive market allo­
cation of resources is the optimum. This is exactly what Little is 
presuming when he says that "an individual is better off if he is in 
a chosen position."^8 Little goes on to say that,
If welfare economics is found to be useless, it is not 
because there is anything shifty about the philosophical 
or logical foundations. We claim to have stated the 
required postulates in a clear, precise manner. It 
only remains to accept or reject them.^9
Little is to be commended for his clarity, precision and honesty. 
Biblical stewardship, however, does not accept his subjective theory 
of value nor the conclusion that competitive markets yield an optimum 
allocation. Neither the individual, nor the community, nor the rest 
of creation is necessarily better off because the individual is in a 
chosen position; but only if he has chosen the good and avoided the 
evil. Individual preferences do not define and determine what is 
objectively good and valuable, rather they are to be judged by what 
is objectively good and valuable. Objective value, based on biblical 
principles, derives not from individual subjective preferences, but 
from the objective, purposes of the Creator for creation. Satisfac­
tion of individual subjective preferences is not the criterion of 
value, but rather the purposive relationships, functions and activi­
ties established by God. To choose the good, stewardship argues, is
48Little, ibid., p. 124.
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to choose according to God's creational purposes. Furthermore, the 
good is an inclusive concept, it does not only include human rela­
tionships, but includes all creational or creaturely relationships. 
In such a world of purposive, valuable relationships, Pareto opti­
mality palls in comparison. In a creation, which is good and valued 
by its Creator, subjective valuation is denied its claim as the 
ultimate arbiter of value. Thus, "subjective economic efficiency" 
and Pareto optimality are restricted to involving truly indifferent, 
innocuous tastes and preferences, that is, choices between green and 
red neckties and between chocolate and vanilla ice cream cones, etc.
The conclusion to restrict economic efficiency is also reached 
by Talbot Page."*^ He has done a more technical than philosophical 
analysis of the subjective valuations of the present value criterion 
as it applies to the intertemporal allocation of natural resources. 
He contrasts the present value criterion which allows individuals 
to discount future costs and benefits by their rates of time pref­
erence with a so-called conservation criterion which discounts by 
the marginal productivity rate of the resource or of the whole 
economy depending on the situation. About these two criteria he 
concludes:
The conservation criterion functions at the macro-
economic level establishing a context for markets;
"^Talbot Page, Conservation and Economic Efficiency, published 
for Resources for the Future (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Uni­
versity Press, 1977).
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the present value criterion functions at the micro- 
economic level of market efficiency. For policy 
analysis and prescription both levels are needed.
The context which the conservation criterion is to establish is 
future livability; a sustainable allocation of resources which pro­
tects against the elimination of so-called essential resources with-
52out which human survival would be impossible. Practically this 
means that market allocation of essential resources would be somehow 
controlled to ensure a sustainable allocation. Within this restricted 
market context the present value criterion as exemplified or mimicked 
by efficient markets is the appropriate criterion for the valuation 
of all other resources. Thus, the conservation criterion- with future 
livability as its objective social goal - calls for limits on the use 
of essential resources even though this violates the economic effi­
ciency goal of the present value criterion. This result, as Page 
notes, is often although erroneously criticized.
The conservation criterion, or at least, its more ordi­
nary manifestation as a sustainable yield criterion, 
is often criticized on the grounds that it does not 
maximize the present value of the yield's benefits.
This reasoning is surely wrong. It is no more appro­
priate to conclude that the sustainable yield criterion 
is invalid because it does not satisfy the present value 
criterion than it is appropriate to conclude that the 
present value criterion is invalid because it does not 
satisfy the sustainable yield criterion. One cannot 
use one criterion to bludgeon another. They are on
5lIbid., p. 205.
52Page does not enter the debate about the existence of essen­
tial resources. Rather, his analysis assumes that such resources do 
exist and proceeds to address the question of whether or not markets 
would exhaust themD
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the same logical level. The most one can say at this 
point is that the two criterion conflict; they imply 
different states of the world.^3
In reconciling the two conflicting criteria, Page has drawn the con­
clusion that only the non-essential resources may be allocated by the 
present value criterion whereas resources deemed essential for the 
goal of a sustainable future need to be allocated by the conservation 
criterion. The goal of the present value criterion is to maximize 
the subjective values of the present generation whereas the goal of 
the conservation criterion is to keep the resource base intact for 
the present and future generations. The latter goal requires that 
essential resources be treated differently, that they be allocated 
on a sustainable yield basis apart from pure market allocations.
These conclusions are not fully shared by economists so it is all the 
more important to understand how they have been derived.
As was noted above, Page does not attempt to demonstrate that 
essential resources exist. Rather, he notes that this is a widely, 
albeit not completely, accepted belief of so-called conservationists 
who have a reasonable, if not full proof, basis for their beliefs, 
and therefore assumes it to be true. Given this assumption he pro­
ceeds to analyze the question of interest: is economic efficiency
an adequate criterion to guarantee that essential resources will not 
be exhausted? The present value criterion is employed as a reasonable 
model of the criterion of economic efficiency since the two criteria
53page, ibid., p. 188.
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are closely related. The efficiency criterion is used to evaluate
specific projects and particular markets in the short run and the
present value criterion is used to evaluate both specific projects
and projects on a macro level and also over short or long time spans.
The connection between the two criteria,
is that for each distribution of market power in the 
present and implied intertemporal allocation of resource 
usage, there exists a social welfare function and dis­
count rate such that maximization of the present value 
of this social welfare function under this discount rate 
leads to the same allocation of resource usage as given 
under the efficiency criterion. This is the sense of 
the statement that the present value criterion tends, 
more or less, to mimic what the market automatically 
does. In this sense the present value criterion is an 
intertemporal version of the efficiency criterion.^
The next step in setting up a model for the analysis is to 
simplify the present generation’s decision making process about both 
the intragenerational allocation and intergenerational distribution 
of resources. This is accomplished by collapsing the present gene­
ration into one individual, Robinson Crusoe. This model is then 
used to determine the results of discounting Crusoe’s future under 
two different resource situations. In the first case, Crusoe is 
cast upon an island with only a supply of corn which he may eat or 
plant. In the second case, Crusoe is less fortunate, he has only 
a large supply of hard tack.
In the first case, if Crusoe does not discount the future (i.e., 
the discount rate is zero) then he will arrange his planting and
54Ibid., p. 163.
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consumption so that he eats little in the early years and gluttonously 
in the later ones. If, on the other hand, he discounts the future by 
some positive rate then his consumption will be more egalitarian. 
Moreover, if he discounts by the productivity rate of the corn then 
his consumption would be completely egalitarian. This final possi­
bility provides Page with the concept of intergenerational justice
as egalitarian consumption and with the criterion that we discount
55
by the rate of marginal productivity of the economy.’
In the second situation, if the initial stock of hardtack is 
large enough then Crusoe will be spared the difficult decision of 
when he is going to starve to death. Assuming this is the case, if 
Crusoe discounts by his time preference (assumed positive) then he 
will eat well in the early years and at a subsistence level in his 
final year (assumed to be known). If, on the other hand, he discounts 
by the productivity rate, which is zero, he will follow an egalitarian 
consumption pattern eating the same amount each year. Page notes 
that in this extreme "hardtack economy" it is impossible for market 
forces to bring the rate of productivity (zero) into equality with 
normally positive rates of time preference. The implication is 
that present generations, if allowed to discount resources according 
to their rates of time preference, will fare well but future gene­
rations will experience, at best, subsistence levels of consumption.
55Ibid., p. 154.
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In these simplified models each generation is collapsed into a
single individual, Crusoe, with the succeeding generation being Crusoe
one year later. These models allow Page to ignore the intragenera-
tional distribution questions which Crusoe, a single individual, does
not face and to focus on the Intertemporal decision. Page argues
that if we are willing to accept, as a formal solution to this
decision, the scheme of aggregating discounted utility streams then,
We now have three possible candidates for an individual's 
definition of the 'discount rate': the rate at which he
would loan money or some other commodity, the productivity 
of the economy, or his 'pure time preference' (his compar- 
ison of the worth of future utility in terms of present 
utility). If our desire is to be egalitarian over time 
in terms of a total measure of well-being, the above 
examples tell us that the proper discount rate is the 
rate of marginal productivity of the econom y.56
Page's conclusion is based on the result that in the corn (renewable) 
economy not to discount (i.e., discount rate is zero) means that the 
present generation would live at a subsistence level so that future 
generations could live gluttonously. And to discount by time pref­
erence would be egalitarian only if it happened to equal the produc­
tivity rate. Whereas, discounting by the productivity rate produces 
an egalitarian allocation which, however naive it might be, is one 
possible definition of intergenerational fairness. Finally, in a 
hard tack economy to discount by the rate of productivity (zero) is 
the same thing as not discounting future generations. This results 
in an egalitarian consumption path, but it remains to determine the
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level of consumption and thus the finite number of future generations 
that will exist. The higher the level of consumption above subsis­
tence the fewer generations that will exist. This is equivalent to 
Crusoe deciding when he will starve to death. (Page does not mention
this latter situation possibly because he does not believe the world
57is fully a hard tack economy.)
Page continues the analysis by considering the objection that 
the present generation may have as one of its preferences the exis­
tence of future generations and therefore its discounted allocation 
of resource would provide for the future. Making the usual assump­
tion of separable utility functions he shows that indeed the more 
(less) altruistic the present generation the better (worse) off are 
future generations. In fact, if the present generation is completely 
selfless the discount rate is zero and the future is very well-off 
indeed. At the other extreme, if the present generation decides
that provision for future generations gives them no satisfaction then
58the future is entirely cut off. In all these cases the common 
element is that the present generation determines the allocation 
according to its subjective valuations. The future is provided for 
only to the extent that the present is satisfied from contemplating 
such a future. This version of the present value criterion Page 
equates with the actual working of markets wherein future costs and
57Ibid., p. 149-54.
58Ibid., p. 159-61.
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benefits are discounted by the present generation’s time preference 
(and also weighted by the distribution of dollar votes). In con­
trast. to this version with its sovereignty of the present Page offers 
the concept of "disinterested fairness." In this version the welfares 
of future generations are aggregated and weighted (discounted) by the 
rate of marginal productivity of the economy. Thuss the higher the 
rate (assuming it is positive) the higher the level of consumption
59possible for the present and all future generations and vice versa. 
These two versions of the present value criterion would, of course, 
become equivalent if the rates of time preference and marginal pro­
ductivity were equal. This might happen by coincidence but, Page 
argues, it would not happen systematically.
Thus we have two interpretations for the present value 
criterion, with the important difference that for one 
the discount factor measures the time preference of the 
first generation and for the other the discount factor 
measures the economy’s productivity. In the actual 
world these two interpretations do not boil down to 
the same thing, for a wedge may be driven between the 
rates of time preference and productivity. Moreover, 
there will be differences between the interpretations
59An interesting possibility for investigation is that the mar­
ginal rate of productivity is negative. The work of Georgescu-Roegen 
would seem to suggest that if productivity is broadly defined in 
entropy terms then it is negative. Consider his statement quoted 
earlier: "Economists are fond of saying that we cannot get something
for nothing. The Entropy Law teaches us that the rule of biological 
life and, in man’s case, of its economic continuation is far harsher.
In entropy terms, the cost of any biological or economic enterprise 
is always greater than the product. In entropy terms, any such 
activity necessarily results in a deficit." Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, 
Energy and Economic Myths (New York: Pergamon Press, 1976), p. 55.
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as the rates of time preference and productivity change 
over time.
In the final stage of the analysis. Page attempts to reconcile 
these two conflicting criteria by arguing that each is appropriate 
but in different situations, for different social goals. If one of 
our social goals is permanent livability then the present value cri­
terion needs to be restricted within the context of a sustainable 
yield allocation of essential resources. The conservation criterion 
thus needs to be used to establish (as best as possible) the context 
of permanent livability by limiting the rate of depletion and pollu­
tion of essential resources to a sustainable yield.^
Page's analysis of the present value and conservation criteria 
represents an analysis with conclusions similar to those presented 
in my analysis of subjective and objective valuation. Given the 
assumption of essential resources Page concludes that markets which 
mimic the present value criterion do not guarantee future livability. 
Future livability serves as a good example of an objective valuation 
of resources and one that is not guaranteed by the subjective val­
uations of resources in free markets. Future livability, in Page’s
62
work, is limited to the human specie but it need not be.
^Page, ibid., p. 162.
^Page proposes severance taxes as the best mechanism to estab­
lish a sustainable yield allocation of essential resources. Whether 
or not this mechanism is the best or will even work is subject to 
debate, but is not important for the purposes of this dissertation.
62The general question of species extinction as a problem of 
subjective versus objective valuation is discussed in Chapter 5.
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Nevertheless, it serves as one example of the implications for a 
neoclassical economic theory rooted in a subjective theory of value.
A theory of stewardship not only restricts the efficiency cri­
terion, it also expands the concept of welfare economics from its 
singular focus on human beings to encompass all of creation. Ste­
wardship is concerned with human and non-human welfare. The steward 
is called to be a caretaker of all of creation. This means, among 
other things, that the steward is not an allocator of a given 
"resource endowment," and a given "distribution of resource owner­
ship" with its given system of property rights. One of the more 
subtle and pervasive assumptions of neoclassical natural resource 
economic theory is that it knows what natural resources are. For 
the neoclassical economist natural resources seem to be determined 
by eyesight; "everyone knows what a tree looks like." For the 
steward, however, labeling parts of creation as natural resources 
for human production and consumption, and other parts as "protec­
ted," and determining the appropriate property rights for their 
management requires much more than good eyesight.
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The relatively new economic theory of property rights is an 
attempt to use the neoclassical economic methodology to both explain 
and guide the development of the legal-economic institution of 
property rights. In general, property rights theorists have retained 
the perspective of subjective individualism with its assumption of
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utility maximizing behavior motivated by self-interest, and thus 
ignore, for example, "satisficing" behavior and objective valuation. 
The basic goal of the property rights approach is to expand the 
neoclassical model into the legal arena and show that the develop­
ment of property rights can be made endogenous to the economic model 
of individual subjective utility maximization. In the words of Eirik 
Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich:
Can the logic of economics explain the development of 
property rights? Is the development of property rights 
determined endogenously within the economic system?
Does the creation and specification of property rights 
take place in response to the desire of individual 
decision-makers for more utility?^
To a reader uninitiated to the ambiguous, all-inclusive concept of 
utility, this passage might suggest the necessity of a rather sub­
stantial empirical undertaking. Such an impression would be wrong. 
The property rights approach is purely deductive and given the ency­
clopedic understanding of utility it is fairly simple to deduce that 
the answer to the above question is "yes." Thus, with their all 
encompassing notion of utility and using deductive logic, Furubotn
Eirik G. Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, eds., The Economics 
of Property Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co.,
1974), pp. 7-8. Also see their article "Property Rights and Eco­
nomic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature," Journal of Economic 
Literature 10 (December 1972), p. 1157, where the authors identify 
one of the characteristic features of the property rights literature 
as, "confidence that the market logic can be applied fruitfully to 
a very great range of practical problems. Thus, the focus of dis­
cussion is on economic efficiency and the conditions under which 
markets should be, or should not be, extended into new areas."
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and Pejovich summarize the economic theory of endogenous property
rights:
Assuming that individuals or groups in society are 
motivated by self-interest and seek constantly to 
increase their utility levels, they will, presumably, 
try to exclude others from exploiting an existing good 
whenever it appears advantageous to do so. That is, 
whenever their own expected benefits appear to exceed 
the expected costs of defining, negotiating, policing, 
and enforcing the "claim." Of course, to exclude some 
people from the free access to a good means to specify 
property rights in that good . . . .  Thus, new property 
rights are created, and existing ones are changed because 
certain individuals and groups believe it profitable to 
restructure the system and are willing to bear the costs 
of bringing about such change.53-
In similar fashion, H. Demsetz says,
It is my thesis . . . that the emergence of new property 
rights takes place in response to the desires of the 
interacting persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost 
possibilities . . . .  property rights develop to inter­
nalize externalities when the gains of internalization 
become larger than the costs of internalization.^
He goes on to add something of a disclaimer, however, when he
says,
I do not mean to assert or deny that the adjustments in 
property rights which take place need to be the result 
of a conscious endeavor to cope with new externality 
problems.
■^Furubotn and Pejovich, The Economics of Property Rights, p.
C O
H. Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," in The 
Economics of Property Rights, ed. by E. Furubotn and S. Pejovich 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1974), p. 34.
53t1. ,Ibid.
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This statement is clear enough, but he doesn't stop here. He adds
the following comment which seems to question the subjective utility
maximizing hypothesis, albeit rather weakly:
These adjustments have arisen in Western societies 
largely as a result of gradual changes in social 
mores and in common law precedents . . . .  These 
legal and moral experiments may be hit-and-miss pro­
cedures to some extent but in a society that weights
the achievement of efficiency heavily, their viability 
in the long run will depend on how well they modify 
behavior to accommodate to the externalities asso­
ciated with important changes in technology or market 
values.54
Although Demsetz makes a slight recognition of values other 
than unhampered exchange, he ultimately declares that efficiency - 
that persuasive and deceptive word - to be the overriding concern of
our society. Consequently, he feels justified in concluding that
property rights are overwhelmingly determined by the desire for 
efficiency. This problematic conclusion, apparently perceived by 
property rights theorists as a logical deduction, becomes an unde­
fended norm in such boldly normative statements as:
Economists have to offer a testable theory of the 
development of property rights. Ideally, such a 
theory will throw light on the linkages between the 
system of laws and economic decisions and, in this 
way, contribute to the establishment of an institu­
tional environment favorable to efficiency and 
55progress. J
55Furubotn and Pejovich, The Economics of Property Rights, p. 7.
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With efficiency as its criterion, the new theory requires that 
well.defined and exchangeable property rights be established. In 
those situations where property rights cannot be clearly defined, 
the normative goal is to mimic the efficiency of the market's sub­
jective valuation and allocation by regulating to achieve maximum 
real income. Recall the passage by Coase, for example,
The aim of such regulation should not be to eliminate 
smoke pollution but rather to secure the optimum 
amount of smoke pollution; this being the amount 
which will maximize the value of production.56
The fundamental weakness of the new economic theory of property 
rights is its assumption that the institution of property rights 
arises and changes in response to individuals trying to maximize 
their subjective utility. Moreover, even if this assumption were 
found to be empirically true, it does not logically follow that that 
is what ought to determine a system of property rights. In other 
words, to advocate Pareto optimality or maximum value (subjective) 
of production as the criterion for establishing a system of property 
rights requires an explicit normative defense of individual subjec­
tive valuation. Although Furubotn, Pejovich and Demsetz do not pro­
vide such a defense, others have. Demsetz's reference to the 
"hit-and-miss" legal and moral procedures is hardly indicative of the 
vast body of literature and long standing debate over the justifi­
cation of property rights.
~^Coase, ibid., p. 42.
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The subjective-individualist theory of property rights, as 
defended by Murray Rothbard, for example, depends on the truth of 
two premises:
(a) the absolute property right of each individual in 
his own person, his own body: this may be called the
right of selfownership; and (b) the absolute right in 
material property of the person who finds an unused 
material resources and . . . occupies or transforms 
that resource by the use of his personal energy . . . 
called the homestead principle . . .  .57
He defends the premise of right of self-ownership by arguing
that no valid alternative exists.
There are only two alternatives: either (1) a certain
class of people, A, have the right to own another class,
B; or (2) everyone has the right to own his equal quotal 
share of everyone else. The first alternative implies 
that while Class A deserves the right of being human,
Class B is in reality subhuman and therefore deserves no 
such rights. But since they are indeed human beings, the 
first alternative contradicts itself . . . .  [concerning 
the second alternative] in practice, any attempt at com­
munist society will automatically become class rule, and 
we would be back at our rejected first a l t e r n a t i v e .58
At first glance this defense appears sound, but there is a defect in 
Rothbard's argument. There is a missing third alternative. A ste­
wardship theory of property rights would contend that only God has 
absolute property rights. Individuals have limited, conditional 
property rights, even including one’s rights over self. Individuals
57Murray N. Rothbard, "Justice and Property Rights," in 
Property in a Humane Economy, ed. by Samuel L. Blumenfeld (LaSalle, 
111.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974), p. 106.
C O
Ibid., pp. 107-8.
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have the rights of a steward not an owner. Although Rothbard does 
not deal with this third alternative, F. A. Harper, another defender 
of a subjective-individualist theory does.
Harper acknowledges the biblical view of God’s absolute owner­
ship expressed by passages such as: "For all the earth is mine
(Ex. 19:5);" and "The earth is the Lord’s, and the fullness thereof;
59
the world and they that dwell therein (Ps. 24:1)." These notions, 
however, are quickly dismissed by Harper as not pertinent to the ques­
tion of property rights in the "here and now."
Important as are these underlying religious questions 
about creation, it seems to me they are not necessarily 
involved in our consideration of property and ownership 
among persons on earth for the duration. The problem 
of those other matters are of another dimension. Whether 
one be a devout atheist or a devout patron of a faith 
that considers all to belong to the Creator and that 
therefore nothing in that sense belong to mortal man, 
he must face the same problem of how we shall deal with 
one another here and now while the show of earthly life 
is in process; how shall we resolve these problems as 
they arise? Neither the religious nor the secular view 
would seem to necessitate giving any property privilege 
to one person that is denied to another. ®
Regardless of "how it seems" to Harper, the absolute ownership by God 
and conditional stewardship by humans are not matters of "another 
dimension." The problems of "how we shall deal with one another 
here and now," and how we shall manage and care for the rest of cre­
ation "for the duration," are radically dependent on religious and
C Q
F. A. Harper, "Property and Its Primary Form," in Property in 
a Humane Economy, ed. by Samuel L. Blumenfeld (LaSalle, 111.: Open
Court Publishing Co., 1974), p. 16.
60-.,Ibid.
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moral presuppositions. The subjectivist and objectivist, of course, 
"face the same problem of how we shall deal with one another here and 
now;" but, because of different presuppositions about value, creation, 
and the nature of the good, they come to different conclusions. Ste­
wardship presuppositions and conclusions relate to the here and now, 
not some other dimension as Harper would have us believe.
Harper continues his "argument" against the relevancy of biblical 
principles by dragging in a familiar red herring: the question of
dictating values.
If the view is held that all belongs to the Creator, for 
instance, and that it cannot belong exclusively to you 
as an individual, such a limitation of your powers of 
ownership of created property would hardly give you a 
license to dictate to other human beings what they may 
or may not use during their lives; or what they may or 
i  their claim on property at the time of
Whether or not this is true, it is irrelevant; the political-philoso­
phical question of a justification for dictatorial pronouncements is 
not the issue. Harper, however, concludes, on the basis of one red 
herring and his confused idea of "another dimension," that biblical 
principles of stewardship are ruled out as a justification for limited 
property rights.
So for the purpose of our present discussion, I would 
prefer to avoid completely this interesting theological 
question. And if someone should contend that all cre­
ation belongs to the Creator, and that we function only
^Ibid., pp. 16-17.
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as His tenants, perhaps we can at least speak of property 
and ownership as being at a lower - but real - level of 
dealings of persons with one another . . . .  We could 
then go on with our discussion of the problem, using 
terms for a common problem that faces atheists and 
religious members of our earthly society alike.^2
And what is the conclusion of "our present discussion" now that 
the "religious members" supposedly have been convinced that their 
"interesting theological question" is not relevant to the justifica­
tion of individual property rights at a "lower-but-real-level?"
Not surprisingly, Harper concludes with the secular position: 
the individual, rather than God, is the absolute owner.
The primary object of property and ownership which ante­
dates all others and is superior to all others in its 
importance is self. It seems to me that all other items 
are secondary to this . . . .
The origin of all economic property and claims to
ownership, then, is to be found in self-ownership of
persons and thence on to derived and valid claims to 
all other forms of property. He acquires these other 
things, in part, by using his own labor to "create" ^
something from the tools made available to us by Creation.
Contrary to this secular, individualist theory which reasons 
that ownership determines and validates use of property, a steward­
ship theory reasons in the exact reverse direction. Proper use of 
property determines valid stewardship. This biblical direction of 
reasoning is also found to predominate in the thinking of the Church
with few exceptions. A. J. Carlyle finds this line of reasoning in
St. Augustine:
62Ibid., p. 17.
63Ibid., pp. 19, 21.
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. . .  he maintains that the right of property is limited 
by the use to which it is put, a man who does not use his 
property rightly has no real or valid claim to it.64
Carlyle also notes the similar reasoning of St. Thomas on the relative
rights of individuals:
private rights cannot override the common right of man­
kind to the necessaries of life . . . .  temporal pos­
sessions are indeed private as regards ownership, but 
not as regards their use: as regards use, so far as
they are superfluities, they belong to others who have 
need of t h e m . 6 5
In addition, H. G. Wood finds a similar view in the non-Puritan groups 
of the Reformation and the Evangelical Revival of the 18th and 19th 
centuries:
only a good use of property confers a moral right to it, 
and . . . this moral right is deeper than any legal right, 
is indeed the standard by which any legal right may be 
questioned or revised.66
And finally, Carl F. H. Henry argues that property rights derive
neither from the individual nor from the state.
Private property . . .  is not an institution to be 
authorized by the state but an inalienable right 
divinely conferred upon mankind . . . .  The Church 
has no mandate to impose spiritual imperatives . . . .
But the Church is obliged to proclaim those revealed
*^A. J. Carlyle, "The Theory of Property in Mediaeval Theology," 
in Property: Its Duties and Rights, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1922), p. 131.
^Ibid. , p. 1 37.
^H. G. Wood, "The Influence of the Reformation on Ideas Con­
cerning Wealth and Property," in Property: Its Duties and Rights,
p. 175.
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principles which government must promote and men must 
observe for the sake of a just society. ^
The Church, and others, have indeed spoken out on proper prin­
ciples and our legal institution of property rights does exhibit 
limitations on individual property rights for the sake of a just 
society. One such limitation which directly affects the so-called 
right of self-ownership is that individuals are not allowed to sell 
themselves or their children into slavery. Besides this single 
example, there is the broad area of limitations on individual prop­
erty rights commonly called the "police powers" of the state which 
are exerted for the "health, safety, and well-being of the people."00 
The governing principle of the police power of the state (compen­
sation not compelled) in contrast to a "taking" by the state (com­
pensation compelled) is found in the following statement by the 
Supreme Court (1876):
Property does become clothed with a public interest when 
used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and 
affect the community at large. When, therefore, one 
devotes his property to a use in which the public has 
an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an 
interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled 
by the public for the common good, to the extent of the 
interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant
6 7
Carl F. H. Henry, "Christian Perspective on Private Property," 
in Property in a Humane Economy, ed. by Samuel L. Blumenfeld (LaSalle, 
111.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974), p. 28.
68Thomas James Norton, The Constitution of the United States 
(New York: Committee for Constitutional Government, 1943), p. 95.
by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains 
the use he must submit to the control.69
These few examples of existing limitations on individual property 
rights are not meant to demonstrate that our legal institution of 
property rights is based on a theory of stewardship. They are, 
however, meant to show that individual property rights are not 
conceived as absolute but limited.
CONCLUSION
The differences between subjective and objective theories of value 
are substantial. The subjective theory of neoclassical economics 
locates the source of value in the individual's tastes and pref­
erences; that which is valuable is that which satisfies the individ­
ual's desires. In contrast, a stewardship theory presupposes an 
objective theory of value. A biblically based stewardship theory 
would locate the source of value in an objectively good creation as 
created and sustained by God.
It was argued that the objective value of creation is not an 
unknowable entity. Quite the contrary, the biblical theory of human­
kind as stewards presupposes our capability to discern good and proper 
functions, relations and uses of creation. The theory argues, more­
over, that at least the basic principles for proper stewardship are 
revealed in the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures. It remains the theologi­
cal and philosophical task of mankind to flesh out a more distinct
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theory and ethic of stewardship; to identify the proper functions and 
uses of creation; to balance conflicting objective values. In short, 
to exercise creaturely dominion over creation.
How well have we done; how well has economic theory done? It 
is the contention of this dissertation that the subjective theory of 
value of neoclassical economics is neither compatible with nor condu­
cive to the development of an objective theory of stewardship. In 
addition, it is contended that absolute, unattenuated property rights 
do not provide for stewardship, but rather as we learn to exercise 
proper dominion we will put limits on our property rights as we 
already have on our personal and social relationships.
Stewardship does not agree that values are only subjective; that 
they are reducible to personal preferences. Consequently, it rejects 
Pareto optimality as a sufficient or necessary criterion for the best 
allocation of natural resources. Nor does it accept the related 
conclusion that natural resources will be optimally allocated when 
individuals have well defined and exchangeable property rights. 
Stewardship thus rejects the fundamental, normative conclusions of 
neoclassical natural resource economic theory; a theory that is
appealing, however, to those who only recognize the need to resolve
69
conflicts in individuals' subjective valuations. For conflicts 
69Gordon C. Bjork, Life, Liberty and Property (Lexington, Mass.: 
Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Co., 1980), pp. 7-8, for example, 
recognizes social, ethical conflicts in land-use decisions, but con­
cludes that exchangeable property rights will solve the problem. He 
says, "The most fundamental questions in land-use planning are about 
who should benefit . . . and who should lose. They are questions 
about equity . . . .  [but] there is no social consensus about how
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over innocuous tastes and preferences competitive markets function 
well (with a few well recognized exceptions). But for the more impor­
tant conflicts between individuals over objective valuations, compet­
itive markets and neoclassical theory are inadequate and misleading.^ 
To resolve these conflicts, stewardship points to the requirement of 
a double criteria of proper ends and economically efficient means to 
achieve them. The criterion of proper ends will mean limits, duties 
and obligations, besides rights, on the part of mankind as stewards 
of property. Proper ends function to recognize and incorporate objec­
tive value into the process of managing all of creation and allocating 
parts of it as natural resources. They are part of the process of 
defining what in creation is and is not a natural resource; what will 
and will not enter the market place for allocation to human produc­
tion and consumption.
land should be used . . . .  The problem to be solved is the recon­
ciliation of those inevitable conflicts of interest . . . .  The 
establishment of clearly defined and transferable property rights to 
the use of resources is the important element in the reconciliation 
of conflicts of interest."
^The environmentalist who disagrees with the idea that compet­
itive markets will optimally allocate natural resources is usually 
accused, by the economist, of being ignorant of economics. Indeed, 
it may be that the environmentalist understands better than the 
economist the subjective value premises supporting that persuasive 
word, "optimal."
CHAPTER 5
A COMPARISON OF NEOCLASSICAL AND STEWARDSHIP 
THEORIES ON THE QUESTION OF ENDANGERED SPECIES 
AND EXTINCTION
In the previous chapter we argued in fairly general terms that 
the subjective value premises of neoclassical economics were incom­
patible with the objective value premises of a stewardship theory.
The typical result of this incompatibility is the inability of the 
neoclassical theory to resolve conflicts between economic efficiency 
and equity or ethics - other than subjective ethics. The neoclassi­
cal economist is equipped to determine the optimal outcome when the 
tradeoffs are between subjective values, but cannot incorporate objec­
tive values (usually and erroneously referred to as ethics) into the 
welfare analysis. In this chapter the fundamental differences between 
neoclassical and stewardship theory are examined in the context of 
a specific and currently relevant problem: the debate over endan­
gered species and their extinction. First, the neoclassical theory 
of optimal allocation and extinction of renewable resources is 
explained. Second, the question of extinction is examined from a 
stewardship perspective. Third, the Federal Endangered Species Act 
is evaluated in light of both theories.
NEOCLASSICAL THEORY 
The neoclassical concept of optimal allocation of natural 
resources is based on the familiar cost-benefit criterion of
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maximizing present values of net economic revenues. The criterion can 
be applied to both private and public resource decisions, although the 
relevant costs, benefits and discount rates are not necessarily the 
same in both situations. Private resource owners are normally con­
cerned only with internalized costs and benefits, whereas public 
resource managers are presumably concerned with social costs and 
benefits. In addition, there may be reasons for a social rate of 
discount that is different in value from a private rate.'*'
Regardless of ownership (public agency or private), a fundamental
aspect of the theory is that the resource owner views the resource as
an investment or capital asset. The resource is managed so that it
earns at least the "normal" (opportunity cost) rate of return,
otherwise the resource may be disposed of (e.g., sold, extinguished,
or even abandoned). This conclusion is usually credited to Hotelling
although others before him, such as Lewis C. Gray, had developed the
o
theory but not the math.
The question that we are interested in is whether or not it is 
ever optimal to deplete a renewable resource to extinction. The 
theory argues that, given certain conditions and functional relation­
ships between the rate of depletion, initial stock of the resource,
"'’The terms "interest rate" and "discount rate" always refer to 
real rates.
^H. Hotelling, "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources," Journal 
of Political Economy 39 (1931), pp. 137-75. Lewis Cecil Gray, "The 
Economic Possibilities of Conservation," Quarterly Journal of Economics 
27 (1913), pp. 497-519.
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price, cost, renewal rate and discount rate, it will be optimal to 
harvest a renewable resource to extinction. It is sometimes pointed 
out, however, that this may not be the ethical thing to do; never­
theless, no guidance or theory has been developed to reconcile this 
conflict of criteria or values. For example, Colin Clark says,
The technical sense in which the term ’optimal' is used 
here should be emphasized . . . extinction is the optimal 
harvest policy only because it leads to the largest present 
value of economic revenues. We are certainly not sugges­
ting that the deliberate extinction of a species is socially 
or aesthetically desirable just because extinction appears 
to be the most profitable course of action.^
What are the conditions under which it is optimal to harvest a 
renewable resource (animal or plant specie) to extinction? In devel­
oping the answer to this question, the theory has grown from its early 
beginnings in Hotelling's 1931 article and a 1954 article by Gordon 
on a common property resource: the fishery.^ Gordon, using a static
equilibrium model rather than the present value maximization model, 
concluded that a common property renewable resource will tend to be 
harvested at the rate where total revenue equals total cost.^ This 
rate may or may not lead to extinction depending on the relationship 
(or more precisely the ratio) of the cost of harvesting (extraction, 
catching) to the price of the resource. If costs were large enough
O
Colin W. Clark, Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Manage­
ment of Renewable Resources (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976),
p. 61.
^H. S. Gordon, "Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource:
The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy 62 (1954), pp. 124-42.
■’Gordon's model, of course, points to the inefficient (MR 4 MC) 
use of a common property resource.
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relative to price, for a given resource renewal rate, the resource 
would not be exhausted and vice versa. At very high costs relative 
to price the resource would not be harvested at all. Thus, some 
renewable "resources" might not be profitable enough to promote com­
mercial production: either because of relatively high extraction
cost or because of no demand at positive prices (e.g., sparrows, 
starlings, and snail darters). These conclusions are, of course, 
well known; what may be somewhat less well known is that privately 
owned or publicly managed renewable resources may also call for 
extinction as the optimal allocation. The conclusions of "optimal 
extinction" applies to both private and public management, but may 
be less likely with the latter due to the possibility of including 
social costs and benefits.
Clark and Munro, together with Smith,^ who expanded on the work of 
Gordon and Scott,^ have shown that a sole owner (whether private or 
government agency) with the goal of maximizing the present value of 
net revenues may find it optimal to harvest a renewable resource to 
extinction. If the discount rate is large enough relative to the 
renewal rate then extinction will be optimal. On the other hand,
^Colin W. Clark and G. R. Munro, "Economics of Fishing and 
Modern Capital Theory: A Simplified Approach," Journal of Environ­
mental Economics and Management 2 (1975), pp. 92-106; V. L. Smith, 
"Control Theory Applied to Natural and Environmental Resources," 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 4 (1977), pp. 1-24.
^H. S. Gordon, ibid.; Anthony D. Scott, "The Fishery: The
Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy 63 
(1955), pp. 116-24.
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the renewal rate could be large enough such that the resource would
be protected from extinction "even under free-access harvesting . . . .
This . . . explains why squirrels and rabbits are not likely candi-
8
dates for a list of endangered species."
Cropper, Lee and Pannu further expand on the work of Clark and
Munro by allowing the resource price to be inversely related to the 
9
rate of harvest. Thus, as the resource approaches extinction and
the rate of harvest decreases (presumably), the price rises. Their
results indicate that extinction is optimal only for sufficiently
small initial stocks of the resource. The economic sense of this is
that with a low initial stock, and a slow reproduction rate, the time
required for the stock to grow to a stable equilibrium is not worth
the cost. The authors further note:
The fact that the optimal policy depends on the initial 
stock means that the rate of interest does not play as 
important a role in the non-linear case. Indeed for 
sufficiently large stocks, extinction need not be optimal 
even if the discount rate is infinite.-*-®
Economically, this means that if it is not profitable to harvest the
resource at rates greater than the renewal rate then extinction will
®V. L. Smith, ibid., p. 10. 
q
M. L. Cropper, D. R. Lee, and S. S. Pannu, "The Optimal Extinc­
tion of a Renewable Natural Resource," Journal of Environmental Eco­
nomics and Management 6 (1979), pp. 341-49. Clark and Munro assumed 
net revenues to be a linear function of the rate of harvest.
10Ibid., p. 342.
136
not take place even with an infinite discount rate or, it might be
11
added, with open access to the resources.
The theory is developed a bit further in an article by Sinn,
wherein he reintroduces Ciriacy-Wantrup’s idea of a minimum viable 
12
population. (This is defined as the population size below which
extinction is likely to occur given current technological knowledge
13
and economic capabilities of species management.) Sinn shows that 
if it is profitable to harvest a resource below the minimum viable 
population then extinction is optimal even if the marginal cost of 
extraction approaches infinity as the resource approaches extinction. 
Since this conclusion is approaching the limits of economic useful­
ness; let me summarize these findings of neoclassical theory.
The optimal allocation of renewable resources may lead to ex­
tinction whether the resource is common property or privately owned 
or governmentally managed. Extinction is the optimal policy if it 
leads to the maximization of discounted net revenues. Whether or not 
extinction is the optimal policy for a particular resource depends on 
its renewal rate the discount rate, the profitability (a function 
of net revenues) as the resource is depleted, and the initial stock.
^Ibid., p. 346.
12
Hans-Werner Sinn, "The Economic Theory of Species Extinction: 
Comment on Smith," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
9 (1982), pp. 194-98. S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Resource Conservation. 
3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 38-40.
13As Ciriacy-Wantrup notes, this concept is open to a great deal 
of uncertainty as regards our knowledge and the economics of reversing 
the process of extinction.
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Other things remaining equal, and assuming profitability, if the 
renewal rate is low relative to the discount rate then extinction 
will be optimal. Extinction will also be optimal if it remains 
profitable to harvest below the minimum viable population or if the 
initial stock is low relative to the stable equilibrium size.
These conclusions apply equally well to both market determined
prices and costs and nonmarket valuations which might include
aesthetic, amenity and option values as part of the opportunity
14
cost of extinction. Other things equal, the inclusion of these 
additional social costs could change the optimal policy for particular 
resources from extinction to non-extinction; but they do not change 
the general conclusions: extinction is optimal if it maximizes dis­
counted net revenues. The inclusion of these nonmarket valuations 
is, of course, important if we are to correctly calculate the net 
revenues of a natural resource, but they do not necessarily preclude 
extinction. ^
It is also important to recall that these nonmarket values are 
based on subjective valuations (individual preferences) not on the 
notion of intrinsic or objective value. Aesthetic, amenity and option 
values are values that accrue to individuals - to our self-interest,
14For a summary discussion of amenity services and option value 
see John V. Krutilla and Anthony C. Fisher, The Economics of Natural 
Environments (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).
^This is an important point in relation to the Endangered Spe­
cies Act discussed below.
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satisfaction or subjective preferences. Subjective, human values are 
the only values that the neoclassical paradigm incorporates. Objec­
tive values are not denied by neoclassical theory, they are simply 
outside of its definition (assumption) of value. But there is the 
rub. Neoclassical economics is incapable of resolving or even addres­
sing problems of human choice that involve both subjective preferences 
and objective values. We have seen numerous examples of this, e.g., 
Clark's comment on extinction in terms of profitable versus desirable. 
In response to this problem economists are fond of pointing out that 
moral philosophers have yet to agree on the best moral theory of 
value.^ This is undoubtedly the case (and likely always will be), 
but this provides no reason for the accpetance of a subjective theory 
of value. Furthermore it provides economics no rationale for accept­
ing any particular theory of value as its own. If economics is to 
be a science of human choice with the goal of adding to human knowl­
edge about choices in terms of better and worse, then it has no legi­
timate business presupposing one particular theory of better and 
17
worse. Neoclassical economics has neither remained value-free nor
^ O n e  economist, Sidney Alexander, however, humorously calls into 
question the individualistic-utilitarian ethic of neoclassical econom­
ics. "Economists, and those who seek to honor economics, ai e fond of 
quoting Keynes' dictum that practical men are only the slave;? of some 
defunct economist. It may afford philosophers in turn some mischi­
evous amusement to see the power of defunct philosophies in economics 
and other social studies." Sidney S. Alexander, "Human Values and 
Economists' Values," in Human Values and Economic Policy, ed. by 
Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1967), p. 102.
17Recall, for example, Lionel Robbin's comments; see pp. 9-10.
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made it possible to analyze economic problems of human choice invol­
ving .subjective and objective values. When confronted with an eco­
nomic problem involving both values, the economist - as we have seen - 
has no solution. He defines an optimal solution and then says it may 
not be optimal if "other values" are included. If people make choices 
on the basis of both subjective preferences and "other values" then 
we can't expect neoclassical economics to determine optimal, efficient 
choices as long as it refuses to include these "other values" in its 
analysis. It is the contention of this dissertation that the resolu­
tion to this deficiency lies in the direction of neoclassical theory 
giving up its sole commitment to a subjective theory of value. (Philo­
sophers may not agree on the best theory of value, but it seems rea­
sonable that subjective relativism will not be their rallying point). 
This new direction requires economics to be able to analyze human 
choice in relation to or in the context of any theory of value. It
means that economics would be able to incorporate knowledge (however
18
tentative) from all related disciplines. One result will be the 
ability to analyze and suggest policy when human choices confront 
subjective and objective values. Let us see how this result is pos­
sible in the specific case of extinction and endangered species.
18This incorporation is currently happening in the relationship 
between economics and physics (and ecology). See, for example,
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
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STEWARDSHIP THEORY
The essence of an objective theory of value is that all value 
is not lodged in the satisfaction of human subjects. This is true 
whether the theory is based on religious or non-religious premises. 
Both bases reject subjective relativism as an acceptable general 
theory of value. Both postulate instead an objective moral universe 
wherein the satisfaction, or better yet, the true happiness of 
humans is one source of objective value (but also that some human 
"satisfactions" are of no objective value). They postulate a uni­
verse full of objective value and full of "valuers": things that
are not only instrumentally valuable, but also experience value or
19value their experiences. Apparently not all things in creation 
are "valuers" and perhaps not all things possess intrinsic value; 
this is certainly problematic. Regardless of the resolution of these 
problems, an objective theory of value is essentially different from 
the subjective theory adopted by neoclassical economics. It should 
not be surprising, therefore, that the two theories would at least 
on occasion disagree on what is best or worse in an economic analysis 
of human choice - resource allocation.
Neoclassical theory, under certain conditions, concludes that 
the optimal use of a renewable resource means its extinction. Would 
stewardship theory lead to a different conclusion? The answer to
19
See, for example, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New
Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review/
Random House, 1975); and Richard A. Watson, "Self-Consciousness and 
the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature," Environmental Ethics 1 
(Summer 1979), pp. 99-129.
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this question lies in the differences between the methods of analysis 
of neoclassical and stewardship theory. As we saw above neoclassical 
analysis is based on maximizing the present value of net revenues 
(value being determined subjectively). Stewardship analysis, al­
though it does not ignore individual preferences, is concerned with
20
the objective worth of those preferences. Satisfying individual 
preferences is objectively valuable if the preferences are objec­
tively worthy of satisfaction.
It is, presumably, still a commonplace that not all of our pref­
erences are worthwhile either for ourselves or for the rest of society. 
Some of our preferences are so unworthy that we (family, or society) 
inflict punishment on each other when we try to satisfy them. The 
punishment may be as mild as a sumptuary tax on liquor or a ban on 
pornography or as strong as incarceration for cruelty to animals and 
draft evasion or even capital punishment for rape and treason. On the 
other hand, some preferences are considered meritorious and have led 
at least one economist, Richard Musgrave, to introduce the idea of 
"merit goods."
. . . observation of budget policy suggests many instances 
where the very intent of the decision maker appears to be 
to interfere with or override individual preferences. Thus, 
sumptuary taxes are imposed on liquor because the consump­
tion thereof is held undesirable, or low-cost housing is 
subsidized because decent housing for the poor is held
^ T h e  worth or value of things, such as our preferences, can be 
a question of either moral or nonmoral values (or perhaps both). For 
example, truth telling is morally valuable and lying is morally dis- 
valuable, whereas a moderate diet is nonmorally valuable and gluttony 
is nonmorally disvaluable.
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desirable . . . .  The issue now under consideration, 
therefore, must not be confused with the distinction 
between private and social goods itself. Certain 
.goods are held meritorious (they are considered 'merit 
goods’) while others are held undesirable . . . .  when 
interpreted as imposition of preferences of the ruling 
group or decision makers, allocation on a merit-good 
basis stands outside what has been dealt with here as 
the theory of social goods. In all these cases it is 
evident, however, that interference may apply with 
regard to private goods (e.g., pornography) no less 
than to what we have defined as social goods. The 
social- and merit-good problems must therefore be 
distinguished.
Musgrave's idea of merit (and "demerit") goods has not caught on with
neoclassical economists. This is not surprising since the idea is
that some "goods" are truly good and other "goods" are actually bad.
This idea of merit goods, as Musgrave is careful to explain, is not
to be confused with public or social goods which neoclassical theory 
22recognizes. Therefore, neoclassical theory has made no room for
21Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in 
Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1973),
pp. 65-66.
OO
Merit goods, when they are even mentioned in public finance 
texts, are often explained (away?) as a type of public good in spite 
of Musgrave's careful explanation that he thought otherwise. See, 
for example, Werner Z. Hirsch, The Economics of State and Local Gov­
ernment (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 12: "Merit goods involve
interdependencies in utility functions . . . ."or see Ansel M. Sharp 
and Bernard F. Sliger, Public Finance (Austin: Business Publications,
1970), p. 18, where merit goods are merely a way of redistributing 
income: "Another category of public goods and services is merit
goods . . . .  These public goods are provided for the expressed 
purpose of enhancing the economic well-being of specific individuals 
or groups . . . .  Public merit goods and services must be defended 
on another ground-equity in the distribution of goods and services 
. . . .  an admitted interference with the distribution of income 
which otherwise would exist."
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goods or preferences which purport to be objectively good or bad.
It cannot compare a subjective value with an objective one. Nor can 
Pareto optimality, based as it is on the assumption that the indivi­
dual is better off in a chosen position, incorporate objective 
positions. And yet, it is not necessary for economics to assume 
that all preferences are equally worthy of being satisfied and thus 
"taken as given." Furthermore, although this assumption may be 
praised for its tolerance, it does not (as Little has clearly shown) 
mean that economics is value-free, tolerant; "yes;" value-free, "no."
Stewardship, on the other hand, need not be intolerant or author­
itarian. The notion of objective value in creation does not logically 
lead to a "stewardship elite" who will tell the rest of us what has 
objective value and what doesn't. But stewardship theory does force 
us to evaluate economic decisions, such as the extinction of another 
specie in a broader value context. As we will see, extinction may 
indeed be the optimal allocation according to stewardship, but the 
analysis hardly resembles that of neoclassical theory.
For extinction of a specie to be optimal, the objective value of 
the specie would have to be less than the objective value sacrificed 
to preserve it. How do we determine the objective value of a specie 
and of the goods and services that would be sacrificed if the specie 
were preserved? The problem is how should we allow for trade offs 
when the things being traded (sacrificed) are both objectively val­
uable? We are faced with the difficult question of ends and how a 
society ought to determine them. We are, so to speak, at the
interface of economics, ethics, religion and political theory, to 
name only a few. The function of a stewardship theory is not to 
resolve the fundamental questions of these disciplines. Its function 
is to help us integrate; to show us the need to integrate knowledge 
from various disciplines in order to make better decisions and policy. 
Its function is to help us discern between ends and means. When neo­
classical theory, for example, analyzes extinction it places it in 
the category of means, the accepted end is maximizing discounted net 
revenues. Stewardship theory, however, argues that extinction of a 
specie is a good candidate for objective valuation: is it a worthy
end? The question: "How should society determine whether or not
extinction is a worthy end?" is a fundamental question for religion, 
ethics and political theory. That does not mean the question is 
irrelevant to economics and stewardship, far from it. It simply 
identifies where we must look for knowledge on the subject. For 
the purposes of this dissertation I will accept the fact that in the 
United States democratic solutions are preferred to authoritarian 
ones. Furthermore, the more important the end in question, the more 
we tend to call for full democratic participation, whereas ends of 
lesser importance are more likely to be determined by representative 
democracy. Where the question of specie extinction lies on this 
continuum of ends is neither clear, nor my major concern. Rather,
I want to show how we might proceed with an objective valuation of 
a specie in a democratic process.
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The crucial point is to construct an evaluation process wherein 
objective-intrinsic values are appraised, rather than subjective tastes 
and preferences. We want to determine and compare the objective value 
of the specie with the objective value of the alternatives (e.g., 
goods and services). The obvious way not to do this is to ask people 
how much they would be willing to pay to preserve the specie. Why is 
this obviously wrong? We certainly have a problem of tradeoffs, and 
economic theory of scarcity and opportunity costs helps us to see that. 
But "willingness to pay" solutions ask people to think and compare in 
terms of subjective not objective values. Although no mechanism will 
guarantee that we rationally try to determine the objective value of 
a specie with whatever would have to be sacrificed for its preserva­
tion, trying to put a monetary value on these things seems likely to 
promote subjective valuations. A better procedure might be to com­
pare the alternatives in real terms. That is, compare the specie 
with the actual goods and services that would be sacrificed for specie 
preservation. For example, preserving a specie, such as the snail 
darter, might mean a smaller dam or a more expensive location, or 
some other alternative that would raise electricity rates. Rather 
than comparing those increased rates with "willingness to pay" esti­
mates, compare the specie with real sacrifices due to those higher 
rates. Perhaps the higher rates would mean sacrificing television 
for one hour per day; or not using electric appliances such as can 
openers, knives and toothbrushes. The point is to design the analysis 
so that we try to evaluate the intrinsic goodness of two competing
ends. We are not interested in the subjective value that we place 
upon the specie, but rather in the intrinsic value that the specie 
has as a part of creation. If we decide to sacrifice a specie it 
should be as clear as possible to us what objective values we have 
lost and gained.
Stewardship is not a theory concocted to preserve nonhuman spe­
cies, wilderness, etc. Nor is it designed with a logic or mechanism 
(criterion) that defines and guarantees that we make right choices - 
it does not promise optimality (Pareto or otherwise). It does how­
ever make the choice process aware that subjective preferences and 
objective value are different and may conflict. When theydo conflict, 
the institutional mechanisms (the market, property rights, etc.) for
making choices may need changing if the ends (objective values)
23involved are important enough. To recognize conflicts and make 
institutional changes requires knowledge of what is good and valuable 
(morally and nonmorally) in creation and in our lives. This is not 
the task of any single discipline; nor is it unrelated to economics 
(and especially so since neoclassical economists enter the debate 
armed with their subjective criterion of efficiency).
23We allow the market exchange process to be our institutional 
mechanism for making many choices that are clearly a matter of sub­
jective valuations (from chocolate ice cream to Chevrolets), but we 
put limits on this institution when the "goods" partake of objective 
value. It is curious that economic theory has done so little work 
in differentiating subjective and objective goods, i.e., determining 
the proper domain of market exchange.
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Economics as a science of human choice has a long history of 
affiliation with moral philosophy, religion and political theory. 
Classical, medieval and ancient political economy are the sources 
for an economic perspective on stewardship. Indeed, stewardship 
theory is quite vulnerable to the charge that it is merely ancient 
political economy in disguise. A "political economy awakening," 
however, does not require abandoning the analytical progress of 
neoclassical theory. The problems of stewarding creation in the 
20th century are not going to be answered by giving up useful 
analytical techniques, but rather by learning when and when not to 
use them. It remains to be seen whether or not neoclassical theory 
will see the reasons for giving up its superficial positivistic 
approach and its underlying normative theory of subjective moral 
relativism.
THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
The differences and the benefits of a stewardship versus neo­
classical approach to the question of species extinction can be
24
further exposed by examining the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
The ESA and related literature show some rather confused, ambiguous 
thinking about values. Consequently, the purpose, implementation 
and amendments to the act are unclear. Much of this confusion can 
be traced to the failure to understand and distinguish between the
2416 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 and Supp. Ill 1979); Pub. L. 
93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973).
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subjective valuation of neoclassical economic theory and the objec­
tive valuation of a stewardship theory. Due to this failure, the act 
is unclear on how endangered species are to be valued and compared to 
the proposed projects which threaten their existence.
In December 1973 the ESA became law apparently with the major 
premise,
. . . echoed by increasing puMic outcry in recent years 
. . . that wildlife are valuable national resources and 
that the extinction of an increasing number of species 
in the name of progress must be stopped. Presumably, 
while most congressional supporters of the act must have 
felt that the needs of wildlife were valid considerations, 
it is doubtful that many meant for wildlife to be the only 
consideration. Yet §7 of the Act seems to do just that in 
that it precludes all federal agencies from 'authorizing, 
funding or carrying out' anything that may 'jeopardize' 
an endangered or threatened species, irrespective of any 
and all other considerations.*5
Lachenmeier has thus identified part of the confusion: did the Con­
gress actually intend preservation of a specie to preclude any and 
all conflicting goals; that there should be no weighing and balancing 
of the value of preservation with the opportunities sacrificed? This
particular question was supposedly resolved with the 1978 amendments
26
to the ESA which established a procedure and a committee to weight
^Rudy R. Lachenmeier, "The Endangered Species Act of 1973: 
Preservation or Pandemonium?" Environmental Law 5 (1974), p. 29.
26The committee is composed of at least seven members: Secre­
taries of Agriculture, Army, and Interior; Chairman of the Council 
of Economic Advisors; Administrators of the Environmental Protec­
tion Agency, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; 
and one individual from each affected State.
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the benefits of preservation with the benefits of the proposed pro- 
27ject. The amendments indicate that a weighing of benefits is to 
take place, but confusion remains because of the ambiguity of "bene­
fits." Does this mean benefits as determined by individual pref­
erences or does it mean objective benefits (i.e., the intrinsic value 
of the specie existing and the intrinsic worth of the project’s goods 
and services)? The amendments resolve the question of whether or not 
balancing ought to take place (it should), but the more fundamental 
vagueness remains. Indeed, the differences between subjective and 
objective values are confused by Lachenmeier when he says that the 
major premise of the act is that "wildlife are valuable national 
resources," (subjective or objective?) and that the congressional 
supporters of the act took as valid considerations "the needs of 
wildlife" (presumably objective). In fairness to Lachenmeier, and 
to others who easily speak of "economic values" and "ecological 
values" the ESA itself falls victim to this prevalent ambiguity.
For example, the act reads:
The Congress finds and declares that . . . these species 
of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, 
educational, historical, recreational and scientific value 
to the Nation and its people . . .  .28
The committee will grant an exemption to a project ("agency 
action") if five of the seven members determine that - "(i) there 
are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of 
alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the species 
or its critical habitat, and such action is in the public interest; 
and (iii) the action is of regional or national significance . . . ." 
16 U.S.C. § 1536 (h) (Supp. Ill 1979).
2816 U.S. C. § 1531 (1976).
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What are these values; are they subjective or objective? Does "value
to the Nation and its people" mean objective-intrinsic value of the
specie or simply "social value," which is recognized by neoclassical
economics? Even "ecological value" can easily be understood to mean
the subjective value of a specie as it performs a life support func-
29
tion in man's environment. If these values refer to human bene­
fits then the ESA is far less radical than some feared and others 
hoped. If the benefits that the committee is to weigh are purely 
subjective then neoclassical resource economics will prove of good 
service. For the ESA would simply be forcing the inclusion of all 
social values into a cost-benefit analysis. This neoclassical eco­
nomists know how to do. But is this the actual intent of the act? 
Even though the language can be interpreted to mean only subjective 
values, section 1536 of the 1973 unamended act suggests otherwise. 
This part of the act directs all Federal departments and agencies to:
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the pur­
poses of this chapter by carrying out programs for 
the conservation of endangered species and threatened 
species listed . . . and by taking such action necessary 
to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried 
out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence 
of such endangered species and threatened species or 
result in the destruction or modification of habitat 
of such species . . . .30
29For a discussion of terms such as "ecological values' in rela- 
tion to subjective and objective values see, for example, John N. 
Martin, "The Concept of the Irreplaceable," Environmental Ethics 1 
(Spring 1979), pp. 31-48; and Holmes Rolston, III, "Values in Nature," 
Environmental Ethics 3 (Summer 1981), pp. 113-28.
3016 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976).
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This section of the act, with its apparent absolute proscription
against jeopardizing the existence of endangered species, went
through various litigations with mixed results. The final decision
by the United States Supreme Court in TVA vs. Hill established the
intent of the ESA to be the absolute proscription of interferences
31with endangered species that would result in their extinction.
Since the original act had no procedure for weighing benefits, abso­
lute proscription meant just that - there was no appeal to overriding 
benefits of a project. This fact was, of course, the undoing of the 
original act and it was subsequently amended.
The amended ESA is more reasonable than the original because it 
recognizes that endangered species are not of infinite value (either 
subjectively or objectively). Preserving species means some alterna­
tive opportunities will not be preserved. Preserving a particular 
specie may actually require the sacrifice of another specie. The 
amended ESA thus recognizes the economic problems of scarcity and 
opportunity cost. But has it recognized the nature of "objective 
opportunity cost?" Has it worded the amendments carefully enough to 
do what seems to have been its original intent?
32
If the original intent was to protect otherwise uneconomical 
species from extirpation, then the ambiguities of the terms
■^David B. Stromberg, "The Endangered Species Act of 1973: Is
the Statute Itself Endangered?" Environmental Affairs 6 (1978), 
p. 533.
32This is Stromberg*s conclusion and he notes that had the 
Supreme Court not decided in favor of "absolute proscription" and 
had allowed a benefit-cost approach," . . .  a 3-inch fish could
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33"benefits," used in the amendments, and "values," used in the 
original act, will make it difficult to preserve that intent. The 
common sense interpretation of the "benefits" referred to in the 
amendments is the standard benefit-cost notion. If "benefits" is 
supposed to mean something else, for instance, something like intrin­
sic value then we should expect to see a clear explanation of this 
fact since intrinsic value is not the common sense meaning of "bene­
fits." But no such explanation appears. Regardless of the intent 
of the amendments the results are very confusing and future liti­
gation over the function of the committee is virtually certain.
It seems reasonable to speculate that the original act was 
designed to protect endangered species by placing them above eco­
nomic consideration via a benefit-cost study. Indeed, this was 
the final conclusion of subsequent litigation over the ESA's alleged 
economic hardship which found in favor of absolute proscription and 
led to the amendments in 1978. The amendments appear to call for a 
typical benefit-cost approach, albeit a very thorough one, which 
would be a radical departure from an intent of absolute proscription. 
Do these amendments actually represent such a fundamental change in 
Congress' intent to
never compete with a $90 million dam project, an 'unattractive and 
useless1 Furbish lousewart plant could not hope to survive against 
a $600 million project." Stromberg, ibid., pp. 532-33.
33See footnote 27 above.
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provide a program for the conservation of such endang­
ered species and threatened species . . . .  [because 
-some] have been rendered extinct as a consequence of 
economic growth and development untempered by adequate 
concern and conservation . . . . ^
It is more likely that this legislation is stumbling over the 
idea that things have value other than their value for satisfying 
human preferences. It is stumbling because we lack something like 
a theory of stewardship which differentiates between subjective and 
objective values in creation. The legislation has moved from one 
extreme to another; from giving endangered species infinite objec­
tive value to giving them no objective value and thus only subjective 
value. If the real intent of the ESA is to force us to recognize 
that we are stewards of a creation full of objective value and not 
merely managers of natural resources for human consumption, then it 
has failed and requires further amendments. The necessary amendments 
will have to clarify the belief that preserving species is one objec­
tive good (end) that has to be balanced with other objective goods. 
Choosing between conflicting objective goods is not accomplished with 
the standard economic benefit-cost analysis based on subjective pref­
erences. Objective goods are balanced on objective grounds: which
of the two conflicting good ends is the best, most desirable. This
-^16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976). For a discussion of the content of an 
environmental ethic that would represent an attitude of "adequate con­
cern and conservation," see, for example, J. Baird Callicott, "Ele­
ments of an Environmental Ethic: Moral Considerability and the Biotic
Community," Environmental Ethics 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 71-81; Charles 
Hartshorne, "The Rights of the Subhuman World," Environmental Ethics
1 (Spring 1979), pp. 49-60; and Don E. Marietta, Jr., "The Inter­
relationship of Ecological Science and Environmental Ethics," Environ­
mental Ethics 1 (Fall 1979), pp. 195-207).
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difficult question is not decided by asking people about their wil­
lingness to pay for subjective desires. It should be decided by 
human beings rationally comparing the intrinsic worth of each pro­
posed end. The comparison of ends is clearly a normative problem and 
it should not be mistaken or disguised as a positivistic economic 
one. Which human beings should participate in this determination of 
ends should depend on the importance of the ends. Some projects may 
have such a profound impact on creation that a referendum would be 
best. Others of lesser importance would probably be better suited to 
a congressional vote or perhaps simply a special committee. The 
committee as defined in the ESA, however, does not seem at all appro­
priate for weighing the religious and moral considerations of a 
specie's existence and human needs or wants. Why would any of the 
various Secretaries or Administrators on the committee be expected 
to have this kind of expertise or to speak for the stewardship ethic 
of the American people? If we are committed to a democratic process 
in the determination of stewardship ends (even though this does not 
guarantee the correct moral choice - no system does) then a small 
committee of administrative experts with no special knowledge of 
stewardship ethics seems to be ruled out. A congressional decision 
would probably be more representative, although not necessarily any 
better informed by a stewardship ethic.
Indeed, a stewardship ethic which recognizes the objective value 
of God's creation does not seem to describe the prevailing ethic 
of 20th century mankind. And yet, the ESA offers a small amount of
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hope that such an ethic Is emerging, albeit rather confused. To 
alleviate the confusion and ambiguity surrounding this particular 
act, future acts, and other institutional changes requires, among 
other things, an economic theory which recognizes and incorporates 
into its analysis of human choice and "optimal" resource allocation 
both subjective and objective values.
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